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Zusammenfassung 
!
Das Ziel dieser kumulativen Dissertation zum Thema der Nachhaltigkeit - spezialisiert auf die Fragestellung der 
Kapitalkonservierung im unternehmerischen und auch privaten Kontext - ist es, zu bestehenden Theorien und 
empirischen Forschungsarbeiten beizutragen. Kapitalkonservierung, also die nachhaltige Verwendung des 
“Rohstoffes” Kapital, ist für alle Bereiche des gesellschaftlichen Lebens von außerordentlicher Bedeutung und 
deckt ein Spektrum von Themen wie Kapitalausstattungen von Versicherungen bis hin zu individuellen 
Versicherungsentscheidungen ab. 
!
Die empirischen Studien mit unternehmerischem Fokus legen dabei den Schwerpunkt auf die Wirkung von 
Schwankungen in den Dividendenzahlungen auf zukünftige Erträge. Die dabei beobachteten Zusammenhänge 
werden im Anschluss, unter Berufung auf die Signaltheorie, auf die in den jeweiligen Märkten vorherrschenden 
Transparenzgrade zurückgeführt, was parallel auch in theoretischen Überlegungen vorhergesagt wird. 
!
Der zweite Teil der Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Fragestellung, inwieweit verschiedene Einflussfaktoren die 
Risikowahrnehmung von Individuen beeinflussen. Dabei wird insbesondere die Einführung der Pflegepflichtver-
sicherung in Deutschland 1995 als Faktor fokussiert. 
!
Zusammenfassend sind die folgenden Fragen Schwerpunkte der vorliegenden Arbeit: 
Teil I: 
• Wie können Versicherungsunternehmen in Krisenzeiten ihre Kapitalisierung stärken? 
• Haben gekürzte oder gestrichene Dividenden einen negativen Effekt auf die künftige Entwicklung? 
• Warum ist dieser Effekt nicht homogen in allen Rechtsräumen und Industrien beobachtbar?  
• Welchen Einfluss hat Transparenz auf die Dividendenpolitik von Unternehmen? 
Teil II: 
• Wie hat sich die Einführung der Pflegepflichtversicherung auf die Risikowahrnehmung von Privatpersonen 
ausgewirkt? 
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Abstract !
The aim of this dissertation thesis is to contribute to existing theories and empirical research with respect to 
sustainability. Throughout the thesis the broad term sustainability is understood as the special case of capital 
conservation, i.e. the sustainable use of the “resource” capital. This is of utmost importance for all fields of 
societal life and covers a range from capital adequacy of insurance companies to individual insurance decisions. 
!
The empirical studies on corporate questions in this thesis focus on the impact of variation in dividend policy on 
future earnings. The observed dependencies are subsequently explained by variations in the transparency of the  
applicable legal regime for the respective markets. In parallel this is predicted by an extension to existing 
signalling theories.  
!
The second part of this thesis deals with the question how different triggers or factors influence individual’s risk 
perception. As one main focus serves the 1995 introduction of an obligatory long-term care insurance scheme 
in Germany.  
!
To briefly recap, the following questions are key aspects of the thesis at hand: 
Part I: 
• How can insurance companies recapitalise in times of crisis? 
• Do cut or even discarded dividend payments a measurable effect on future development? 
• Why is this effect not observed homogeneously throughout all legal regimes and industries? 
• What is the impact of transparency on corporate dividend policy? 
Part II: 
• How did the introduction of a public long-term care insurance scheme impact individual’s risk assessment 
or risk perception? 
• May the expected loss be a major driver for risk perception, possibly even on par or more important than 
the assessment of loss probabilities? 
!
Keywords: 
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!
Sustainability and capital conservation in corporate and individual finance 
!
!
This year - 2013 - the term sustainability (“Nachhaltigkeit” in german) commemorates its 300th anniversary. Ever 
since it was originally coined in 1713 by Hans-Carl von Carlowitz  in the context of forestry, it was used with a 1
wide range of connotations.  
!
Carlowitz was originally inspired by observations he made during the wood market crisis, working at the court of 
Augustus the Strong, as well as during his 5 year lasting travels through Europe, where he witnessed the strict 
forestry policies of Jean Baptiste Colbert in France. Saxony was a region of high mining activity with an even 
higher demand for wood. Mining tunnels, drilling deeper and deeper into the mountains to extract precious silver 
and iron ores needed stabilizing constructions. Insatiable smelting furnaces pushed that demand even further, 
resulting in large deforestations.  
A similar observation of reckless exploitation of natural resources was made even 200 years before Carlowitz 
introduced a term for a counter-strategy. In his Iudicium Iovis , published in the 1490s in Leipzig, Paul 2
Schneevogel (his latinized name later being Paul Niavis) tells a tale about an eremite witnessing the trial of a 
mining worker in front of the court of antique gods, the charge being “rape of mother earth by penetration of her 
intestines”. In his allegory Paul Niavis even uses the linguistic latin predecessors sustentare and conservare, 
describing the function of the earth, which is threatened by the severe interferences in the wake of the silver 
mining rush that started in the second half of the 15th century.  
This motive can also be found in yet another classic, celebrating its 500th birthday this very year. In his book 
“The prince”, first distributed in 1513, Niccolo Machiavelli states: 
!
“But from want of foresight men make changes which relishing well at first do not betray their 
hidden venom, as I have already observed respecting hectic fever.”  3
!
About 200 years after this observation, massive industrial mining lead to peaks in wood prices and as a 
consequence to increased deforestations to meet the demand. Carlowitz deemed this behavior to be fueled 
only by greed and short-sightedness. This inspired him to write the sylvicultura oeconomica, his treatise about 
sustainable forestry, where he defines a preferential strategy: 
!
“Wird derhalben die größte Kunst/Wissenschaft/Fleiß und Einrichtung hiesiger Lande darinnen 
beruhen / wie eine sothane Conservation und Anbau des Holtzes anzustellen / daß es eine 
 Sylvicultura oeconomica - Carl von Carlowitz - 17131
 Iudicium Iovis oder Das Gericht der Götter über den Bergbau: ein literarisches Dokument aus der Frühzeit des deutschen Bergbaus - Paul Niavis - Akademie-2
Verlag Berlin, Freiberger Forschungshefte, D3 - 1953
 The Prince - Niccolo Machiavelli - Chapter XIII, No. 8, The Harvard Classics 1909-143
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continuierliche beständige und nachhaltende Nutzung gebe / weiln es eine unentberliche Sache 
ist / ohne welche das Land in seinem Esse nicht bleiben mag.“  4
!
This is the first known text passage where the term “nachhaltend” was used with this notion and is the 
beginning of an evolution of a key phrase far beyond forestry. But while “sustainability” was initially referring to 
sound cultivation and lumbering of forests, reflecting the self-evident principle you cannot extract more wood 
from a forest than what grows back again, recent usage of the term is usually describing a more abstract 
concept. 
!
If nowadays someone uses the term “sustainability” or “sustained”, he is usually referring to the capacity of a 
development to endure (see below). Since the second half of the 20th century the term was rediscovered by a 
rising ecological movement. The United Nations started dealing with ecological concerns of the international 
community. A major milestone in this regard was the definition of “sustainable development” in the “Brundtland-
Report” by the Brundtland Commission (formally known as World Commission on Environment and 
Development - WCED) in 1987: 
!
"[...] sustainable development, which implies meeting the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, should become a central 
guiding principle of the United Nations, Governments and private institutions, organisations  and 
enterprises"  5
!
At the time memories of Chernobyl and several other man-made catastrophes across the globe were still fresh 
and the need for sustainable (ecological) development was well perceived and supported by the wide public.  
A couple of years later, in 1992, the UN held the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. One of its global landmark 
results was drafting a non-binding, voluntary action plan, the agenda 21 with regard to sustainable 
development. Also the Commission on Sustainable Development was installed in accordance with chapter 38 of 
agenda 21.  Other landmark discussions were initiated in this forum as well, as was an agreement on the 6
Climate Change Convention, eventually resulting in the Kyoto protocol in 1997 (going into force in 2005). 
Interestingly, closing the circle spanning centuries, that very conference also published a document, the forest 
principles, giving several recommendations for sustainable forestry, as Carl von Carlowitz envisioned nearly 300 
years before.  
!
 Sylvicultura oeconomica - Carl von Carlowitz - pages 105-106 - 1713 -  Loose translation: “Therefore the most pressing art/science/effort of these lands will 4
entail / to ensure a conservation and cultivation of wood / that there is a continuous and sustainable utilization / because it is essential / and without it the nature 
can not stay in good form.”
 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development - United Nations - General Assembly Resolution 42/187 - 19875
 Institutional arrangements to follow up the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development - United Nations - General Assembly Resolution 6
47/191 - 1993
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!
!
From that moment the word “sustainable” was used inflationary as can be seen in the graph below. Looking at 7
the phrase’s occurrence in german and english literature, its usage in both languages seems to have grown 
exponentially between the 1990s till 2005. In 1998 the german word for “sustainable” (“nachhaltig”) was even in 





Even though since the 1980s the usage of “sustainability” was strongly associated with environmental and green 
policies, the term is of economical rather than ecological heritage. This ecological framing is probably due to a 
lot of pressing situations, where natural resources are the scarce quantity to be optimally - i.e. sustainably - 
utilized. Actually, while one of the major intents of economics is the "allocation of a scarce resource" (think 
sovereign budgets on health, defense or education), this is not capturing the full scope of economic thought. 
Rather allocation of a scarce resource over a given time horizon, capturing the dynamic nature of all economic 
decisions, is appropriate. If economics is understood likewise, the term "sustainability" is of primarily economic 
nature. This economic facet of sustainability, a trade-off between short-term profits and long-term growth, can 
be quantitatively interpreted as a trade-off between expected value and variance. Any actor might sacrifice some 
expected value (not reaping short-term profits decreases the expected value as they would receive a weight of 
about 1 in the calculation) to smooth out the future growth path. How this applies to the different actors of 
interest will be explicated below. 
!
This is the interpretation of "sustainability" I will refer to throughout this introductory text, connecting the 
superficially distinct spheres of dividend policy of financial institutions and long-term care insurance coverage 
decisions of individuals by the common theme of minimizing the long-run negative impact  on a scarce resource 




Figure 1: Frequency of the usage of the terms “Sustainability” and its german origin “Nachhaltigkeit” from 1700 till today
 Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books  - Michel*, Shen, Aiden, Veres, Gray, Brockman, The Google Books Team, Pickett, Hoiberg, 7
Clancy, Norvig, Orwant, Pinker, Nowak and Aiden* - Science, 331(6014) - p. 176-182 - 2010
 It ended up second only to “rot-grün”, the german phrase for the coalition under Gerhard Schröder that took over in Germany after 16 years of conservative 8
rule in that very year
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!
Layers of capital conservation 
!
Three levels of actors are or should be in pursuit of capital conservation and hence of a sustainable 
development in their respective sphere of influence, sorted by scale, listing the parameters at their discretion: 
!
• Governments - the household budget (tax regime and level of benefits) 
• Corporations - supply side (equity) and demand side (business) 
• Individuals - savings, insurance coverage 
!
I will discuss specific aspects of capital conservation in both the corporate as well as the individual sphere. 
Starting with corporations, financial institutions will be brought into focus, as the case for capital conservation is 
most obvious. On the individual level I want to focus on insurance coverage decisions, securing a living standard 
in the uncertain future by some structured capital conservation.  
!
While I will not extensively discuss the macro-level, governments, I still want to add some brief comments on 
governments. It should be obvious how capital conservation has to be understood in the sovereign context. On 
a macro-prudential level, sovereigns sacrifice some portion of growth to enter a more stable growth path. For 
instance, the 3% of GDP deficit threshold for countries in the European Union anchored in the stability and 
growth pact (first regulation - the preventive arm - entered into force in 1998, the second one in 1999) is 
designed to cap the debt ratio, such that future generations (this is adding the time component as explained 
above) find more or less stable debt conditions to live with. Sustainability is also the main driver for most current 
discussions on austerity measures throughout Europe, since an increasing number of sovereigns in the EMU is 
hard-pushed financially. The aftermath of the financial crisis is endangering the cohesion within the political and 
therefore also the monetary union. An interesting analysis about sustainability in the context of the financial crisis 
and the sovereign debt crisis as a consequence was published by Contessi (2012) .  9
While most social security systems are designed as pay-as-you-go systems, financing parts of the coverage by 
federal funds is common. Sustainability in this specific context can be interpreted as restrictions imposed on 
benefits to avoid debt getting out of hand while maintaining a desired minimum level of benefits. Failure to 
appropriately set sustainability requirements can be observed in some US pension schemes. Rauh and Novy-
Marx (2010) calculate a gap of us much us 2.5 trillion dollars comparing the present value of state employee 
liabilities and the fund’s assets.  This will put severe pressure on future generations, which is further elevated by 10






 An Application of Conventional Sovereign Debt Sustainability Analysis to the Current Debt Crises - Contessi - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 94(3) - 9
p. 197-220 - 2012
 Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth? - Novy-Marx and Rauh - Journal of Finance, 66(4) - p. 1211-1249 - 201110
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!
Sustainability on Corporate Level 
!
Arguably, the core of corporate economics is the observation that firms come into existence because of lower 
transaction costs when internalizing certain steps of the production process.  Resources can be managed 11
more efficiently and transaction costs can be reduced: Companies exist to exploit the benefits of being big and 
not needing contracts for every step in the production process.  
As mentioned in the example of forestry above, this entails not just maximizing short-term profits, but to strike a 
balance between short-term profit and long-term development or growth of the business. Rather than chopping 
down the forest today to reap the one-off benefits, a manager should ensure a sustained use of resources, if 
only not to make the initial investment into machines and employees obsolete as soon the resource is depleted. 
This can be generalized to most producing industries and to a certain extent to service industries as well. In the 
latter case the resource at the manager’s discretion would be human capital - the employees and effective 
service providers, alongside facilities and infrastructure (transportation, telecommunication etc.). 
This is obviously also applicable to financial institutions as service providers, but they can be taken as producing 
companies in another sense as well, transforming raw (and sometimes even virtual) money or cash-flows into 
financial products - securities and insurance contracts subject to the respective regulatory regime. This 
regulation can be interpreted as an external force trying to assure the sustainability of the financial sector. The 
path current regulation across all jurisdictions is treading is that of minimum capital requirements (Basel and 
Solvency directives issued by the BIS ), effectively establishing a mandatory level of capital conservation. Again, 12
the predominant rationale is forcing a prudent balancing of the trade-off between short and long term profit and 
growth targets. Regulators impose these restrictions as they feel that currently corporate governance has a 
dominant short-term focus. This is one of the many lessons taken away from the crisis. Still, regulators should 
be aware that an overly conservative approach, i.e. requiring excessively high CET1  ratios for banks might 13
have adverse effects. Banks and insurances alike may push up this ratio not only by increasing their capital 
base, but also by a downsizing of business activities. This could eventually lead to a credit crunch, like the one 
Lehman fell victim to in 2008. Even worse, downsizing insurance’s and bank’s business could result in market 
failures, severely impairing risk transfer mechanisms and capacities. 
!
!
Sustainability and Capital Conservation for Financial Institutions 
!
But what does sustainability mean in this context? In today’s financial markets the volume of derivatives, bonds 
and other (structured) securities seems unlimited. When the monetary resource became effectively virtual once 
the gold standard was abandoned in favor of a pure fiat money in 1976, the financial and real economies 
essentially decoupled .   14
 The Nature of the Firm - Coase - Economica, 4(16) - p. 386-405 - 193711
 Bank of International Settlements - http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm 12
 CET1 (Common Equity Tier 1) is a regulatory defined measurement of core equity of a financial institution and a central part of Basel III and its objective 13
to set minimum requirements. It is related to the institution's risk weighted assets (RWA) to provide a proxy for the financial state of the bank.
 Data provided by research.stlouisfed.org (US GDP and TCMDO quarterly time series from 1970 to 2013)14





If a resource is not subject to any constraints, sustainability might become an empty phrase, as there seems to 
be no necessity to limit usage of that freely producible resource. But in case of money it is an illusion uncovered 
as early as 1622 when the Holy Roman Empire decided to debase its coinage. Ever since, bank runs, major 
financial crashes and asset price bubbles pushed banks and insurances into bankruptcy, as the due liabilities 
could outsize the assets at hand by a large margin. This is neatly illustrated by leverage ratios  of today’s 15
banks, which can be lower than 2%. The latest example is the financial crisis originating from the US subprime 
mortgage market where losses quickly melted off capital cushions of financial institutions, rendering them unable 
to continue to operate. Eventually this resulted in a credit crunch that disintegrated Lehman Brothers, a major 
investment bank and extended the crisis to a global scope. 
!
Regulators and also risk managers of banks and insurances always tried to estimate the necessary size of the 
capital cushions needed to cover not just expected losses, but even unexpected losses. A successful risk 
management is vital to the business model of financial institutions. But while risk managers merely can give 
recommendations, regulators have the clout to force institutions to assess their risk and reserve a fraction 
thereof as loss provisions. In Basel III, including all additional buffers, up to 10.5% of risk weighted assets (RWA) 
have to be held as Core Tier 1 capital. So, especially in times of crisis, when the means of refinancing an 
institution’s positions are highly constrained (or too expensive), financial institutions essentially have two options 
to increase their capitalization independently of debt markets (convertibles can count towards CET1 in specific 
cases): 
!
I. Issue additional equity, diluting current shareholders investments 












1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Total Credit Market Debt Owned GDP
Figure 2: Development of Total Credit Market Debt Owed vs Gross Domestic Product since 1970 
 The leverage ratio is defined of the quotient of equity and total assets (in contrast to risk-weighted assets for the capital ratio)15
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!
Both options do not appeal to existing investors, I want to put my focus on option II., as its effect are not as pre-
determined as are those of the first option (dilution of stakes): In the aftermath of a financial crisis, keeping free 
cash flows within the company may be the better option, as raising new capital proves to be rather costly. Still, 
changes in a company’s payout policy are heavily disputed and their effect has to be closely monitored. As 
corporate finance suggests, dividend payments, while being more costly than capital gains in most tax regimes, 
serve the additional purpose of signaling the soundness of a company to markets.  A 16
reduction of payments might be perceived as sign of weakness and lowered earnings 
expectations. The three predominant hypotheses concerning payout policies are:  1718
!
i. Dividend Irrelevance Hypothesis 
ii. Dividend Signaling Hypothesis 
iii. Dividend Smoothing Hypothesis 
!
While i. supposes that capital gains and dividend payments are interchangeable from the investor’s perspective. 
But this only holds in perfect markets without any taxes: both assumptions are in conflict with reality. Therefore, 
only ii. and iii. are worthwhile investigating in an empirical setting. While both hypotheses agree that changes in 
dividend policy convey signals to the market, they differ structurally regarding the predicted relationship between 
dividends and earnings of a company. That is, the dividend signaling hypothesis predicts that dividend changes 
precede earnings-changes. In this scenario the manager wants to actively communicate future earning changes 
(either direction) to the markets. On the other hand, the dividend smoothing hypothesis would be supported by 
observing earnings leading dividends.  Managers would, even in highly profitable years, only prudently raise 19
dividends to assert that the company is in the position to keep a stable level of payouts. Also this behavior tries 
to eliminate the misperception that the manager wants to signal some future developments, possibly leading to 
missed expectations, even while keeping constant earnings. As worked out above, to test which of these 
hypotheses applies, the temporal relation between earnings and dividends is key. Arguably, time-series 
techniques are most appropriate; as any cross sectional data is stripped of crucial chronological information.  
Furthermore, any analysis of corporate dividend strategies is subject to a multitude of factors and especially the 
macroeconomic environment might complicate meaningful econometric studies.  The publication “Inflation and 20
the Dividend Policy of U.S. firms” (see module 1) tackles the problem that inflation might distort the proper 
assessment of the predominant hypotheses described above. This is hardly a new theme in finance research.  21
The study still adds to the existing literature, as it applies appropriate statistical tools on a sufficiently big amount 
of recent data. 
E[L] = p · sev
 Dividend smoothing vs. dividend signaling: evidence from UK firms - Goddard, McMillan and Wilson - Managerial Finance, 32, p. 493-505 - 200616
 Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares - Miller and Modigliani - The Journal of Business, 34(4), p. 411ff. - 196117
 Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy and “the bird in the hand” fallacy - Bhattacharya - The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), p. 259-270 - 197918
 Dividend smoothing vs. dividend signaling: evidence from UK firms - Goddard, McMillan and Wilson - Managerial Finance, 32, p. 493-505 - 200619
 Historical Cost Earnings Versus Inflation-Adjusted Earnings in the Dividend Decision - Bar-Yosef and Lev - Financial Analysts Journal, pp. 3-12 - 03/04 198320
 Stock Yields, Stock Dividends and Inflation - Gabriel A. D. Preinreich - The Accounting Review, Vol. 7(4), p. 273-289 - 193221
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Employing cointegration and impulse-response analysis  on U.S cross industry time-series data, inflation is 22
identified to yield a significant positive effect on dividends. A positive shock (i.e. an increase) in inflation leads, 
possibly with lags, to an increment in dividends. This is intuitively comprehensible, as inflation increases nominal 
earnings. But another interpretation not as obvious might also explain this positive relationship: Managers might 
follow a dividend strategy preserving the stakeholders returns in real terms. As it is argued, either way inflation 
has to be considered in an empirical analysis investigating dividend policy if utilizing a time-series framework. 
Furthermore, taking inflation into account, the study finds that in this broad U.S. cross industry data there is 
some support for hypothesis iii. from above.  
The studies “Bank Dividend Policy and the Global Financial Crisis: Empirical Evidence from Europe” and “Impact 
of the Financial Crisis on the Dividend Policy of the European Insurance Industry” (see module 2 and 3) further 
investigate the predominance of the different payout policy paradigms for banks and insurances respectively. 
Returning to the main theme of capital conservation, this is most crucial for financial institutions, justifying a 
dedicated analysis for these two building blocks of the financial sector. The data examined in these studies are 
aggregated numbers on earnings and dividend payments (normalized as per share values) across Europe. The 
GDP deflator serves as a proxy for inflation to correct for the distortion caused, as described above. A vector 
error correction model (VECM) was estimated and the different variables were shocked to reveal the temporal 
relationship between earnings and dividends per share of the top players within the insurance and banking 
industries.  
Both studies cannot find support for either of the two hypotheses of dividend determination which somewhat 
points at the irrelevance hypothesis from above. Therefore the authors conclude that banks and insurance 
companies in Europe could be less hesitant to cut dividend payments in the strive to strengthen their respective 
capital base. This is somewhat surprising, as signaling theory in corporate finance appropriates dividend 
payments an important role for conveying information to the capital markets. The root cause for this seeming 
paradox might be the observation that both industries are tightly regulated, an extensive amount of disclosures 
and minimum requirements are imposed. This might render additional information less effective signals and, as 
explained in the introduction, incurring taxes might prove too costly for the firm compared to capital gains. In a 
letter to the two major industry associations in June 2013 the Banco de España even recommended that 
institutions should not pay out dividends exceeding 25% of the earnings.  23
To further investigate this relation between regulatory regime and effectiveness of signals conveyed by dividends, 
the publication “Dividend Policy Issues in the Financial Crisis - The Example of the German Automotive Industry” 
(see module 4) picks one major European country and a different industry to confirm this effect. And indeed, the 
data reveals definite support for pre-cautious signaling. This is in line with the conjecture of the regulatory regime 
being one of the main drivers for signaling effectiveness. To round off the preceding analyses the next study in 
this block “Dividend Policy and the Global Financial Crisis: Empirical Evidence from the Italian Insurance 
Industry” (see module 5) varies the country, rather than the industry, which is the second crucial factor 
determining the regulatory regime. Even though for financial institutions there are supra-national regulations in 
place, the implementation on federal level is at the national regulators discretion. This might be one explanation 
for the finding that in Italy signaling actually does have an impact, even though the cross European peer study 
 Estimation and hypothesis testing of cointegration vectors in gaussian vector autoregressive models - Johansen - Econometrica, 59(6), p. 1551-1580 - 199122
 Statement by the Banco de España on the dividend distribution policy of credit institutions - Press release - Madrid, 27.06.201323
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did not yield those results. All of the above evidence suggests that another, yet unobserved, variable might be 
the root cause for the diverging effectiveness of signals in different markets.  This does not render the findings 24
from above invalid, as the studies do not observe the signal effectiveness itself, but rather the chronology 
between earnings and dividends. This structure will not be affected by transparency itself. 
!
This gap is closed by the final paper in this block “Market Transparency and Dividend Policy of Insurance 
Companies: A global Comparison” (see module 6). While providing further empirical evidence comparing 
developed insurance markets (U.S., Japan, Europe) the main contribution of the study is the theoretical section 
identifying transparency as the underlying variable, the existence of which was suggested by the studies 
discussed thus far. The underlying observation is as simple as: “In a fully transparent market signals should not 
convey additional information”. Starting from this observation a canonical model for dividend signaling is refined 
by the additional variable transparency. While preserving the corner cases for maximal/minimal transparency, the 
model supports the conjecture that the future valuation of a company decreases with transparency, given a 
constant dividend payout. In a second step the study also introduces the cost for the company to increase 
transparency into this framework. This is motivated by an assumed trade-off between spending money on 
providing more transparency, reducing the need for signaling and the cost incurred by dissipative signals. The 
importance for corporate governance is obvious. Neither parameter should be set independently of the other, as 
this might prove more costly than a joint fixing. 
The findings of these studies are twofold. First of all on a rather technical level, any empirical work on dividend 
theory should include (as endogenous variable) or at least control for inflation. More importantly, the study finds 
transparency to be an important factor determining dividend signal effectiveness. How markets perceive 
increased retained earnings (i.e. dividend cuts) is of interest when contemplating to keep cash-flows inside the 
firm to improve capital levels. It seems to be the root cause why signals substantially vary in effectiveness across 
jurisdictions and industry sectors.  
!
!
Limitations of the research and scope for future research: 
The methodology applied the studies listed above - vector error correction modeling - is subject to some 
limitations. The structure of the model leads to a one way propagation of shocks determined by the order of the 
input variables and the respective Cholesky composition. This problem is addressed in the econometric study: 
“Variable-ordering induced problems of impulse-response analysis and other difficulties: the dividend policy of 
Austrian firms” (see module 7). The study stresses the finding that using a VECM requires additional reasoning 
about the order of variables to be input to produce meaningful results. 
Another limitation is the appropriate proxy for transparency. Transparency is established as a major driver of 
signaling effectiveness and therefore a consistent measure of transparency should be applied. This is a great 
field of open questions for future research. So far studies on transparency do not really assess its impact on 
market signals. Also, given this relation between transparency and signal strength a firm might try to strike the 
perfect balance between transparency and dividend signaling. While dividend signaling is monetarily expensive 
(as described above), increasing transparency might only be feasible to a specific level without enclosing 
 This is not to be seen as an econometric missing variable, the effect of it actually can be observed, but rather something that was overseen in most 24
interpretations of results 
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company internals. The implication that the company should target for maximum, i.e. full transparency to reduce 
the costs for dissipative signals therefore is a void one in the dynamic market environment. A good balance 
should be struck. That allows for plenty of subsidiary questions in transparency research. For example it might 
be of more effect to disclose selected parts of internal data rather than increase the overall amount of 
disclosure. 
There are also implications for policymakers to consider. By increasing the level of disclosure requirements, 
regulators could make it easier for financial institutions to capitalize without sending costly signals. This has to 




Sustainability and Capital Conservation for Individuals 
!
After covering one sphere of the micro-economic sphere with respect to capital conservation, I want to zoom in 
even further and lay my focus on individuals. While some studies even link demography and dividend payoffs , I 25
want to go down another road, as initially laid out. The last section established dividend cuts as a valid 
instrument to increase capitalization for corporations in specific cases, effectively smoothing out their 
prospective growth path. Is there something analogous for individuals? As in the corporate case, where capital 
is reserved for future expected and to a certain extent even unexpected losses, insurance contracts provision 
capital for future uncertain losses. The individual gives up some of his income to safeguard himself against future 
high impact scenarios. While a broken car might be a loss, an individual might cope with, high severity events 
like major surgery, disability or long-term care need are unlikely to be covered by savings and current income 
alone. Especially long-term care, being an abstract risk that is believed to only occur in some rather distant 
scenario, is a substantial risk. Still the long-term care insurance market in Germany is hardly utilized, even 
though there exist plenty of products to choose from.  This insurance puzzle might have different root causes. 26
The statutory insurance scheme in Germany is partially covering the costs caused by long-term care, contingent 
upon the level of dependency. Providing only partial coverage is a measure that had to be taken as the public 
long-term care insurance scheme is largely unfunded, financed by a inter-generation redistribution. The 
demographic change that is especially evident in Germany will exalt this situation even further. This is only one 
case of sovereign strive for sustainability. To minimize the gap that needs to be financed by raising additional 
sovereign debt, coverage in health care is getting increasingly restrictive and student have to pay obligatory 
contributions when attending university. Hence, for long-term care, a partial coverage was the only feasible way 
to go if a public insurance scheme is politically desired.  The resulting partial coverage leaves quite a significant 27
gap, resulting in out-of-pocket payments of up to 50% of the average costs of 3,000€ for the concerned 
person.  Nescience of this gap might lead to the erroneous neglect of complementary insurance coverage. 28
 Demographics and the Long-Horizon Returns of Dividend-Yield Strategies - Lee - Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2013.25
 Don’t they care? Or, are they just unaware? Risk perception and the demand for long-term care insurance - Zhou-Richter, Browne and Gründl - The Journal of 26
Risk and Insurance 77(4), p.715-747 - 2010
 More information about Germany’s public LTC insurance scheme can be found in: Krummaker, Zuchandke, Reddemann - Financing Long Term Care in 27
Germany, in: Financing Long-Term Care in Europe: Institutions, Markets and Models - Costa-i-Font and Courbage (eds.) - Palgrave MacMillan - 2011
 see module 828
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On the other hand, as stated above, expected loss is the metric an individual implicitly bases his demand for 
additional protection on. That means insurance coverage is some function of expected loss:   29
Expected losses or costs are a product of the probability of needing long-term care and the highly individual 
cost of long-term care. 
!
!
Combining those two observations, it can be seen that insurance coverage or insurance demand is a function 
monotonously increasing in both the probability of a risk occurring as well as the severity of the loss incurred in 
that adverse scenario. Using the relation above and objective data in an insurance economics context gives rise 
to the insurance puzzle mentioned above: Theoretically coverage of this risk should be significantly higher than 
observed. The assumption that individuals know the exact individual probability and severity is somewhat 
unrealistic though. Empirical studies thus turned towards perceived risk, as this is the actual driver for insurance 
coverage decisions. 
They investigate the first factor - indeed, risk perception and an individual’s estimate of probabilities seems to be 
used synonymously - but there exists only a small number of studies assessing the latter factor. 
This gap is partly closed by the study “Impact of the Introduction of the Social Long-Term Care Insurance in 
Germany on Financial Security Assessment in Case of Long-Term Care Need” (see module 8) and the 
publication “The perception of financial risks - A panel data analysis on perceived financial security in the event 
of long-term care need in Germany” (see module 9). Both publications take a close look at the variable 
perceived financial security contingent on requiring long-term care taken from the German socioeconomic panel 
(SOEP) that is conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), a think tank. It is a 
representative panel survey of households and individuals running annually since 1984. The question we are 
focusing on is: “How do you individually assess your financial security in the event of long-term care need?” 
which is only included every 4 years.  
The first study only utilizes a cross-sectional regression while the second publication exploits the rich data set 
also including longitudinal data by applying panel regressions and exploring the results delivered by fixed and 
random effects estimators.  
!
The first publication (see module 8) specifically focuses on the impact resulting from the introduction of a public 
social insurance scheme for long-term care in 1995 for all German citizens. The main finding of the study is that 
the respondents felt better secured after the introduction of the scheme, even though there existed some 
fallback solutions for individuals in need even before that date. Furthermore, households with an individual in 
need of long-term care started to perceive their financial protection as improving after the introduction, while it 
had no influence on the assessment before 1995. Among others, this impact of experience on perceptions is 
further explored in the second study (see module 9). Again it is shown that experience with a long-term care 
receiver impacts the perception significantly to the positive. Other factors are found to have an impact on the 
perception: 
Owning assets or being indebted altered perceptions. The effect is highly non-linear, and seems to be 
dependent on debt maturity, observing mortgages having a higher (negative) influence than other general debt. 
 The exact functional relation or other factors do not matter, as long as the demand is monotonously increasing in expected loss29
f(E[L])
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The direct effect of assets on insurance demand (rather than perception, which in turn might drive demand) 
might oppose this negative relationship, as insurance is not only providing the necessary funds when in need, 
but furthermore acts as wealth protection. These two countervailing trends might be one factor giving rise to the 
bell shaped relation between assets and long-term care insurance demand.  30
One especially interesting finding is that while having children does not affect the perception after 1995 - that is 
after a public scheme was introduced in Germany - this had a substantial positive effect on the perception of 
security before the introduction. One obvious explanation is that the state stepped in where traditionally the 
family provided help or even full-scale care for the needing household member. Additionally the bequest motive 
might be relevant in this context, but studies do agree neither on the direction nor on the relevance of altruism 
and bequest motives in this context. 
!
Thus both studies contribute to the empirical literature on risk perception and especially address an area that is 
currently not well researched (in comparison to perception of event probabilities). They therefore also do stress 
the importance of perception when trying to apply theoretical concepts that work on the average subjects (i.e. 
homo oeconomicus) to distinct individuals.  
For policymakers, trying to incentivize people to close their individual gap, there is one main lecture to be taken 
away from these analyses. Rather than investing money in yet another information campaign to educate 
individuals about the likeliness of needing long-term care, they should provide meaningful information about the 
consequences of dependence: Financially and socially, stressing the burden put upon the family if the needing 
person suddenly discovers the existing gap without any chance to fix it retrospectively. This might have a bigger 
marginal effect, as currently information campaigns mostly focus on probabilities. 
!
!
Limitations of the research and scope for future research: 
First of all, both studies share the limitation that the answer to the question raised within the SOEP is merely a 
proxy for the perception of financial security. Additional variables, like purchased insurance coverage would 
increase the explanatory power of any statistical evaluation of SOEP data. 
The first study mentioned does not take full use of the data available, as it only uses cross-sectional techniques. 
Its results are largely confirmed and furthermore refined by the second study. Unfortunately the question used as 
a proxy for perceived severity is only included in the SOEP survey every five years, a longer data history might 
have produced more significant results. This analysis should be revisited once the question is included next 
time.  Also, the fact that detailed data (that is amount) about an individual’s assets is only reported for the 31
waves of 2002 and 2007, limiting the research to a binary state quantifying the effect of having assets while not 
taken into account how many assets/debt and individual actually holds. 
All these limitations are data issues that will get lifted with time as more data is acquired, and should spark some 
similar analyses on different, i.e. bigger datasets, as well. Also conducting a similar analysis for different 
countries might be interesting to further specify the influence of certain factors. Mass media and its effect on 
perception is an interesting topic that would greatly enhance the current literature on risk perception. 
 The influence of prescription drug use on long-term care insurance ownership - Bernet - Risk Management and Insurance Review, 7(2) - p.107-120 - 30
2004
 The next wave including the respective question will be available in December 201331
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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyse the dividend policy of firms from a macroeconomic
perspective. In order to do so inflation and real growth are also considered.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper examines the relationship between dividends,
corporate earnings, real growth and inflation in the USA by applying cointegration techniques. In
this framework, impulse response analysis is used to test the two most popular theories of dividend
determination.
Findings – The data indicate three cointegration relations among the four-time series. Impulse
response analysis then shows some interesting dynamics. Dividend smoothing seems to be a relevant
phenomenon. Furthermore, inflation has a positive effect on dividends.
Research limitations/implications – The most important finding of this paper is the indication of
a positive relationship between inflation and dividend payments. This can be interpreted in two
different ways: managers may try to follow a dividend policy, which is perceived to be optimal,
believing that there is a desirable level of real dividend income to be paid to their investors. On the
other hand, inflation may simply increase the nominal value of corporate earnings and therefore
the dividends paid. Independently from the interpretation of the results, inflation should definitely be
considered analysing dividend policy.
Practical implications – Managers should also examine the inflationary environment formulating
an adequate dividend policy for their firm.
Originality/value – The paper provides an as of yet widely ignored link between the micro- and
macroeconomic sphere examining one of the most important problems of financial economics.
Neglecting the effects of inflation on dividendsmay, among others, be one reason for themixed empirical
findings testing theories of dividend determination.
Keywords United States of America, Dividends, Inflation, Stock markets, Financial economics
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Recent experiences in the USA and other countries have shown that inflation is not dead
at all.Owing tohighenergy costsprices ondifferent stages ofmeasurement (e.g. consumer
price indexs and producer price indexs) have increased considerably in the first half of
2008. In the second half the falling oil price has dampened inflationary pressures
dramatically. Until recently, some observers even seemed to believe that there was the
danger of an emerging deflation due to the financial crisis and the deleveraging process of
the global banking system. As a consequence, the yield on ten year US Treasuries
temporarily fell to about 2 per cent in December 2008. However, because of aggressive
interest rate cuts implemented by the Federal Reserve and other central banks fears that
inflation rates will accelerate again in the medium- and long-term have returned.
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Combined with large fiscal stimulus packages interest rate cuts obviously increase
inflationary risks. Therefore, it is probably no surprise that the year on year per cent
change in theUSconsumerprice indexhas returned topositive territory in the endof 2009.
Inflation quite clearly is a macroeconomic phenomenon which has major
consequences for capital markets and affects a wide range of important financial
variables (e.g. interest rates and corporate earnings). This paper provides empirical
evidence regarding the relationship between dividend policy and inflation in the USAby
using techniques of cointegration analysis thereby providing a new perspective on two
very important problems of financial economics – namely, why firms decide to pay
dividends and whether stocks are a useful hedge against inflation. The paper is
organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the optimal dividend policy issue.
Section3 thendiscusses the relationshipbetween inflationand thestockmarket. Section4
describes the data sets examined, discusses some methodological issues and also
provides some details of a preliminary analysis of the data sets. Section 5 presents the
results of impulse response analysis of the vector error correction model (VECM). Based
on the theoretical considerations presented in Sections 2 and 3, the final section
concludes by discussing the implications of the empirical findings.
2. Some thoughts about dividend policy
In a famous and very controversial paper Miller and Modigliani (1961) have noted that
the dividend policy followed by a firm does not affect its value. According to this
so-called dividend irrelevancy hypothesis changes in dividend payments have no
economic implications. As a consequence, Miller and Modigliani have concluded, that
there is no optimal dividend policy for a firm. This theory is based on a number of
assumptions. Most importantly, there exist no taxes and capital markets are assumed to
be perfect. Under these circumstances and with a given investment policy, higher
dividends result in lower capital gains. Assuming that investors do not prefer dividends
to capital gains or vice versa, decisions about dividend payouts have no economic
relevance at all. Nevertheless, managers in many firms still seem to believe that there
exists an optimal dividend policy. According toMiller andModigliani this fact is hard to
explain.Moreover, there are even strong arguments against dividend payments because
the tax laws of many countries penalize dividend income by taxing dividends more
heavily than capital gains. Thus, there seems to be some kind of a dividend puzzle.
The most popular justifications for the existence of dividend payments are based on
agency theory and problems of asymmetrically distributed information between the
management and investors. Corporate finance theory suggests that themanagement of a
firm can use dividend changes to overcome information asymmetries by trying to signal
revised earnings expectations to its investors. This is the so-called signalling hypothesis.
Agency theory does have further interesting implications for dividend policy. Most
importantly, principal agent problems between the owners and the management of a
firm may affect dividend policy when there is a separation of ownership and control.
Gugler (2003), for example, has argued convincingly that higher dividends constrain the
management of a firm by reducing free cash flow and by forcing the management to
obtain more outside funds from investors trying to finance additional investment
projects. Moreover, it is often assumed that managers are reluctant to cut dividends
and therefore increase dividend payments only gradually with rising earnings.




that dividend increases are carried out rather cautiously because firms try to avoid
significant dividend cuts when corporate earnings fall. Therefore, it could be quite
complicated to correctly identify this strategy in an inflationary environment, as
inflation alsomay cause dividends to grow steadily in nominal terms, making it difficult
to identify dividend smoothing in empirical studies.
Goddard et al. (2006) have argued that the signalling and smoothing hypotheses
make antipodal predictions about the temporal relationship between dividends and
corporate earnings. While the smoothing hypothesis suggests that earnings lead
dividends the signalling hypothesis predicts the opposite. Those observations may be
even more distorted as clientele effects could also be of importance. In fact, numerous
firms do tailor their dividend payouts to suite particular groups of investors. Given the
tax laws of many countries family-controlled firms may, for example, have an incentive
to avoid dividend payments at all. In these firms, there is no separation of ownership and
control. Consequently, there is also no principal agent problem and no need to constrain
the management.
Even though some econometricians suggest that dividend signalling might have
influence under certain circumstances, DeAngelo et al. (2000) have noted that the
relevance of dividend signallingmight in general be overestimated. An excellent survey
of the relevant literature has been provided byAllen andMichaely (1995). More recently,
Gugler (2003) has examined data from Austria searching for clientele effects and has
argued that the ownership structure does influence a firm’s dividend policy. He has
noted that family-controlled enterprises have lower payout target ratios and are more
likely to cut dividends while state-owned firms are most reluctant to do so. These
findings are consistent with solutions of the dividend puzzle that are based on agency
theory. Moreover, analysing data from the UK Goddard et al. (2006) have reported some
evidence supporting the signalling hypothesis. However, they have argued that the
relationship between dividends, corporate earnings, and stock prices is very complex
and therefore cannot be explained by a single theory of dividend determination. Other
researchers have produced even less convincing empirical evidence testing the
signalling hypothesis (DeAngelo et al. (2000) and Bernhardt et al. (2005)).
In fact, most economists interested in corporate finance theory seem to believe that
additional empirical evidence is needed. Bhattacharyya (2007), for example, has noted
that properly conducted empirical research should account for all implications of the
underlying economic theories of dividend policy. Our paper therefore also focuses on
macroeconomic aspects which are often ignored. Most importantly, we also examine the
role of inflation. This possibly important variable is usually neglected, though
Modigliani (1982) has noted that the earnings-payout ratio is increased by inflationwhile
stock prices might not change due to different leverage of those effects, giving an
obvious motivation to include inflation in empirical work analyzing dividend policy.
Furthermore, it may also be helpful to add real economic activity as additional variable.
3. Inflation and the stock market
There is a common belief that the equity market can act as an effective hedge against
inflation because stocks are claims on real capital. Accepting this argument, inflation
should lead to higher stock prices by increasing the nominal value of real capital.
Additionally, inflation magnifies the revenues of the corporate sector leading to higher




intuitively appealing. However, empirical evidence seems to indicate the existence of a
negative contemporaneous correlation of stock returns and inflation (Bodie, 1976;
Fama and Schwert, 1977; Schwert, 1981).
The theory of finance has problems to explain this negative correlation. It is
sometimes argued that the corporate sector may be unable to pass on higher prices.
Moreover, Feldstein (1982) has noted that in the US inflation has increased the real tax
burden of firms. There is also amacroeconomic dimension of the problem since inflation
distorts the price system and increases transaction costs. As a consequence, high
inflation ratesmay retard economic growth (Barro, 1996; Faria and Carneiro, 2001). This
would, of course, hurt the stock market as well. Generally speaking, higher inflation
rates may simply be a sign for the existence of other major macroeconomic problems.
In fact, Fama (1981) has suggested that the observed negative relationship between
inflation and stock returns originates from a positive relationship between stock returns
and future economic growth and an inverse relationship between future economic
growth and inflation. Accepting this point of view, inflation would only be a proxy for
economic growth and the relationship between inflation and stock returns should be
interpreted as a more or less spurious one. This is the so-called proxy hypothesis.
Moreover, following Campbell and Shiller (1988) it has been argued by Schotman and
Schweitzer (2000) that two countervailing trends are present. First of all – and as already
discussed – corporate earnings scale with inflation. Therefore, inflation could increase
expected dividend payments in the future. This is positive for stock returns. But there is
a second important effect. Higher inflation also tends to increase inflation expectations
leading to a higher discount rate thereby reducing stock prices. The existence of these
two opposing effects may help to explain why the empirical evidence reported in the
literature is mixed. As a matter of fact, while quite a number of empirical studies do
suggest that inflation rates and stock returns are negatively related in the short run this
is not necessarily true for the long run. In spite of the negative contemporaneous
correlation of stock returns and inflation rates inflation may even have a positive effect
on stock returns in the long run. Most notably, Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) and
Kolari and Anari (2001) have provided empirical evidence indicating that stocks can
indeed serve as a long-term inflation hedge.
4. Data, methodology and an initial analysis
Our measure of inflation is the US GDP price deflator which is reported by the
Department of Commerce.This price index is a broad gaugeof inflation. It is publishedon
a quarterly basis. Taking a macroeconomic perspective, we do not focus on the dividend
payments of individual firms but examine the aggregated dividends paid by the S&P
500 members using the dividend per index share concept. The S&P 500 Index is quite
commonly used as a proxy for the performance of the US stock market and therefore is
also a common benchmark for US equity funds. This index consists of the 500 leading
companies in the USA and seems to be the generally accepted measure for US stock
market activity. Bloomberg provides data on the volume of dividends paid by the index
constitutes of the S&P 500 (dividend per index share). In order to test whether dividend
signalling or dividend smoothing are relevant phenomena, we use a methodology
suggestedbyGoddard et al. (2006) and therefore also have to consider corporate earnings.
Given our measure of dividend payments the S&P 500 earnings per index share seems




Furthermore, because of the fact that the proponents of the proxy hypothesis believe that
there is a relationship between inflation and real growth we additionally do include a
measure of real economic activity in the USA as fourth variable of the model (namely US
real GDP). Adding real output to the VECM is also useful in order to examine the two
main drivers of earnings growth. In fact, Berner (2002) recently has argued that
econometricians should focus more strongly on the analysis of corporate profits.
Therefore, our approach seems to be promising.We examine data fromQ1 1980 through
Q4 2008 focusing on the experiences after PaulVolcker’s appointment as Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board. Thereby, we do hope to avoid possible problems with
structural breaks which are known to cause major problems testing for cointegration
(Gregory and Hansen, 1996).
Visual inspection clearly shows that the time series examined do not seem to be I(0).
Testing for unit roots on the differences is performed after controlling for structural
breaks. We therefore use the procedure suggested by Lanne et al. (2002). In this
approach, first of all the deterministic components and nuisance parameters are
estimated and the series then adjusted using those parameters. While applying the test
to the first differences, an impulse dummy is used, as suggested by the aforementioned
authors. The respective results (Table I) signal quite clearly that all examined time series
are integrated of order one (in levels). The break in the dividend time series occurs rather
late, leaving only very fewdata points after the occurrence. Thus, it is also testedwithout
a breakpoint; the results are included in Table I as well.
Structural breaks are – as already noted – a potential problem using cointegration
tests. Even more so due to the test procedure suggested by Lanne et al. (2002) showing
some empirical evidence for structural change. Numerous papers have been devoted to
the subject of cointegration and structural breaks (Gregory and Hansen, 1996;
Johansen et al., 2000). One possible approach to cope with the difficulties arising from
structural change could be testing for structural breaks in bivariate cointegration
models and then switch to a multivariate setting. In the case examined here, this is not
necessary. In fact, structural breaks quite clearly bias cointegration tests towards
rejection even if in reality some form of cointegration relationship between the time
series examined does exist. However, given that the results of the Johansen (1991)
cointegration tests reported in Table II suggest that there exist three cointegration
Variable D (dividends) D (earnings) D (deflator) D (real growth)
Test’ statistic (without break) 28,8082 24,5696 23,7893 22,9856
28,9367
Level of confidence .99% .99% .99% .95%
.99%






H0 0 1 2 3
Likelihood ratio 79.34 48.75 24.43 3.62






relationships among the four variables examined here structural breaks seem to be no
major problem[1]. Moreover, the results are robust if including the break points deduced
by the procedure suggested by Lanne et al. (2002). Therefore, we have to conclude that
according to our tests the time series follow stable common trends and that there exists
a long-term equilibrium relationship between the variables dividends (US_Dividends),
corporate earnings (US_Earnings), real economic activity (US_GDP_Real) and the price
level (US_GDP_Defl)[2].
The critical values for the test statistics are taken from Doornik (1998). We have
considered eight time lags. This is the optimal lag length of the model according to the
Akaike information criterion. Dummy variables are used to account for seasonality. The
LM tests reported in Table III do not reject the hypothesis of serial correlation in
the VECM residuals possibly causing problems regarding the ordering of the variables,
as we are going to use the Cholesky decomposition for impulse response analysis. This
will be explained inmore detail in the following section. To further examine the problem,
the cross-correlations of the residuals up to eight lags are inspected. While there are no
significant correlations on the residuals, the squared residuals show strong serial
correlation (cross- and auto-correlation) resulting in non-biased but inefficient
estimators. Thus, a two stage, generalized least squares, approach is utilized. The
impulse-response functions discussed in the following are robust to a change of the
estimation technique (ordinary least squares (OLS) to generalized least squares), clearly
indicating the findings to be consistent.
5. Impulse response analysis
The dynamics of themodel are analysed by computing impulse response functions using
the Cholesky decomposition. The ordering of variables is selected according to economic
theory, as the Cholesky decomposition is not ordering invariant. The macroeconomic
variables quite clearly should be more exogenous than the variables from the financial
sphere. Moreover, dividends are paid from earnings. This leaves two possible orderings
of variables (US_GDP_Defl ! US_GDP_Real ! US_Earnings ! US_Dividends and
US_GDP_Real ! US_GDP_Defl ! US_Earnings ! US_Dividends). The resulting
impulse response functions for the OLS estimation are shown in Figures 1 and 2. The
confidence intervals are obtained using Efron (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) bootstrap
techniques (95 per cent level). Both orderings lead to remarkably similar results – at least
with respect to the financial variables which are at the centre of this empirical
investigation, indicating robustness under reordering[3].
FollowingGoddard et al. (2006) our empirical findingsquite clearly imply that dividend
smoothing is a relevant phenomenon because corporate earnings lead dividends. There is
no empirical evidence for dividend signalling. Turning to the relationship between
macroeconomic and financial variables both orderings give unequivocal support for the
hypothesis that corporate earnings and dividends react positively to a shock to real
economic activity. This is no surprise at all. Explaining the statistically significant
Lags 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
LM statistic 31.2 63.0 94.3 113.1 137.6 161.3 188.1 223.4 300.2
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negative reaction of real economic activity to an increase in dividend payments is less
easy. An exogenous positive shock to dividend may, for example, signal less attractive
investment opportunities of the corporate sector and – as a consequence – lower future
economic growth. The statistically significant negative reaction of dividends to a shock to
corporate earnings to be observed after 16 quarters probably has to be put in this context.
There also is an at least marginally statistically significant positive reaction of
dividends to inflation. Dividends are only one source of stock market returns. Therefore,
this result does not necessarily imply that stocks are a good hedge against inflation.
However, the empirical findings reported above quite clearly do suggest that inflation is
indeed contributing to dividendgrowth.There are different possibilities to interpret these
empirical findings. US firms may assume that there is a desirable level of real dividend
income to be paid out to their investors. This would imply that the corporate sector does
believe in the existence of some sort of optimal dividend policy in real terms. A second
interpretation of our results would require a by far less active role of management, as
inflationmay simply increase the nominal volume of corporate earnings and – given that
dividends are paid as a percentage of earnings – thereby also the volume of dividends.
Obviously, both explanations are compatible with our empirical findings and have
similar implications (higher inflation leads to higher dividends). However, there are some
obvious differences. Most importantly, the first explanation requires the management to
formulate an optimal real dividend payout policy. Therefore, additional empirical
evidence supporting this hypothesis clearly could be interpreted as a further hint
suggesting that managers and investors “really” care about dividends. In fact, this
hypothesis can even be seen as some kind of new theory of dividend determinationwhich
is based on the assumption that investors have a preference for a stable source of
continuous real income. Irrespective of these interpretations of the empirical results
reported above the findings of this paper do have consequences for econometricians
planning to test theories of dividend determination. Most importantly, increases to the
volume of dividend payments arising from higher inflation rates could be falsely
identified as empirical evidence in favour of dividend smoothing.
6. Conclusion
The empirical evidence reported above indicates that in the USA there is a stable
long-run equilibrium relationship between dividend payments, corporate earnings, real
economic activity and the price level. Moreover, impulse response analysis reveals some
interesting facets of dividend policy. There is clear evidence for dividend smoothing.
Furthermore, we have established the existence of a positive relationship between
dividends and inflation. Interpreting these results is not that easy. First of all, this
finding does not necessarily mean that stocks are a useful hedge against inflation.
However, it still is noteworthy that companies seem to increase their dividend payments
more strongly in an inflationary environment. There are at least two possible
explanations for this behaviour. First of all, the management could believe that there is
some sort of optimal dividend policy in real terms. As a consequence, there may be
an incentive to ceteris paribus stabilize the real value of dividend income. On the other
hand, inflation may simply increase the nominal volume of corporate earnings
and therefore dividend payouts. Analysing whether firms formulate their payout policy
in real termswould be interesting. In any case, higher inflation seems to be amajor driver




Most importantly, a gradual increase of dividend payments due to higher inflation rates
could be falsely identified as empirical evidence supporting the dividend smoothing
hypothesis. Therefore, the results reported above are of special importance because we
have controlled for inflation. Moreover, a higher variability of inflation may distort the
ability of firms to use dividend changes to signal revised earnings expectations to their
investors – this would be just another facet of the well documented informational costs
of inflation.
The usual negligence of macroeconomic factors may indeed be an important reason
why empirical tests often fail to support specific theories of dividend determination.
Therefore, the results reported above imply that econometricians studying dividend
policy have to consider the effects of inflation. Moreover, given that inflation rates are
more volatile in economies classified as emerging markets our findings may also be an
additional explanation for the observation that firms in these regions seem to have less
stable dividend payments (Adaoglu, 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003). Further empirical
research examining data from emerging markets could therefore also be helpful.
This study has some additional implications for further research. In particular,
it would certainly be interesting to examine the negative relationship between dividend
shocks and real economic activity in more detail. Moreover, it should also be analysed
how corporate earnings react to inflation shocks and to shocks to real output. Sharpe
(2002), for example, has argued that inflation is negative for stock prices because it
lowers expected real earnings growth and increases the real required return.
Furthermore, it would be important to include monetary policy as additional variable.
On the one hand, monetary policy is a function of real economic activity and the
general price level; on the other hand, monetary policy also affects real growth and
inflation. Therefore, this is a potentially relevant variable. It would, for example, be
possible to combine the approach suggested here with the empirical model of Belke and
Polleit (2006) who examine the long-run relationship between dividend growth and
monetary policy. Both studies seem to fit together like pieces in a puzzle because the
activities of firms commonly called “dividend policy” analysed here are a disturbance
in Belke and Polleit (2006) while the activities of central bankers which are usually
called “monetary policy” are not observed here.
Notes
1. We also could have used the ARDL approach. The main advantage of this method is that it is
not necessary to a priori determine the order of integration of the examined time series
(Bahmani-Oskooee and Ng, 2002; Belke and Polleit, 2006). However, we are quite confident
that all four variables in themodel are I(1). Therefore, we have used the approach suggested by
Johansen. This technique still is the most popular multivariate method estimating a
cointegration relationship. This popularitymainly is a result of a simulation study byGonzalo
(1994) indicating the favourable characteristics of the multivariate cointegration test
suggested by Johansen.
2. Yet, it may be interesting to note that bivariate cointegration tests quite clearly suggest the
existence of a massive structural break in the cointegration relationship between the volume
of dividend payments and the general price level in 2000. The empirical evidence for
structural change corresponds with the bursting of the dot-com bubble. The test has been
performed using the critical values from Johansen et al. (2000). However, this finding quite




can be explained by a combination of falling earnings and a reduction of real economic
growth. In order to preserve space, we will not report any details of the tests.
3. We have also tested the robustness of the results with regard to different data sets examined.
Cointegration among dividend payouts, corporate earnings andmacroeconomic variables is a
very common phenomenon which can be found analyzing data frommany different countries
and time periods. It can also be observed examining specific industry sectors (e.g. European
insurance companies or German car manufacturers). The following brief discussion of the
results of impulse response analysis focuses on dividends per index share and earnings per
index share of the members of the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the period
Q1/1993-Q4/2009. By analysing this sample, we exclude the experiences of the savings and
loan crisis; this prolonged banking crisis quite clearly was an extraordinary event. The
30 firms that comprise the Dow Jones Industrial Average are very large firms that are of
special interest for investors and the stock market in general. Consequently, many financial
analysts cover these firms.While the smallest firm in the Dow is currently actively covered by
20 analysts according to Bloomberg (using the ANR function) only six analysts follow the
smallest member of the S&P 500. A larger number of analysts covering a firm quite clearly
helps to increase transparency – which is a key concept with regard to dividend policy issues
as the most popular explanations for the existence of dividend payments are based on agency
theory. Therefore, it could be assumed that dividend signalling and dividend smoothing are
less important for themembers of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Using four time lags and
estimating the VECM with the variables real growth, inflation, corporate earnings and
dividend payments the impulse response functions show clear evidence of a positive reaction
of dividends and earnings to a shock to inflation. Moreover, in this case, there is also no
empirical evidence indicating that dividend signalling is a relevant phenomenon. Therefore,
it can be concluded that these findings are very similar to the results examining the earnings
and dividends of the S&P 500 members. However, there are no signs for dividend smoothing.
This deviating result is no surprise and seems to be in accordance with the transparency
conjecture derived from economic theory as discussed above. Also note that there is some
empirical evidence in favour of dividend smoothing examining the members of the Dow Jones
Industrial Average when the variable real growth is neglected.
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The global financial crisis has caused controversial discussions about the capital base of the
banking industry in Europe. Dividend cuts and omissions have been suggested as one
possibility to improve the financial strength of banks by retaining earnings. However, there are
fears that investors could interpret a reduction of dividends as a sign for future problems. The
dividend signalling and dividend smoothing hypotheses quite clearly are the theoretical basis
for these worries. The basic idea of this study is that without empirical evidence supporting the
hypothesis dividends did matter in the past, banks should not fear dividend cuts or even
dividend omissions. The empirical evidence from the European banking industry reported here
does not indicate that dividend signalling and dividend smoothing are relevant economic
phenomena.













The world economy has suffered from the consequences of the global financial crisis. The banking sector was hit especially
hard. Therefore, it is no surprise at all that stock prices of banks all over the world have dropped significantly. While the problems
clearly originated in the U.S. housing market many European banks have also been affected by the crisis. These major difficulties
of the financial services industry resulted in bailouts and nationalizations. There also is a time dimension to the problem. At first,
losses at banks were directly related to the U.S. subprime crisis (mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt obligations).
Then the global recession increased the volume of nonperforming loans and caused falling stock prices and a widening of credit
spreads. Meanwhile, fiscal problems of some European countries even have caused concerns about sovereign credit risk. At the
moment, new (and higher) capital requirements as already codified in Basel II, rating downgrades of debtors and expected future
loan losses will increase the demand for capital. Moreover, as a reaction to the crisis there are discussions to further tighten bank
capital standards (e.g., Rajan, 2009; Bullard et al., 2009). In sum, the banking sector not only in Europe has been, still is and most
certainly will be in need of additional capital.
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Banks only have limited possibilities to strengthen their capital base. Given that numerous banks already had issued new
equity raising capital from external sources there was a shortage of capital for financial institutions in 2009. Private investors
simply did not want to increase the exposure to banks in their equity portfolios. In many countries governments stepped into the
breach and even nationalised some banks. Due to harsh criticism of the bank rescue plans in the U.S. and other countries banks
would at the moment experience major difficulties to obtain additional help from governments. Especially the U.S. media
criticized that banks used “taxpayer funds” to pay dividends. Meanwhile, stock prices have at least partly recovered. The Dow
Jones Stoxx 600 Banks Price Index, for example, has risen considerably from its lows in March 2009. However, it could still prove
to be quite expensive for banks to obtain additional capital by issuing new equity. Banks might also decide to reduce their
exposure to risk. This would imply that the banking sector would have to lower the supply of credit (at least in the short run— see
Buch and Prieto (2012) on long and short run effects of changes to bank capital on loans). However, in a recession economic
policymakers certainly are not interested in reducing the availability of bank credit because there are fears that a negative shock
to credit supply could further hurt the economic activity. Walsh and Wilcox (1995), for example, have shown that loan supply
shocks did have a negative effect on the U.S. output examining data from the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, Akhter et al. (2010)
recently also have provided empirical evidence indicating that the availability of credit helps to avoid poverty. Therefore,
economic policymakers surely do not favour a reduction to bank lending in an economic crisis. In fact, the government bailouts in
Europe and other parts of the world have mainly been intended to stabilize the availability of credit.
Banks can also improve their capitalisation by cutting or even omitting dividend payments. However, some observers seem to
fear that investors and financial analysts could interpret a reduction of dividend payments as a negative signal indicating future
problems. These discussions do have a history. In fact, Mayne (1980) has noted that U.S. banks used dividend cuts to improve
their capital base in the banking crisis of the years 1973 to 1976. More recently, Boldin and Leggett (1995) have argued that
retained earnings were the primary source of capital for the U.S. banking industry after the savings and loan crisis. However,
Bessler and Nohel (1996) have pointed out that bank managers in the U.S. were reluctant to cut dividends in the 1980s despite
suffering losses. After the subprime crisis the Federal Reserve, for example, in early 2012 did not want to permit Citigroup to raise
its dividend in order improve the ability of the bank to cope with future financial shocks. Interestingly, the financial press had
reported that shareholders back then had been pressuring U.S. banks to pay higher dividends.1
Given these controversial discussions about dividend cuts we plan to empirically analyse the dividend policy of the European
banking industry using a framework that has recently been suggested by Reddemann et al. (2010) More precisely, we are
searching for hints indicating that dividend signalling or dividend smoothing are relevant economic phenomena using vector
autoregressive models (VAR) (respectively vector error correction models (VECM)). In short, the basic idea of this study is that
without empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that dividends did matter in the past, analysts and other stakeholders
should not react on or fear dividend cuts or even dividend omissions by the respective bank.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses dividend policy issues from the perspective of corporate finance theory.
Section 3 then provides a literature review focussing on empirical tests of the theories of dividend determination introduced in
Section 2. The fourth section describes the data sets examined and discusses some methodological issues. In Section 5 the
empirical evidence is presented. The final section concludes.
2. Some thoughts about dividend policy issues
In their seminal paper Miller and Modigliani (1961) have argued convincingly that the dividend policy of a firm is irrelevant
assuming that the firm's investment policy is given, capital markets are perfect and taxes do not exist. In this environment higher
dividends simply result in lower capital gains. Consequently, the dividend policy of a firm does not have any economic relevance
when investors do not prefer dividends to capital gains or vice versa. Therefore, it could be argued that the controversial
discussions about dividend cuts or omissions of banks are pointless and that banks should reduce the volume of dividend
payments to strengthen their capital base without having to fear any negative consequences.
The dividend irrelevancy hypothesis obviously produces major difficulties in trying to explain the existence of dividends. In
fact, there is a dividend puzzle because it can be observed that numerous firms in many countries regularly pay dividends. The
corporate finance theory has suggested a number of arguments why dividends may not be irrelevant at all. The most popular
approaches to explain the existence of dividend payments are based on agency theory. These theoretical concepts rely on the
assumption that the management of a firm is not necessarily motivated to act in the best interest of the owners.2 In fact, it is quite
common to argue that dividend payments lead to a reduction of free cash flow and thereby force the management of a firm to
obtain capital from external sources more frequently when new investment projects have to be financed. Raising new capital
forces a firm to give information to investment bankers, prospective investors and other economic agents. This process of
providing information to financial market participants is assumed to reduce agency costs helping the owners to monitor and
control the management of the firm. However, obtaining capital from external sources by issuing new equity generates
transaction costs. According to this theory the optimal dividend policy of a firm should minimize the sum of the transaction costs
and the agency costs.
1 Reports discussing this problem have, for example, been published by the New York Times and Bloomberg News.
2 It could also be argued that firms may run out of lucrative investment projects and in this case should return financial funds to investors by increasing
dividend payments. However, given that central banks not only in the U.S. and UK have lowered the refinancing costs banks at the moment seem to have many
profitable investment opportunities.
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It is also very popular to argue that dividend changes can be used to overcome information asymmetries, being dissipative
signals. According to this so-called dividend signalling theory – which is one of the most important approaches to explain the
existence of dividend payments – managers can reduce or increase dividends to signal revisions to earnings expectations to
financial analysts and investors. Moreover, it has also been suggested that firms try to avoid the need to reduce dividend
payments because of concerns that dividend cuts or omissions could be perceived to give disturbingly negative signals to external
economic agents. According to this so-called dividend smoothing hypothesis dividends are rarely decreased but also not
increased to an unsustainable level. Dividend smoothing can be interpreted as dividend signalling with precaution. In order to
avoid dividend cuts there should only be increases to dividend payments when the management of a firm believes that future
cash flows are strong enough to enable the firm to sustain the new higher level of dividend payouts. This theory does also assume
that a strong link between dividend payments and corporate earnings exists. However, Goddard et al. (2006) have argued
convincingly that the signalling and smoothing hypotheses make opposing predictions about the temporal relationship between
corporate earnings and dividend payments. While the dividend signalling hypothesis assumes that dividends should lead
corporate earnings the dividend smoothing hypothesis predicts that earnings should lead dividend payments.
Banks are often seen to be special. Allen (2001), for example, has argued that standard microeconomic theory does have some
problems in trying to explain the role of financial institutions and has pointed towards some inconsistencies assuming that there
is an agency problem investing directly in firms and no agency problem giving funds to a bank. Macroeconomists, on the other
hand, tend to believe that banks are of special importance (e.g. Himmelberg and Morgan, 1995). The global financial crisis has
given some support to this hypothesis as the problems in the banking industry have had major negative consequence for the
world economy. This essential macroeconomic role is an important reason for banks being subject to special regulatory
requirements. It is quite popular to argue that government regulation may also affect the payout policy of banks (e.g., Rozeff,
1982; Bessler and Nohel, 1996). Obviously, one of the main goals of bank regulation is to protect the customers. However, it can
be argued that bank regulation also reduces the agency costs borne by the shareholders of a firm by providing an external
monitoring instance. According to this view dividend payments by banks and other regulated industries are even more puzzling
than dividend payments by industrial firms. Similar problems also do arise in the insurance industry. In an attempt to explain
dividend payments by insurance companies Casey et al. (2007) have argued that investors in the insurance sector prefer a high
degree of leverage since regulation does protect not only customers but also investors against insolvency. This interesting
hypothesis predicts that investors can use the dividend income from holding insurance stocks to obtain other financial assets and
maintain a high level of relatively risk-free leverage with their portfolio of insurance stocks.
On the other hand, some financial economists argue that it is quite difficult for external economic agents to adequately
evaluate the market value of a bank's assets. Boldin and Leggett (1995), for example, have noted that market values are not
presented on a continuous basis to external economic agents. Therefore, investors, depositors and creditors cannot easily
distinguish well-run from poorly managed banks. As a consequence, dividend signalling could even be more important for banks
than for industrial firms. Again, similar arguments have also been made with regard to the insurance industry. Akhigbe et al.
(1993), for example, have noted that it is very difficult for external economic agents to assess the true economic condition of any
insurance company at a particular point of time. Most importantly, they have argued that accounting procedures frequently hide
major changes in the market values of real estate holdings which, of course, are an important asset class for the insurance
industry.
Higher dividend payouts also imply a smaller contribution to capital, weakening the financial strength and thereby the ability
of a bank to take more risks. Therefore, in the banking industry an increase to dividend payments is not always seen as a positive
signal by investors and financial analysts (e.g. Boldin and Leggett, 1995). Yet again, similar arguments have been discussed in the
literature examining the dividend policy of insurance companies (e.g. Harrington, 1981; Akhigbe et al., 1993).
3. Literature review
In economic theory it is very common to discuss dividend policy issues from the perspective of industrial firms. Therefore,
empirical research has focussed mainly on this type of companies. In fact, there have been numerous studies reporting empirical
evidence for industrial firms and it would certainly be beyond the scope of this paper to provide a survey of this literature.
Moreover, this is also not necessary because there already are some excellent review articles (e.g. Allen and Michaely, 1995;
Bhattacharyya, 2007). However, it has to be noted that only few econometricians have focussed on the dividend policy of the
banking industry. Given that dividend policy issues often are discussed from the viewpoint of Miller and Modigliani this is
probably no major surprise. In this world analysing bank dividend policy means examining irrelevant firms doing irrelevant
things. This is hardly a motivation for applied econometricians. Rozeff (1982), for example, has analysed the determinants of the
dividend policy of U.S. firms and has omitted banks, insurance companies and other regulated industries from his empirical
investigations restricting his analysis to unregulated industries.
Still, there have been some important studies mostly examining U.S. data. Back in the 1970s Gupta and Walker (1975) have
shown that bank dividends are related to corporate profits, total asset growth and liquidity. Mayne (1980) has documented that
the size of a bank does influence dividend policy examining data from more than 12,000 U.S. banks. Larger banks seem to pay
higher dividends. This empirical finding is explained by the facts that the stocks of larger banks are more widely held and that
these institutions have better access to external capital and therefore do depend less strongly on internally generated funds.
Moreover the study shows that banks affiliated with holding companies tend to pay higher dividends than independent banks.
Boldin and Leggett (1995) have found empirical evidence supporting the dividend signalling hypothesis examining data from 207
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U.S. banks and employing cross sectional regression techniques. They have used credit ratings as a proxy for expected future
earnings and have reported a statistically significant positive relationship between dividends and credit ratings. Collins et al.
(1996) have analysed how dividend payout ratios have reacted to changes to insider holdings (which obviously affect agency
costs) examining data from the U.S. financial services industry (38 banks and 15 insurance companies). They have argued that
there are similarities to the behaviour of firms in unregulated industries. Banks and insurance companies tend to increase their
dividend payout ratios when the level of insider holdings decreases. Bessler and Nohel (1996) have documented that banks
experience statistically significant negative abnormal returns around the announcement date of dividend cuts or omissions.
Financial markets also seem to react more strongly to dividend cuts of banks than to dividend cuts of non-financial firms. More
recently, Dickens et al. (2003) have identified a number of possible relevant factors for the dividend policy of U.S. banks and have
reported that there are five statistically significant determinants of dividends. According to their study the relevant factors are
investment opportunities, size, agency problems, dividend history and risk. These findings have been confirmed by Theis and
Dutta (2009). Only very few authors have shown an interest to study the dividend policy of European banks. Most importantly,
Eriotis et al. (2007) have shown that the dividend policy of Greek banks differs from the dividend policy of Greek industrial firms
in a statistically significant way. More precisely, bank managers in Greece seem to be less interested in paying a stable long run
target dividend.
To sum up, the empirical findings reported in the relatively few studies of bank dividend policy do provide some insights but
certainly no clear answers to the question why dividends are paid. In spite of far more research efforts this can also be said about
results reported for industrial firms. Thus, there are some similarities. In fact, many financial economists seem to believe that an
additional empirical evidence is needed (e.g. Allen and Michaely, 1995; Collins et al., 1996).
4. Data and methodology
Bhattacharyya (2007) has noted that properly conducted future empirical research should account for all implications of the
underlying economic theories of dividend policy. Most importantly, Basse (2009) has suggested that inflation may be relevant
arguing that this important macroeconomic variable is a major driver of dividend growth which is usually neglected in empirical
tests of theories of dividend determination. This fact could help to explain why the dividend policy issue is not resolved yet. As a
matter of fact, a gradual increase of dividend payments due to higher inflation rates could, for example, be falsely identified as
empirical evidence supporting the dividend smoothing hypothesis.
Therefore, this study tries to analyse the dividend policy of European banks by also considering inflation. In order to do so we
use a variant of the VAR approach introduced by Goddard et al. (2006) who have examined the relationship between dividend
payments and corporate earnings. This variant has been suggested by Reddemann et al. (2010) and employs VECM techniques in
conjunction with impulse response analysis. The approach also considers inflation as a third endogenous variable of the model.
The approach obviously requires us to take a more macroeconomic perspective examining aggregate data on earnings and
dividends. Therefore, we analyse quarterly data on dividends per index share and earnings per index share of the Euro Stoxx
Banking Index. These time series are supplied by Bloomberg. Inflation is measured by the EMU consumer price index reported by
Eurostat. This is a very popular gauge of inflation in the Euro Zone. As a matter of fact, Fama and Schwert (1977) have noted that
eventual consumption is the purpose of investing in financial assets and that therefore the consumer price index is the correct
measure of inflation in the context of financial econometrics. In order to avoid possible problems with structural breaks due to the
introduction of the Euro in January 1999 our sample is from 1998 Q4 to 2008 Q4.
To test for cointegration we use the procedure suggested by Johansen (1991). This multivariate cointegration test is based on
VAR techniques. In Eq. (1) y is a vector ofm possibly non-stationary variables, Ai. is a m × m. Matrix (with i = 1,…,n), and c1. and
c2. are m vectors of constants respectively trend coefficients:
yt ¼ A1yt−1 þ A2yt−2 þ…þ Anyt−n þ c1 þ c2t þ ut : ð1Þ
The error term ut is assumed to be normally distributed. Differentiating and rearranging yields:
Δyt ¼ A1−Ið Þyt−1 þ A2yt−2 þ…þ Anyt−n þ c1 þ c2t þ ut ð2Þ
Δyt ¼ A1−Ið ÞΔyt−1 þ A1 þ A2−Ið Þyt−2 þ…þ Anyt−n þ c1 þ c2t þ ut ð3Þ




ΠiΔyt−iþΠyt−n þ c1 þ c2t þ ut
ð4Þ
where:Πi = − (I − ∑ h = 1i Ah), Π = − (I − ∑ i = 1n Ai).
The cointegration test is based on determining the rank of the so-called long run impact matrix Π. There exist k cointegration
relationships among the variables when the rank of the matrix Π is k b m. The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis that there
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ln 1−λið Þ: ð5Þ
Cointegration describes an equilibrium relationship between non-stationary variables which share common stochastic trends.
When cointegration relationships among the variables examined do exist this important information has to be used in the process
of model building by estimating a vector error correction model (VECM). The dynamics of this model can then be analysed
estimating impulse response functions.
The dividend signalling and dividend smoothing hypotheses quite clearly are the theoretical basis for the argument that banks
should be extremely careful when using dividend cuts or omissions to strengthen their capital base. Therefore, it has to be tested
whether dividend signalling or dividend smoothing are relevant economic phenomena. Following Goddard et al. (2006) and
Reddemann et al. (2010) empirical evidence indicating that dividends lead corporate earnings would be supportive for the
dividend signalling hypothesis while the finding that earnings lead dividends would give support to the dividend smoothing
hypothesis.
5. Results
ADF- and KPSS-tests (not reported) indicate that the three time series examined in this study are non-stationary and
integrated of order 1. The cointegration tests reported in Table 1 signal that two cointegration relationships exist between the
three variables general price level (EMU_CPI), corporate earnings (Indx_Eps_Before_XO) and dividend payouts (Dvd_Sh_Last).
The critical values for the test are from Doornik (1998). Seasonal dummies were included in the testing for cointegration because
the dividend time series shows strong seasonality. Different deterministic trend assumptions did not affect the results. Due to the
limited amount of data points available we use 4 time lags estimating the model. Analysing the residuals of the VECM does
indicate randomness; the Portmanteau test with 12 lags yields a p-value of 0.3418. Given the restrictions to data availability there
may be problems with a small sample bias. As a matter of fact, Hargreaves (1994) has performed Monte Carlo experiments
indicating some difficulties using the Johansen test with less than 100 data points. However, he has also argued that applied
econometricians commonly work with sample sizes of about 50 observations.
Impulse response functions are generated using the Cholesky decomposition. Therefore the results may be sensitive to the
ordering of the variables. In this study an economic theory quite clearly dictates the ordering of variables (general price
level → earnings → dividends) because the general price level obviously is the most exogenous variable and dividends are paid
from corporate earnings so that dividends should be seen as the least exogenous variable (with regard to variable-ordering
induced problems of impulse-response analysis see, for example, Basse and Reddemann, 2010). According to Hoover and Jordá
(2001) the VECM can now be considered to be a structural model. The confidence intervals (95% level) are computed using Efron
bootstrap techniques (e. g. Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). Examining the impulse response functions displayed in Fig. 1 does
indicate quite clearly that there is no empirical evidence for dividend signalling or dividend smoothing because neither the
response of dividends to a shock to corporate earnings nor the reaction of earnings to a shock to dividends is statistically
significant.
Interestingly, there is a statistically significant positive reaction of the inflation variable to a shock to dividend payouts. This
empirical finding obviously does not imply that dividends “cause” inflation in a philosophical sense. The impulse response
function only indicates a Granger causality; firms seem to anticipate future inflation rates and tend to adjust their dividend policy
to expected changes to the general price level. This result quite clearly shows that inflation can be an important variable testing
the theories of dividend determination.
6. Conclusion
In examining the dividend policy of the European banking industry there is no empirical evidence indicating that dividend
signalling and/or dividend smoothing are relevant economic phenomena using the approach suggested by Reddemann et al.
Table 1
Johansen cointegration test results.
Johansen trace test
Range: 1998Q4–2008Q4
4 time lags, seasonal dummies
R0 Trace stat. 90% 95% 99% p-values
0 47.94 32.25 35.07 40.78 0.0010
1 23.92 17.98 29.16 24.69 0.0134
2 6.19 7.60 9.14 12.53 0.1828
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(2010). Therefore, facing a severe financial crisis, European banks should definitely consider cutting or omitting dividends to
improve their financial strength. The fears of major negative consequences due to investors and financial analysts assuming that
dividend reductions are a reliable sign for future problems are not supported by the data sets analysed here.
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The financial crisis has led to controversial discussions about the capital base of the
European insurance industry. Dividend cuts have been suggested to preserve capital.
However, some observers seem to fear that investors could interpret a reduction of
dividends as a sign of future problems. The empirical evidence reported here does not
indicate that dividend smoothing or dividend signalling are relevant economic phenomena
examining the dividend policy of the European insurance industry. Therefore, insurance
companies should not be too concerned about the negative consequences of dividend cuts.
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Introduction
The subprime mortgage crisis and its negative effects on capital markets and global
economic growth have shattered the financial sector as a whole. Obviously, banks
have had to bear the brunt of the crisis. Nevertheless, stock prices of many insurers
also have at least temporarily plummeted. In this difficult situation a number of
European insurance companies have debated on either capital increases or dividend
cuts in order to preserve capital anticipating further write downs or even to comply
with minimum capital requirements demanded by regulation. Improving their
capitalization and financial strength may be necessary to stabilize the credit ratings
of some insurers, avoiding possible downgrades by the rating agencies. Additional
pressure may be imposed by the regulators, as there are discussions to react to the
crisis by increasing capital requirements not only for banks. Bullard, Neely and
Wheelock, for example, recently discussed several proposals of new government
regulations laying a special focus on the American International Group (AIG).1 Even
prior to its full implementation Solvency II may already stimulate the demand for
additional capital in the European insurance industry.2 However, raising capital from
1 Bullard et al. (2009).
2 Basse and Friedrich (2008).
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external sources may be difficult for insurers. This is also a direct consequence of the
crisis as numerous international banks already have issued new equity leading to a
shortage of additional capital for financial institutions. Meanwhile stock prices have at
least partly recovered. The German Prime Insurance Performance Index, for example,
has risen more than 70 per cent from its lowest in 2009. Nevertheless, raising capital
could still prove to be expensive for insurance companies in the near future.
Therefore, a dividend cut is the option to strengthen the capital base of the
European insurance industry this paper deals with. It is assumed to be an appropriate
response to liquidity problems and thus a valid tool in the environment of a financial
crisis. As a matter of fact, the level of dividends paid by insurers has dropped by nearly
60 per cent in Europe, in the wake of a trend turning out to be the largest cuts since
1938 throughout all economic sectors according to Standard & Poor’s.3 But dividend
cuts could be perceived as a negative signal indicating future problems to investors.
Given these discussions, this paper plans to empirically analyse the dividend policy
issue from the perspective of the European insurance industry, evaluating if dividend
cuts may be conducted. The impact of dividend policy on the company’s future
earnings is evaluated by seeking for dividend smoothing respectively signalling via
two econometric approaches while including inflation. If no evidence supporting
one of those hypotheses can be found insurers may cut their dividends to strengthen
their capital base without necessarily sending a negative signal.
Dividend policy issues and the insurance sector
In their seminal paper Miller and Modigliani have argued that a firm’s dividend policy
is irrelevant under certain assumptions.4 Most importantly, capital markets are
assumed to be perfect and no taxes exist. Under these conditions and with a given
investment policy of the firm, higher dividends result in lower capital gains. Therefore,
dividend policy has no economic relevance when investors do not prefer dividends to
capital gains or vice versa. Accepting this point of view, there is a dividend puzzle
because it can be observed that numerous firms in many countries regularly do pay
dividends. Trying to solve this dividend puzzle is an important task of financial
economics.
Many explanations for the existences of dividend payments are based on agency
theory. It is, for example, quite common to argue that dividends reduce free cash flow
and thereby force the firms to obtain capital from external sources more frequently
when trying to finance new investment projects. This mechanism provides additional
external monitoring and thus reduces agency costs. Rozeff has empirically tested
explanations of dividend payments based on agency theory examining U.S. data, but
has neglected regulated industries (e. g. insurers and banks) in his analysis, arguing
that the financing policies of regulated firms may be affected by their special status.5
More recently Casey, Smith and Puleo have tested an extend version of Rozeff’s model
3 Mackenzie and Oakley (2009).
4 Miller and Modigliani (1961).
5 Rozeff (1982).
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concluding that insurers do not have to employ strong external monitoring by paying
high dividends, as this function is executed by the regulators.6 Thus Rozeff’s
explanation of dividend payments is neglected in this paper as dividend cuts are
discussed as a measure to improve financial stability in troubled times. Many
observers do argue that capital is scarce following a major financial crisis that is
sometimes even compared to the Great Depression. In fact, as a result of numerous
international banks issuing new equity there is a shortage of additional capital for
financial institutions rendering the agency theory useless, as the monitoring function
cannot be upheld due to market constraints. Therefore, other explanations of dividend
policy have to be examined.
Economic theory does suggest that the management of a firm may use dividend
changes to overcome information asymmetries by signalling revisions to earnings
expectations to current and prospective investors. This is the so-called signalling
hypothesis of dividend policy. To avoid investors misinterpreting the management’s
actions, it may be reluctant to cut dividend payments. Accepting this point of view has
a number of consequences for the process of dividend signalling. Most importantly,
according to this view dividends should only be increased when management believes
that future cash flows are sufficiently strong and enable the firm to sustain the new
higher level of dividend payouts. Consequently this second theory, called the dividend
smoothing hypothesis, which may be seen as precautious signalling, does also assume
that a strong link between dividend payments and corporate earnings exists. However,
Goddard, McMillan and Wilson have argued convincingly that the signalling and
smoothing hypotheses make opposite predictions about the temporal relationship
between dividends and corporate earnings.7 While the signalling hypothesis predicts
that dividends lead earnings, the smoothing hypothesis suggests that earnings lead
dividend payments. In econometrics and more generally in empirical research the
question of causality is ambiguous. Here two approaches to this question are followed,
namely the concept of Granger causality and the even stronger one of impulse-
response analysis. The procedures are further explained in the next section.
Dividend policy is usually discussed from the perspective of industrial firms. An
extensive survey of this literature has been presented by Allen and Michaely.8
However, only few researchers have focused on dividend policy issues with respect to
insurance companies. Meanwhile, research with this special focus seems to become
increasingly popular. Recently, He and Liang, for example, have modelled the optimal
financing and dividend payout strategy of insurance companies assuming that the
management of the firm can control dividend policy, equity issuance and the
reinsurance rate.9
Insurers are often regarded as special because industrialized economies do very
much depend on the financial soundness of the insurance sector. Therefore, the
insurance industry in Europe and other parts of the world is subject to very tight
6 Casey et al. (2009).
7 Goddard et al. (2006).
8 Allen and Michaely (1995).
9 He and Liang (2009).
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government regulation. Obviously, the primary goal of insurance regulation is to
guarantee the solvency of insurance companies. As stated previously, Casey, Smith and
Puleo have shown that agency costs are not a major factor in strongly regulated
markets.10 So why do insurance companies pay dividends at all? In a second study,
Casey, Smith and Puleo have argued that investors probably prefer a high degree of
leverage in the insurance sector (while complying with regulation) since not just
customers but also investors are protected against insolvency by regulators.11 According
to this hypothesis, investors can use dividend income from insurers to obtain other
financial assets and maintain a high level of relatively risk-free leverage, holding a more
or less constant amount of funds invested in their portfolio of insurance stocks.
Examining the U.S. property and liability insurance industry by explaining the
monthly returns of 34 insurance stocks by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
beta and their dividend payouts, Lee and Forbes have documented some empirical
evidence indicating that dividend policy does have effects on stock prices of insurance
companies.12 Akhigbe, Borde and Madura have further refined these findings using cross-
sectional event studies to compare the stock price response to dividend increases.13
They find that dividend changes of insurance companies are perceived differently
to industrial firms with the special case of life insurers conveying less asymmetric
information than those of other insurers as the stock price response to dividend
changes was less. This means investors could be interested in non-public information
about future cash flows. As a consequence, dividend signalling may have a special
importance in the non-life insurance industry. Therefore, investors may have mixed
feelings about dividend increases of life insurers because a higher volume of dividend
payments reflects a smaller contribution to capital. This kind of reasoning does have
some tradition. In his study of the dividend policy of U.S. life insurers Harrington has
already argued that high dividend payouts can weaken the financial soundness of
insurance companies.14 Moreover, Akhigbe, Borde and Madura have also noted that
the regulation of life insurers could force more public disclosure of information than
is available from industrial firms reducing the need for dividend signalling.15 This
argument becomes even more striking within the Solvency II framework and its
tightened disclosure requirements for insurance companies.
Data and methodology
After reviewing the recent empirical evidence on dividend policy, Bhattacharyya has
argued that properly conducted empirical research should account for all implications
10 Casey et al. (2009).
11 Casey et al. (2007).
12 Lee and Forbes (1980).
13 Akhigbe et al. (1993).
14 Harrington (1981).
15 Akhigbe et al. (1993).
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of the respective underlying economic theories.16 Given that there are numerous
factors affecting a firm’s dividend policy, this is difficult to achieve. Basse, for example,
has recently noted that inflation may have an effect on dividend payments analysing the
dividend policy of Australian firms.17 However, inflation is generally neglected in
empirical work examining dividend policy issues – though Modigliani has noted that the
earnings-payout ratio is increased by inflation while stock prices might not change due
to different leverage of those effects.18 Therefore, this article also focuses on the aspect
of inflation studying the dividend policy of the European insurance industry.
As a consequence, this study takes a more macroeconomic perspective, analysing the
dividend policy of German and European (or—to be more precise—the European
Monetary Union (EMU)) insurance companies by examining quarterly data on earnings
and dividends reported for the insurance sector indices of the Deutsche Börse Prime All
Share Index and the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx stock market indices while also considering
inflation. More specifically, the dividend per index share and earnings per index share data
provided by Bloomberg are used. Inflation is measured by the GDP price deflator of the
respective economic area. Obviously analyses on the more aggregate level of indices have
their shortcomings, but the data for individual insurers are heterogeneous and often
incomplete. Thus these two indices are adequate proxies for the dividend and earnings
levels throughout the insurance sector. Trying to avoid possible problems due to the
introduction of the Euro, the sample analysed contains 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q4.
To identify the conjectured causalities between earnings and dividends, two different
concepts are used. First of all it is tested for Granger causality, meaning the knowledge of
one of the variables is significantly improving the forecast of the other. After that impulse-
response techniques in the Vector-Error-Correction Model (VECM) environment are
applied to analyse the interdependencies among the three variables, searching for signs of
dividend signalling or dividend smoothing. This is accomplished by performing an
impulse-response analysis, observing two time series after shocking the third, deducing the
causal structure between these three time series. Finding no empirical evidence supporting
one of these two theories of dividend determination would imply that insurers have until
now not been forced to maintain a somehow stable lead-lag relationship between
dividends and earnings. This result would indicate that insurance companies may cut
dividends to improve their financial soundness without necessarily having to fear major
negative consequences. On the other hand, empirical evidence indicating that dividend
signalling or dividend smoothing have been relevant economic phenomena would imply
that cutting dividends actually has negative consequences.
Results
As proposed standard Granger causality tests are performed for the two described
differentiated datasets (these are non-stationary time series as indicated by not reported
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These results mean the Null-hypothesis of no Granger causality cannot be omitted
for Germany in both directions and from Dividends to Earnings in the EMU. Only the
hypothesis of Earnings not Granger-causing Dividends has to be dropped, giving a
hint at the validity of dividend smoothing, at least on the level of the EMU insurance
industry. These first results will now be tested using the more sophisticated framework
of impulse-response analysis of a VECM. This model class includes long-term
equilibria between variables in a standard VAR by adding this link in the regression
equation to be estimated. Thus this technique considers interdependencies not
accounted for in standard multi time-series models. Some preliminary standard tests
have to be conducted to fix the parameters and to validate the applicability of this
model class.
As mentioned, ADF tests suggested all six time series examined are non-stationary
and integrated of order one as needed by a VECM. Furthermore, testing for
cointegration is required. The test of Johansen19 is applied in this case yielding the
following results for Germany (Table 3), using the critical values for breakpoint
scenarios from Johansen, Mosconi and Nielsen.20
Seasonal dummies are included to account for the strong seasonal patterns induced
by the dividends. Furthermore, a breakpoint in the test is included in 2001 Q4, as a
massive shift in earnings due to the events surrounding the terrorist attacks on 9-11 is
observed. The questions surrounding terror insurance are dealt with in great depth in
a paper by Thomann and Schulenburg.21 The dividend cuts in that period were not
as serious as the ones occurring right now, due to the nature of the incident being
different from the inherent problems the financial sector has to deal with in the current
crisis. Thus both periods (pre 9-11 and post 9-11) have to be analysed separately.
Table 1 Granger causality: Germany
Test for granger-causality:
H0: Earnings do not Granger-cause dividends
Test statistic: l=0.8963 pval-F( l; 10, 33)=0.4946
H0: Dividends do not Granger-cause earnings
Test statistic: l=0.9872 pval-F( l; 10, 33)=0.4399
Table 2 Granger causality: Europe
Test for granger-causality:
H0: Earnings do not Granger-cause dividends
Test statistic: l=2.9429 pval-F( l; 10, 36)=0.0236
H0: Dividends do not Granger-cause earnings
Test statistic: l=0.9838 pval-F( l; 10, 36)=0.4396
19 Johansen (1991).
20 Johansen et al. (2000).
21 Thomann and von der Schulenburg (2007).
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The cointegration test provides evidence for the existence of two cointegration
relationships, meaning the VAR should be augmented by a linear combination of the
original variables. While estimating this VECM with the three variables inflation
(DE_GDP_DEFL), earnings (DE_INS_EPS) and dividends (DE_INS_DPS) the rank
of cointegration is therefore assumed to be two. Seasonal dummies were included and
time lags of up to one year (four quarters) are considered in the process. The resulting
impulse-response functions with bootstrapped confidence intervals (400 replications)
are displayed below (Figure 1).
Using the Cholesky decomposition to orthogonalize the impulses as suggested by
Sims, the ordering of variables follows economic theory.22 We assume that inflation is
the most exogenous variable and that dividends are paid from earnings. The graphs
Table 3 Cointegration between earnings, dividends and inflation in Germany
Trace test (seasonal dummies included)
Hypothesized no. of CE(s) LR Pval 90% 95% 99%
0 67.48 0.0000 38.91 41.69 47.25
1 32.20 0.0039 22.83 25.09 29.73
2 7.89 0.2572 10.66 12.50 16.46
Figure 1. Impulse-response analysis: Germany.
22 Sims (1980).
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clearly show no significance of dividends to earnings or vice versa, as the confidence
intervals do always contain the time-axis, meaning the response is not significantly
different from zero. Therefore, following Goddard, McMillan and Wilson no evidence
that dividend signalling or dividend smoothing are relevant phenomena could be
found.23
Now the same techniques are applied to the set of data for the European insurers
examining the variables inflation (EMU_GDP_DEFL), earnings (EMU_INS_EPS)
and dividends (EMU_INS_DPS). The estimation used four lags (one year) and the
breakpoint at 2001 Q4 again. Seasonal dummies were included as well. The results of
the cointegration test are presented in Table 4. The respective impulse-response
functions are displayed in Figure 2. Again dividends do not react significantly to
Table 4 Cointegration between earnings, dividends and inflation in Europe
Trace test (seasonal dummies included)
Hypothesized no. of CE(s) LR Pval 90% 95% 99%
0 63.02 0.0000 38.84 41.55 46.97
1 25.76 0.0397 22.83 25.06 29.60
2 7.17 0.3297 10.74 12.57 16.52
Figure 2. Impulse-response analysis: Europe.
23 Goddard et al. (2006).
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shocks in earnings and vice versa even though the confidence intervals in the Earnings
on Dividends graph scrape the zero.
These results do not support the conjecture of causality between earnings and
dividends and the result found in the Granger-causality test could not be backed up by
the impulse-response analysis. One explanation for the differing outcomes of the
analyses is the inability of standard Granger-causality tests to account for the complex
relationship among the three variables, which is explicitly used in the impulse-response
analysis. Especially the interdependence with inflation is neglected in the standard tests.
Conclusion
Dividend cuts are one way to improve the capitalization and financial strength of the
European insurance industry. This article examines the dividend policy of European
and specifically German insurers using VECM techniques. The basic argument is that
without any empirical evidence dividends actually did matter in the past, insurers may
reduce or even omit dividend payments if needed. The results of the empirical
investigations are quite clear. No convincing evidence was found indicating that
dividend smoothing or dividend signalling are relevant economic phenomena
examining the dividend policy of the European insurance industry. This result does
have major implications. Most importantly, facing a severe financial crisis, European
insurance companies cutting dividends and thereby improving their financial strength
and complying with regulatory standards do not necessarily have to fear major
negative consequences due to investors assuming this measure to be an indubitable
sign for future problems.
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Abstract: The global financial crisis has created some problems for car 
manufacturers and their suppliers. Dividend cuts and omissions have been 
suggested as one possibility to improve the financial strength of firms in  
the automotive industry. However, some observers have expressed fears that 
investors could interpret a reduction of dividends as a sign for future problems. 
This argument is quite clearly based on the dividend signalling and dividend 
smoothing hypotheses. Therefore, we use VAR/VECM techniques to analyse 
the dividend policy of the German automotive industry. The empirical evidence 
reported in this study does indicate that there is no support for the dividend 
signalling hypothesis. However, dividend smoothing seems to be a relevant 
economic phenomenon. As a consequence, firms in this sector of the German 
economy considering dividend cuts or omissions should at least communicate 
clearly why they plan to do so. 
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1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis has had massive negative effects on the world economy. As a 
consequence real economic growth rates in the USA, Europe and other parts of the world 
fell into negative territory. Some sectors were hit especially strong. In fact, banks, 
insurers and the automotive industry seem to have suffered most. Governments in many 
countries decided to help companies in these sectors by designing specific rescue 
packages. Besides of bailouts of banks and insurance companies the US Government, for 
example, also approved a USD 3 billion scrappage programme intended to give 
incentives to purchase more cars. Similar measures to help stabilise the demand for cars 
were also implemented in Germany and other European countries. The German 
Government initiated a scrappage scheme for cars being older than nine years. The 
programme started in February 2009 and was at first limited to a maximum of 600, 000 
cars and a total amount of EUR 1.5 billion. The unexpected success of the programme 
prompted the government to increase the budget to EUR 5.0 billion. Given a bonus of 
EUR 2.500 per car 2 million buyers benefited from the scheme until it was depleted in 
September 2009. Besides the German scrappage programme, which was one of the first 
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in Europe in the context of the financial crisis, schemes with at most lower bonuses were 
initiated in several European countries (e.g., France, Italy and Spain). 
Especially the bank rescue plans in the USA and other countries have provoked 
sceptical comments. The US popular press, for example, has harshly criticised that banks 
used ‘taxpayer funds’ to pay dividends. Therefore, it has become increasingly difficult for 
the corporate sector to obtain additional help from governments in the USA and other 
parts of the world. In fact, the German Government recently turned down Opel’s request 
for loan guarantees. As a consequence, firms were forced to search for new ways to 
handle the financial crisis. Obviously, cutting or omitting dividends is one way for 
companies to save cash and to improve their financial position in a difficult economic 
environment. Reductions to dividend payments have been particularly common in the 
financial services industry. However, the recession also put dividend cuts on the agenda 
of firms in other sectors of the global economy. Before this crisis the German car 
manufacturers Daimler and Volkswagen, for example, were well known as reliable 
dividend payers in the last decade. Even when facing economic bad times – as in the 
early 1990s – VW continued to distribute a (reduced) dividend. Unlike Daimler 
Volkswagen decided to pay a dividend of EUR 1.60 in 2010 (for the fiscal year 2009) 
after paying a dividend per ordinary share of EUR 1.93 in 2009. The management of 
Daimler declared in 2010 to omit its dividend for the fiscal year 2009 due to the 
disappointing business development in consequence of the financial crisis. In 2009 
Daimler distributed a dividend of EUR 0.60 per share. Both companies have paid a 
dividend in 2011. 
While numerous firms have decided to cut or omit dividends as a reaction to the crisis 
some market participants have warned that investors may have mixed feelings about 
dividend reductions. As will be discussed later on these fears are based on very popular 
theoretical concepts – namely the dividend signalling and dividend smoothing  
hypotheses – which predict that dividend changes provide information about the future 
development of corporate earnings. In fact, investors may interpret dividend cuts or 
omissions by a firm as a sign for more problems to come. This study tries to empirically 
test whether there is support for these hypotheses examining data from the automotive 
industry in Germany. Without clear empirical evidence pointing in this direction car 
manufacturers and their suppliers could decide to reduce dividend payments without 
having to fear major negative consequences due to investors interpreting this measure as 
an obvious sign for further difficulties. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2, 
reviews the relevant literature. Then the third section discusses some methodological 
issues and describes the datasets examined. The empirical evidence is presented and 
evaluated in Section 4. The final section concludes. 
2 Literature review 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) have shown that in a perfect market the dividend policy of 
a firm is irrelevant. In this environment higher dividends simply result in lower capital 
gains. As a consequence, the dividend policy of a firm is seen to be of no economic 
relevance when investors do not prefer dividends to capital gains or vice versa. However, 
it can be observed that numerous firms in many countries regularly do pay dividends. 
This is puzzling from the perspective of economic theory (e.g., Black, 1976; Mann, 
1989). Moreover, dividend income is taxed more heavily than capital gains in a number 
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of countries (e.g., Easterbrook, 1984; Abrutyn and Turner, 1990). Thus, there even are 
clear arguments against dividend payments. Trying to solve this puzzle it has been 
suggested that the management of a firm can use dividend changes to overcome 
information asymmetries by signalling revisions to earnings expectations to investors. 
This dividend signalling hypothesis is a very popular explanation for the existence of 
dividend payments (e.g., Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Denis et al., 1994). It is also quite 
common to argue that firms try to avoid dividend cuts – which are presumed to give 
information perceived to be negative by external economic agents (e.g., Jensen and 
Johnson, 1995; Chen and Wu, 1999). This so-called dividend smoothing hypothesis is of 
special importance for our paper. The basic idea of this theory is that a firm should only 
increase dividends when the management believes that future cash flows enable the firm 
to maintain the higher level of dividend payouts. Therefore, firms are assumed to more 
frequently increase than lower dividend payments. Moreover, this theory also predicts 
that dividend cuts are more pronounced than dividend increases. There is some empirical 
evidence supporting these predictions (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 1988; Michaely et al., 
1995). At this point, numerous relevant studies could be discussed. Yoon and Starks 
(1995), for example, have shown that financial analysts respond to dividend cuts by 
making statistically significant changes to their future earnings forecasts – however, 
according to this paper the reaction of earnings forecasts to dividend increases is not 
statistically significant. Bharati et al. (1998) have also documented a strong link between 
dividend changes and earnings forecasts and have found weak empirical evidence for 
dividend smoothing. The most important motivation for dividend smoothing seems to be 
that managers fear an asymmetric reaction of stock prices to dividend cuts with investors 
reacting more strongly to dividend decreases than to dividend increases. An excessively 
negative effect of dividend cuts on stock prices would, for example, imply that obtaining 
additional capital by issuing new equity would become more costly for a firm. However, 
the empirical evidence reported by Ackert and Smith (1993) seems to show that in the 
USA stock prices are more strongly linked to a less narrowly defined time series 
measuring corporate payouts than to the observed dividend time series. Therefore, the 
negative effects of dividend reductions on stock prices probably should not be 
overestimated. 
Both theories assume that there is a strong link between dividend payments and 
corporate earnings. In fact, it has been argued that dividend smoothing can be seen as 
dividend signalling with precaution (e.g., Basse et al., 2010; Reddemann et al., 2010). 
However, it has been argued convincingly by Goddard et al. (2006) that the signalling 
and smoothing hypotheses make opposite predictions about the temporal relationship 
between dividends and earnings. While the signalling hypothesis suggests that dividends 
lead corporate earnings the smoothing hypothesis predicts that earnings should lead 
dividend payments. 
Excellent surveys of the relevant literature have been published by Allen and 
Michaely (1995) as well as Bhattacharyya (2007). Both papers have also elaborately 
discussed empirical tests of different theories of dividend determination and have clearly 
documented that the empirical evidence reported in numerous studies does not give a 
clear picture. In fact, this is probably the only consensus researchers examining dividend 
policy issues have reached (e.g., Collins et al., 1996; DeAngelo et al., 2000). Recently, 
Basse (2009) has suggested that inflation may be of relevance because this 
macroeconomic variable is an important driver of dividend growth that is usually  
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neglected trying to explain why firms pay dividends. This may be one factor that can help 
to explain why there is no unquestionable empirical evidence supporting specific theories 
of dividend determination. A gradual increase of dividend payments due to higher 
inflation rates could, for instance, be falsely interpreted as support for the dividend 
smoothing hypothesis. 
3 Methodology and data 
We try to analyse the dividend policy of the German automotive industry testing for 
dividend signalling and dividend smoothing. As a matter of fact, our study tries to add 
some insights by focussing on one specific sector – an approach that has become quite 
popular in recent times (e.g., Akhigbe et al., 1993; Bessler and Nohel, 1996). The basic 
idea of this paper is that car manufacturers and their suppliers should not necessarily fear 
dividend cuts or dividend omissions when there is no clear empirical evidence indicating 
that dividends did matter in the past – which, of course, means that there are no signs for 
dividend signalling or dividend smoothing. Following Goddard et al. (2006) empirical 
evidence indicating that dividends Granger cause corporate earnings would be supportive 
for the dividend signalling hypothesis while the finding that earnings Granger cause 
dividends would underline the relevance of the dividend smoothing hypothesis. 
Reddemann et al. (2010) have suggested an improved testing procedure by including the 
additional variable inflation because Basse (2009) has shown that the negligence of this 
major driver of dividend growth could bias the findings of tests of theories of dividend 
determination. 
In order to analyse the relationships between the variables examined here we use the 
econometric technique of vector autoregressions (VAR). The time series used are 
possibly non-stationary and could be cointegrated. Finding cointegration would imply the 
existence of a strong long-term equilibrium relationship (e.g., Engle and Granger, 1987; 
Murray, 1994). In equation (1) y is a vector of m possibly non-stationary variables and Ai 
is a m u m matrix (with i = 1, …, n): 
1 1 2 2 .t t t n t n ty A y A y A Y u      !  (1) 
The error term ut is assumed to be a random variable. Rearranging equation (1) yields: 
 1 1 2 2 ,t t t n t n ty A I y A y A Y u  '      !  (2) 
   1 1 1 2 2 ,t t t n t n ty A I y A A I y A Y u  '   '      !  (3) 
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Johansen (1991) has suggested a cointegration test which is based on the determination of 
the rank of the so-called long run impact matrix . The trace statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that there are at most k cointegration relationships: 
 
1






  ¦  (5) 
In equation (5) T is the number of observations and Oi are the m – k ordered eigenvalues 
from the reduced rank regression. The test is performed using the critical values 
suggested by Doornik (1998). 
There are three possibilities. The system is stationary when the rank of the matrix  
is m. The correct modelling strategy in this case is to estimate a VAR in levels. A second 
possibility is that the system is non-stationary but there are no cointegration relationships 
among the variables analysed. In this case the rank of the matrix  is 0 and a VAR in 
first differences has to be estimated. There is also a third possible result – namely that the 
rank of the matrix  is k < m. Then there exist k cointegration relationships among the 
variables examined. This result would indicate that there are long run equilibrium 
relationships between the time series which have to be considered. In this case the 
estimation of a vector error correction model (VECM) is the correct empirical research 
strategy. 
After having estimated a VAR/VECM the dynamics of this model have to be 
analysed. This can be done by using impulse response analysis. As already noted, the 
dividend signalling and dividend smoothing hypotheses are the theoretical basis for the 
argument that a firm should be very careful when considering dividend cuts or omissions. 
Thus, it has to be tested whether there is empirical evidence indicating that dividend 
signalling or dividend smoothing are of relevance. In Goddard et al. (2006) have argued 
that the finding that dividends lead corporate earnings would be supportive for the 
dividend signalling hypothesis while hints that earnings lead dividends would give 
support to the dividend smoothing hypothesis. In this paper we estimate two models. 
Following Goddard et al. (2006) we estimate a two variable model examining dividends 
and corporate profits. Moreover, we also use a variant of this test which has been 
suggested by Reddemann et al. (2010). In this case we include inflation as third variable. 
Therefore, analysing the dividend policy of the German automotive industry we take 
a more macroeconomic perspective examining aggregate data on corporate earnings and 
dividends as well as the general level of prices. Consequently, we focus on the dividends 
per index share and the earnings per index share of the Prime Automobile Index. This 
index is a gauge for the performance of the automobile sector in the broad German Prime 
All Share Index. It combines the major German car manufacturers VW, Daimler and 
BMW with their most important suppliers (e.g., Continental and Leoni). Inflation is 
measured by the German GDP price deflator. This is a broad gauge of the purchasing 
power of money. 
We examine quarterly data. Trying to prevent problems with structural change, which 
are known to cause massive problems using cointegration tests (e.g., Gregory and 
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Hansen, 1996) we have shortened our data sample analysing the period 1999 to 2009. 
Thereby, we hope to avoid possible structural breaks due to the introduction of the Euro 
in January 1999. Moreover, selecting this sample also helps to eliminate problems with 
structural change caused by the merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler in 1998. However, 
the decision to shorten the sample comes at a price. In fact, Hargreaves (1994) has shown 
that there may be some difficulties using the Johansen test with less than 100 data points. 
However, he has also argued that it is quite common for applied econometricians to work 
with sample sizes of 50 or fewer observations. Moreover, Cheung and Lai (1993) have 
not examined sample sizes below 33 data points studying the finite sample bias of the 
Johansen procedure because of problems with limited degrees of freedom. Thus, based on 
theses studies we believe that the avoidance of possible structural breaks due to 
introduction of the Euro and the merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler is the correct 
empirical research strategy even though this decision results in a sample with just enough 
data points to use the Johansen procedure. 
4 Empirical analysis 
ADF-tests (not reported) indicate that the three time series examined in this study are 
non-stationary variables that seem to be integrated of order 1. The results of the 
cointegration tests reported in Tables 1 and 2 signal that dividends payouts and corporate 
earnings are cointegrated and that two cointegration relationships exist when the third 
variable general price level is added. In both cases we have also included seasonal 
dummies because of the strong seasonality of the dividend payments. The critical values 
for the tests have been tabulated by Doornik (1998). 
Table 1 Cointegration analysis: the two variable model 
Johansen trace test 
R0 Trace stat. 90% 95% 99% p-values 
0 31.34 17.98 20.16 24.69 0.0007 
1 4.97 7.60 9.14 12.53 0.0134 
Notes: Range: 1999Q2 to 2009Q4. With seasonal dummies. 
Table 2 Cointegration analysis: the three variable model 
Johansen trace test 
R0 Trace stat. 90% 95% 99% p-values 
0 70.11 32.25 35.07 40.78 0.0000 
1 22.82 17.98 29.16 24.69 0.0199 
2 7.50 7.60 9.14 12.53 0.1044 
Notes: Range: 1999Q2 to 2009Q4. With seasonal dummies. 
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These results require the estimation of VECMs with two [earnings (EPS) and dividends 
(DPS)] respectively three variables [earnings, dividends and the general price level 
(DEFL)]. We have used four time lags because we believe that a parsimonious model is 
to be favoured due to the limitations to the available number of observations. Trying to 
analyse the interrelationships among the variables impulse response functions are used. 
The orthogonalised shocks are computed using the Cholesky decomposition. This 
technique is known to produce results that are not invariant to the ordering of variables in 
the model. In the case examined here, the ordering of variables is chosen on the basis of 
economic theory. Inflation quite clearly is the most exogenous variable considered in the 
model. Moreover, dividends are paid from corporate earnings. Thus, our ordering of 
variables is general price level o earnings o dividends. Following Hoover and Jordá 
(2001) our model therefore, is a structural VAR/VECM because a particular ordering of 
variables is selected for the Cholesky decomposition. 
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Figure 3 Impulse response analysis: the three variable VECM (DPS o EPS) (see online version 
for colours) 
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Figure 4 Impulse response analysis: the three variable VECM (EPS o DPS) (see online version 
for colours) 
 
The confidence intervals are computed using bootstrap techniques as suggested by Efron 
(see, for example, Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) which have proven to be advantageous 
working with small sample sizes (e.g., Scholz, 1994; Basse and Reddemann, 2010). Both 
the two and the three variable models give no indication that dividend signalling is a 
phenomenon of economic relevance because dividends quite clearly do not Granger 
cause corporate earnings (see Figures 1 and 3). However, corporate earnings seem to 
Granger cause dividend payments. Therefore, the empirical evidence reported in Figures 
2 and 4 does support the dividend smoothing hypothesis. Consequently, managers seem 
to fear dividend cuts and try to avoid the need to reduce dividends by only slowly 
increase dividends when corporate profits rise. Interestingly, the two variable model does 
provide more obvious hints indicating that the members of the Prime Automobile Index 
smooth their dividends. This finding does give some support to the assumption that the 
negligence of inflation could distort tests for dividend smoothing and dividend signalling. 
However, given that the three variable model shows clear signs for dividend smoothing in 
the case examined here, it can be concluded that German carmakers are following the 
practice of only gradually increasing dividends. 
5 Conclusions 
Analysing the dividend policy of the German automotive industry we have found no 
support for the dividend signalling hypothesis. However, there is clear empirical evidence 
indicating that dividend smoothing is of relevance using both the empirical research 
strategy proposed by Goddard et al. (2006) and a modification of this approach which 
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recently has been suggested by Reddemann et al. (2010). Given that dividend smoothing 
can be interpreted as dividend signalling with precaution the empirical findings reported 
in this paper show that dividend cuts or omissions could be interpreted as negative  
signals by financial analysts and investors. This interesting finding does have practical 
implications. In fact, the German automotive industry should be aware of the possible 
negative effects of reductions to dividend payments. Assuming that the practice of 
dividend smoothing is a direct consequence of asymmetrically distributed information 
between investors and the management of the firms, companies planning to cut or omit 
dividends at least ought to communicate very clearly why dividends are reduced. This 
may help to minimise the possible negative effects. There are a number of interesting 
additional research questions. First of all, it could give news insights to include economic 
growth as an additional macroeconomic variable (see Basse and Reddemann, 2011). 
Adding this time series may be useful because using this four variable model would 
include the two main drivers of earnings growth (inflation and real economic activity). In 
fact, Berner (2002) recently has argued that econometricians should focus more strongly 
on the analysis of corporate profits. Therefore, this approach – which would combine 
macroeconomic and financial variables – could proof to be quite interesting. Moreover, 
additional sectors should be analysed. This would enable econometricians to compare 
differences (e.g., the automotive industry and companies from the utility sector). 
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Abstract The financial crisis has led to controversial discussions about the capital
base of the insurance industry. Dividend cuts and capital increases have been sug-
gested to counter diminishing equity. However, some observers seem to fear that
investors could interpret a reduction of dividends as a sign for future problems. The
empirical evidence from the Italian insurance sector reported here does indeed indi-
cate that dividend smoothing is a relevant economic phenomenon. Therefore, Italian
insurance companies should rethink dividend policy rather carefully due to the pos-
sible negative consequences of dividend cuts.
Zusammenfassung Die Finanzkrise hat eine Diskussion zur Eigenkapitalbasis von
Versicherungsunternehmen ausgelöst. Mögliche Auswege, um schwindende Rückla-
gen zu konsolidieren sind Dividendenkürzungen oder Eigenkapitalerhöhungen. Al-
lerdings könnten insbesondere Dividendenkürzungen von Beobachtern als negatives
Signal gewertet und zukünftige Probleme erwartet werden. Empirische Analysen zei-
gen, dass für die italienische Versicherungswirtschaft die Signalwirkung durch Divi-
dendenpolitik nicht unterschätzt werden sollte. Daher sollten italienische Versicherer
ihre Dividendenpolitik sorgfältig austarieren, um keine falschen Signale zu senden
und in Folge mit negativen Folgen konfrontiert zu werden.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis has had major negative effects on the global banking and insur-
ance industries. A number of large financial institutions have collapsed or been bailed
out. Banks have, of course, been hit especially hard. Nevertheless, the insurance in-
dustry has also had some problems. As a response to the crisis regulators have begun
to discuss tougher capital requirements. These new efforts of the regulatory author-
ities do mainly focus on stricter bank capital rules. However, Bullard et al. (2009)
have recently discussed a number of proposals of new government regulations for
financial institutions including higher capital requirements using AIG as an example
from the insurance industry. Moreover, the new regulatory requirements codified in
Solvency II could also force the European insurance industry to increase its capital
levels. This is especially true for life insurers that have mainly invested in bonds with
rather short maturities (e.g. Basse and Friedrich 2008).
Due to the crisis raising capital from external sources may have been difficult for
insurers recently. While stock prices have at least partly recovered it could still prove
to be quite expensive for insurance companies to obtain additional capital in the near
future. The Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Insurance Price Index, for example, has risen con-
siderably from its lows in March 2009 but still is below its price level in January 2008.
As a consequence, European insurance companies do consider dividend cuts in order
to preserve capital. In fact, some insurers (e.g., Swiss Re) already have announced
dividend cuts or omissions in 2009. However, others seem to fear the negative con-
sequences of dividend cuts because investors could interpret a reduction of dividend
payments as a negative signal indicating future problems.
Given these discussions we plan to empirically analyse the dividend policy of the
Italian insurance industry using a framework that has recently been suggested by Red-
demann et al. (2010). Empirical evidence from Italy is of special interest as Italian
insurers are an integral part of the global insurance industry. Many companies have
a long tradition. Actually, the “modern” insurance industry has its roots in the mar-
itime insurance contracts invented in Genoa during the 14th century (e.g. Holdsworth
1917 and Greif 1994). More specifically, we search for hints indicating that dividend
signalling or dividend smoothing are relevant economic phenomena. The basic idea
of this paper is that insurers would not necessarily need to fear dividend cuts or even
dividend omissions if empirical evidence did not support the hypothesis dividends
did matter in the past.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 briefly summarizes the discussions about
dividend policy issues from the perspective of economic theory. Section 3 then pro-
vides a literature review mainly focussing on empirical tests of theories of dividend
determination. Section 4 describes the data sets examined and discusses methodologi-
cal issues. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence. The final section then concludes
by outlining the implications of the empirical findings.
2 Some thoughts about dividend policy issues
At first sight it may be surprising that there are controversial discussions about divi-
dend cuts or omissions of insurance companies because Miller and Modigliani (1961)
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have argued convincingly that the dividend policy of a firm is irrelevant under cer-
tain assumptions. Most importantly, they assume that the firm’s investment policy is
given, capital markets are perfect and taxes do not exist. Then higher dividends result
in lower capital gains and the dividend policy of a firm does have no economic rele-
vance when investors do not prefer dividends to capital gains or vice versa. Therefore,
there is a dividend puzzle as numerous firms in many countries regularly do actually
pay dividends. Trying to solve this dividend puzzle has proven to be quite difficult.
The most popular approaches to explain why firms pay dividends are based on
agency theory. The argument that dividend payments reduce free cash flow and
thereby force the management of a firm to obtain capital from external sources more
frequently when new investment projects have to be financed is one popular exam-
ple. Raising new capital a firm has to give information to investment bankers, reg-
ulators and prospective investors. This process of providing information to external
economic agents is assumed to help shareholders monitor and control the manage-
ment of the firm and thus reducing agency costs. However, obtaining capital from
external sources by issuing new equity generates transaction costs. Therefore, it has
been argued that the optimal dividend policy of a firm should minimize the sum of
the transaction and agency costs.
It has also been proposed that the management of a firm may use dividend changes
to overcome information asymmetries by signalling revisions of earnings expecta-
tions to financial analysts and investors. This dividend signalling theory is an impor-
tant approach to explain the existence of dividend payments. However, many financial
economists do believe that managers try to avoid dividend cuts—which are presumed
to give information perceived to be negative by external economic agents. According
to this view dividends should only be increased when the management believes that
future cash flows are strong enough to enable the firm to sustain the new higher level
of dividend payouts. Thus, this so-called dividend smoothing theory does also assume
that a strong link between dividend payments and corporate earnings exists. In fact,
dividend smoothing can be interpreted as dividend signalling with precaution. How-
ever, Goddard et al. (2006) have argued that the signalling and smoothing hypotheses
make opposing predictions about the temporal relationship between corporate earn-
ings and dividend payments. While the signalling hypothesis suggests that dividends
lead corporate earnings the smoothing hypothesis predicts that earnings should lead
dividend payments.
3 Literature review
In the literature dividend policy issues are usually discussed from the perspective of
industrial firms. An extensive survey of this literature has been presented by Allen
and Michaely (1995). Only few researchers have examined the dividend policy of
insurance companies. He and Liang (2009) are a notable exception. They recently
have modelled the optimal financing and dividend payout strategy of insurance com-
panies assuming that the management of the firm can control dividend policy, equity
issuance and the reinsurance rate. This type of research is very important due to the
special role of insurers. As a matter of fact, the insurance industry in Europe and
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other parts of the world is subject to very tight government regulation. Analysing the
determinants of dividend policy Rozeff (1982), for example, has omitted insurance
companies from his empirical investigations concerning dividend policy arguing that
government regulation may indeed affect their payout policy. The primary goal of
insurance regulation is to guarantee the solvency of insurance companies in order to
protect the customers. However, many financial economists seem to believe the spe-
cial government regulation of the sector could also reduce the agency costs borne by
the shareholders of insurance companies. Therefore, dividend payments by insurance
companies can be seen to be even more puzzling than dividend payments by industrial
firms. Trying to find an explanation Casey et al. (2007) have argued that investors in
the insurance sector prefer a high degree of leverage since regulation does protect not
only customers but also investors against insolvency. According to their hypothesis
investors can use dividend income from insurers to obtain other financial assets and
maintain a high level of relatively risk-free leverage holding a more or less constant
amount of funds invested in their portfolio of insurance stocks.
Akhigbe et al. (1993) have noted that it is very difficult for external economic
agents to assess the true economic condition of any insurance company at a partic-
ular point of time because accounting procedures frequently hide major changes in
the market values of real estate holdings (which, of course, are an important asset
class for many insurers). This lack of complete information could obviously increase
the problems with information asymmetries. As a consequence, investors may have
a special interest in additional information about future cash flows. According to
this hypothesis dividend signalling would quite clearly have a major importance for
insurance companies. Testing this theory does not give a clear picture. In fact, the
empirical evidence reported in the study seems to indicate that dividend increases by
life insurers convey less asymmetric information than dividend increases by industrial
firms while the amount of information signalled with dividend increases of property-
liability and “other” insurers is quite similar to that of industrial firms. Trying to
explain this result is not that easy. First of all, the authors of the study have argued
that the regulation of life insurers could force more public disclosure of informa-
tion than is available from industrial firms reducing the need for dividend signalling.
Moreover, they have also noted that U.S. life insurers maintain relatively low levels
of capital compared to property-liability insurers. Consequently, investors may have
mixed feelings about dividend increases of life insurers because a higher volume of
dividend payments reflects a smaller contribution to capital.
This argument is not new. In fact, already Harrington (1981) has noted that high
dividend payouts can have negative effects on the financial soundness of insurance
companies examining the dividend policy of U.S. life insurers. The empirical evi-
dence reported in this important study does indicate that the dividend policy of U.S.
insurance companies in general does react rather slowly to changes in corporate earn-
ings. The study has also shown a tendency of insurers to increase dividend payments
following acquisitions by holding companies. This finding can obviously not be ex-
plained by traditional agency theoretic models of dividend policy. As a matter of fact,
he has argued that the higher dividend payments of acquired U.S. insurers could be a
consequence of the demand for investment capital by the parent companies.
While a small number of additional studies does exists (e.g. Lee and Forbes 1980
and Casey et al. 2009) empirical research efforts analyzing the dividend policy of
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insurance companies have been quite limited. In sum, the evidence reported in the
few empirical studies does not give a clear picture. The situation is quite similar to
the results reported for industrial firms where seemingly also no consensus exists in
spite of the fact that there have been far more research efforts. In fact, most finan-
cial economists tend to believe that additional empirical evidence is needed. Allen
and Michaely (1995), for example, have noted that much work remains to be done.
Bhattacharyya (2007) recently has argued that properly conducted future empirical
research should account for all implications of the underlying economic theories of
dividend policy. Most importantly, Basse (2009) has suggested that inflation may
be of relevance because this macroeconomic variable is a major driver of dividend
growth usually neglected in empirical work testing theories of dividend determina-
tion, even though Modigliani (1982) has noted that the earnings-payout ratio is in-
creased by inflation while stock prices might not change due to different leverage
of those effects. This fact could help to explain the generally inconclusive findings
reported in the literature. A gradual increase of dividend payments due to higher in-
flation rates could, for example, be falsely identified as empirical evidence supporting
the dividend smoothing hypothesis.
Because of the subprime mortgage crisis the dividend policy of the financial ser-
vices industry obviously is of special importance at the moment. Therefore, Red-
demann et al. (2010) recently have analyzed the dividend policy of the European
insurance industry examining data from Germany and the European Monetary Union
(EMU) as a whole. Considering possible effects of inflation on dividend policy they
have used a variant of the test suggested by Goddard et al. (2006) and have found no
clear empirical evidence indicating that dividend smoothing or dividend signalling
are relevant economic phenomena. Accordingly, they have argued that insurance
companies may cut dividends and thereby improve their financial strength as a re-
action to the crisis without necessarily having to fear major negative consequences
due to investors assuming that this measure is a clear sign for future problems.
4 Data and methodology
This paper tries to analyse the dividend policy of Italian insurers by also focusing
on the aspect of inflation. We use the framework suggested by Reddemann et al.
(2010) who have employed cointegration techniques to analyse the dividend policy
of the insurance industry of Germany and the EMU as a whole by taking a more
macroeconomic perspective examining aggregate data on earnings and dividends as
well as the general price level. Therefore, we analyse the dividends per index share
and earnings per index share of the Milan Stock Exchange Insurance Companies
Index. Inflation is measured by the Italian GDP price deflator. In order to make the
results of this study comparable to the empirical findings of Reddemann et al. (2010)
our sample is 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q4. This also helps to avoid possible problems with
structural breaks due to the introduction of the Euro.
Cointegration describes a long run equilibrium relationship between non-stationary
variables which follow common trends. Two time series integrated of order 1, for
example, are said to be cointegrated when there is a linear combination of these
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variables that is stationary. Johansen (1991) has suggested a multivariate cointegra-
tion test based on the econometric technique of vector autoregressions (VAR). In (1)
y is a vector of m possibly non-stationary variables and Ai is a m × m matrix (with
i = 1, . . . , n):
yt = A1yt−1 + A2yt−2 + · · · + Anyt−n + ut . (1)
The error term ut is assumed to satisfy the usual assumptions. Rearranging this VAR
in levels yields:
!yt = (A1 − I )yt−1 + A2yt−2 + · · · + Anyt−n + ut , (2)
!yt = (A1 − I )!yt−1 + (A1 + A2 − I )yt−2 + · · · + Anyt−n + ut , (3)
!yt = "1!yt−1 + "2!yt−2 + · · · + "yt−n + ut
= "i!yt−i + "yt−n + ut , (4)
where:
"i = −(I − Ah),
" = −(I − Ai),
Testing for cointegration is done by determining the rank of the so-called long run
impact matrix ". In fact, k cointegration relationships among the variables exam-
ined exist when the rank of the matrix " is k < m. Using the trace statistic the null
hypothesis that there are at most k cointegration relationships is tested:
Trace = −T ln(1 − λi ). (5)
In (5) T is the number of observations and λi are the m− k ordered eigenvalues from
the reduced rank regression. The test is performed using the critical values tabulated
by Doornik (1998) in the no-breakpoint scenarios and Johansen et al. (2000) in the
breakpoint scenarios.
When cointegration is a relevant phenomenon there are long run equilibrium rela-
tionships among the variables examined. This important information has to be used in
the process of model building by estimating a vector error correction model (VECM).
The dynamics of this model can then be analysed using impulse response analysis.
The dividend signalling and dividend smoothing hypotheses quite clearly are the the-
oretical basis for the argument that insurers should at least be very careful when
using dividend cuts or omissions to strengthen their capital base. Therefore, it has to
be tested whether dividend signalling or dividend smoothing are relevant economic
phenomena. Following Goddard et al. (2006) empirical evidence indicating that div-
idends lead corporate earnings would be supportive for the dividend signalling hy-
pothesis while the finding that earnings lead dividends would give support to the
dividend smoothing hypothesis.
5 Results
According to ADF- and KPSS-tests (not reported) the three time series are found to
be nonstationary and integrated of order 1. The cointegration tests reported in Table 1
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Table 1 Johansen cointegration
test results
*: rejection on 10% level
**: rejection on 5% level
***: rejection on 1% level
Without break With break (2003 Q4)
Hypothesis Trace statistic p-value Trace statistic p-value
0 or less 34.75 0.0543* 154.84 0.0000***
1 or less 18.16 0.0948* 70.52 0.0000***
2 or less 5.36 0.2548 10.36 0.1286
indicate that two cointegration relationships seem to exist between the three vari-
ables general price level (Defl), corporate earnings (Earnings) and dividend payouts
(Dividends). We include seasonal dummies for all test specifications, as the dividend
payouts have a strong seasonal pattern. Moreover, there also is empirical evidence for
a structural break in the end of 2003. Structural change obviously can be a problem
testing for cointegration (e.g. Gregory and Hansen 1996). Therefore, it is no surprise
at all that the breakpoint scenario produces even stronger evidence indicating that the
time series follow common trends.
Before generating the impulse response functions we do some residual analysis
on the estimated VECM. Especially the serial autocorrelation is interesting, as it
may have effects on the ordering of the variables. The Portmanteau test with 18
lags yielded a p-value of 0.2009, indicating randomness of the residual times se-
ries. Reducing the lag order provides different results, rejecting the null hypothesis
of randomness, as does a LM-test with different lag lengths. This may in particular be
accounted to the periodic dividend time series which may severely weaken the power
of the tests. Following this reasoning we included up to 18 lags in the Portmanteau
test.
Just in case serial autocorrelation may still be present we use an OLS and a GLS
approach for the subsequent estimations of the model (both using 4 time lags, as 8
lags which are suggested by the AIC would produce misleading results due to the lim-
ited amount of data points available) but only display the impulse response functions
generated by using the OLS approach, as when comparing the empirical findings,
the results are nearly identical such that serial autocorrelation does not seem to of
importance in the given framework. Given the restrictions to data availability there
may be problems with a small sample bias. Monte Carlo experiments performed by
Hargreaves (1994) do indeed indicate some difficulties. However, he has argued that
applied econometricians commonly work with sample sizes of about 50 observations.
The Cholesky decomposition is used to generate the impulse response functions.
This technique does have a number of problems. Most importantly, the results may
be sensitive to the ordering of the variables. In the case examined here economic
theory dictates the ordering of variables (Defl → Earnings → Dividends) because
the general price level quite clearly is the most exogenous variable and dividends
are paid from corporate earnings. The confidence intervals are computed using Efron
(e.g. Efron and Tibshirani 1993) bootstrap techniques (95% level). While no empir-
ical evidence for dividend signalling can be found the impulse response functions
of both regressions do indicate that there is a statistically positive lagged reaction of
dividends to a shock to corporate earnings. Consequently, dividend smoothing is a
relevant economic phenomenon examining the payout policy of the Italian insurance
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Fig. 1 Impulse response functions (OLS regression)
industry. Phrased somewhat differently, Italian insurance companies seem to try to
avoid situations in which they are forced to cut dividends.
This finding may be explained by fears that investors could interpret dividend cuts
as a signal indicating future problems. It could be argued that the lagged reaction
of dividends might be a consequence of the practice of paying dividends just once a
year (which is quite common in Europe). However, this interpretation of the results
displayed in Fig. 1 would still imply that dividends are only increased after positive
news regarding corporate earnings. Additionally, there also is empirical evidence for
a positive reaction of dividends in the following year. While this response to a shock
to corporate earnings is not statistically significant at the 5% level loosening this
constraint does provide a clear hint indicating that dividend smoothing is of relevance
for Italian insurers. In this context a comparison of the results discussed here with the
findings reported by Reddemann et al. (2010) may also be of special interest. They
have shown that there is no convincing empirical evidence indicating that dividend
signalling or dividend smoothing are of relevance examining data from the insurance
industry in Germany and the EMU as a whole. Thus, it can be argued that dividend
reductions quite clearly seem to be a less attractive option for Italian insurers trying to
strengthen their capital base than for insurance companies in other EMU countries—
especially in Germany.
6 Conclusion
Examining the dividend policy of the Italian insurance industry we have documented
empirical evidence indicating that dividend smoothing is a relevant phenomenon us-
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ing the approach suggested by Reddemann et al. (2010). Given that dividend smooth-
ing is dividend signalling with precaution the empirical findings reported above do
show that Italian insurers seem to fear that dividend cuts or omissions could be inter-
preted as negative signals by investors and financial analysts. This result does have
practical implications. Most importantly, Italian insurers should be very careful when
trying to improve their capital base by dividend reductions. As dividend smoothing is
a consequence of asymmetrically distributed information between investors and the
management of the firms, insurance companies deciding to use this option should at
least communicate clearly why dividends are cut or even omitted. Reddemann et al.
(2010) have reported no empirical evidence for the relevance of dividend signalling
or dividend smoothing examining data from the insurance industry in Germany and
the EMU as a whole. Therefore, dividend cuts or omissions seem to be less attractive
for Italian insurers than for their competitors in other EMU countries.
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Transparency plays a major role in signaling theory, as a
fully transparent company has no incentives to send dissipa-
tive signals. Thus the need for signaling may be dependent
on the market transparency in general. This paper intro-
duces transparency as additional variable into the principal
agent framework. Consequences of this model augmentation
are derived subsequently.
In the second part this study also tries to empirically verify
or reject the deduced consequences using aggregated data
from insurers in different countries. After dealing with the
measure of Roll for transparency and proposing a different
way of measurement, a proxy for transparency is calculated
for all those countries or economic stratums. The estima-
tion results of a VECM model and the respective impulse-
response functions are calculated and a possible connection
between transparency and the relevance of dividend signal-
ing/smoothing is examined. Throughout the analysis infla-
tion is considered as additional variable as it may also distort
the ability to convey additional information.
This might provide wide implications regarding the dividend
policy of insurers. Especially in the times of financial crisis
and with respect to upcoming regulations (as Solvency II),
dividend cuts may be considered as instrument to strengthen
the insurers capital basis. This is especially true as the fi-
nancial sector is highly regulated and therefore naturally
more transparent than other sectors because of disclosure
requirements.
∗Discussion Paper, last update on June 1, 2010
†Corresponding author
Keywords
Signaling Theory, Dividend Policy, Transparency, Insurance
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1. MOTIVATION
The latest financial crisis and looming tighter regulation may
lead to various insurance companies being troubled to meet
minimal solvency capital requirements in the future. In spite
of the recent rise of stock prices, raising new capital is cur-
rently rather costly and therefore other possibilities should
be considered carefully. One option is keeping free cash flows
in the company to strengthen the capital base instead of pay-
ing them out to investors. Several studies deal with payout
policy in general and theories surrounding these payments.
While Miller and Modigliani concluded that in a specific
setting (most importantly assuming perfect markets) divi-
dend payments and capital gains are interchangeable from
the investors perspective [1], newer studies consider them as
dissipative signals due to higher taxation (compared to cap-
ital gains) or other occurring signaling costs (e.g. [2]). In
this case it seems to be unfavorable to actually payout cash,
but in the framework of agent theory and the theory of sig-
nals these payments may lead to a future plus in earnings,
compensating for the dissipated value.
The approach to empirically analyze signaling pursued by
Basse and Reddemann includes inflation in the analysis to
account for possible distortions and subsequent misinterpre-
tations of empirical results and yields some interesting re-
sults [3]. For example it is shown that dividend signaling
or smoothing are relevant phenomena in the Italian Insur-
ance sector, while being negligible in Germany [3][4]. It is
also found by other studies of the authors ([5][6]) that div-
idend signaling and smoothing are of differing importance
for different sectors. European Banks for example may be
less cautious when thinking about dividend cuts, while in
the automotive industry there is clear evidence of signaling
being effective. Thus fundamental differences between these
economic stratums and sectors may be conjectured. This
may be verified empirically when comparing the impulse-
response functions of the different regions and sectors (see
section 3 and 4).
So what may be the reason for these findings? We think
the transparency of a specific sector might be one impor-
tant answer to this question. The financial sector is subject
to a high degree of supervision and regulation, thus creating
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a naturally higher level of transparency than for example
in the automotive industry. Also regional differences might
be explained by the difference in national law even if there
are minimal requirements as e.g. in Europe. The evidence
presented from several studies would be in line with this as-
sumption.
The paper at hand is organized as follows. In section 2 we
present empirical evidence from insurance sectors of differ-
ent regions to further motivate the addition of transparency
into the framework, which is done in section 3 combined
with the subsequent analysis. We then want to recommend
and apply a method for measuring the transparency to dif-
ferent sectors and regions in section 4. Those results are
then compared with the studies presented earlier to see if
the results concur in the sense that high transparency cor-
relates to low signal effectiveness. Section 5 concludes and
highlights needed subsequent research.
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
We employ the technique of vector-autoregression models
when analyzing the relevance of signals in different insurance
markets (regional, not product specific). Therefore cointe-
gration tests are performed to identify possible deep struc-
tural relations among the variables examined. If those tests
report existence of those relations, this additional informa-
tion can be used in the econometric analysis by including
an error-correction term into the VAR in differences [7][8].
Thus the short-term dynamic is appropriately reflected in
the estimation which would otherwise lead to strong resid-
ual autocorrelations. The examined estimation equation is
as follows (for all details also concerning the Cholesky par-




















x is the endogenous variable which should be modeled by
the vector-error-correction model and the formula shows the
division of the process into its autoregressive and moving av-
erage parts. Finally the ξ variables are orthogonal (after a
Cholesky decomposition of the respective matrices) and may
be interpreted as (orthogonalized) impulse responses. This
means the feedbacks between variables caused by a shock in
one of the variables are accounted for. When this model is
estimated these functions may be used to make statements
about the impact of sudden changes in one variable to the
other. There are three major theories or hypotheses concern-
ing dividend policy in recent literature. Dividend Signaling,
Dividend Smoothing and the Dividend Irrelevance Hypoth-
esis. The latter is due to Miller and Modigliani’s seminal
paper mentioned earlier describing the fact that in perfect
markets without taxation, capital gains are not preferable
to dividend payments and vice versa [1]. The other two hy-
potheses have been tested and restated in numerous studies,
none of which yielded conclusive results. Most importantly,
Goddard, McMillan and Wilson have argued that depend-
ing on which of the two hypotheses holds there should be a
temporal structure contained in the time series of earnings
and dividends [10]. During this analysis one has to consider
possible reorderings and the consequences [11].
In terms of Granger causality, changes in dividends causing
changes of corporate earnings would indicate that dividend
signaling is a phenomenon of economic relevance while the
inverse relation would support dividend smoothing. It has
been argued that inflation is a major driver of corporate
earnings and dividends and may distort the empirical anal-
ysis [12]. Reddemann, Basse and von der Schulenburg have
suggested an appropriate approach to control for inflation
[3]. More details on the test procedure have been discussed
by Basse and Reddemann [11]. This is why we include in-
Figure 1: Impulse-Response Functions for Japanese
Insurers
Figure 2: Impulse-Response Functions for American
Insurers
flation in our analyses and thus prevent tests from produc-
ing insignificant results. To express it in terms of causality,
this means if dividend signaling holds, dividends should lead
earnings and the other way around for smoothing respec-
tively. This prediction is tested with the mentioned impulse
response functions by shocking earnings and dividends by
two standard deviations and observing the impact on the
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respective other variable1. Only if the 0-line is outside the
bootstrapped confidence intervals, a significant relation is
revealed. We will now present the impulse-response func-
Figure 3: Impulse-Response Functions for German
Insurers
Figure 4: Impulse-Response Functions for European
Insurers
tions of different regions. In Figure 1 it is clearly seen that
the confidence interval never crosses the zero and therefore
yielding no signs of signaling or smoothing being relevant
economic phenomena in Japan. The next Figure shows the
1We have examined the earnings per index share and divi-
dends per index share of the insurance sector indices of the
TOPIX, German Prime Standard Index, Nasdaq and Dow
Jones Euro Stoxx stock market indices. Our measure of
inflation is the GDP price deflator for the respective coun-
try/region. We use quarterly data. Our sample is 1999 Q1
to 2009 Q4 to avoid possible structural breaks due to the
introduction of the Euro. Our modeling strategy is guided
by parsimony. Thus, we have included just as many time
lags as necessary to produce uncorrelated residuals.
impulse-response analysis for American insurers. Here are
several points in time where the confidence interval does
not include 0, thus giving hints of signals being effective (as
smoothing may be considered as signaling with precaution).
Similar to the case of Japan the analysis of German and
more generally European insurers (Figure 3 and 4) does not
yield any signs for signaling being relevant for a company‘s
success.
These findings lead to another question. Why is signaling ef-
fectiveness depending on the region where the signal is sent?
There have to be fundamental differences between the two
markets which did not draw much attention to them as of
yet. We conjecture transparency being a major factor when
determining the effectiveness of a dissipative signal. This is
quite intuitive as a market with full information should not
reward signals at all as they are not able to convey further
information. We therefore try to augment an existing model
of dividend determination with the variable transparency
and revisit the comparative statics of the model while now
additionally examining the influence of transparency γ.
3. MODEL SPECIFICATION
As mentioned in section 1 and 2, there is a variety of mod-
els regarding dividend or payout policy and signaling phe-
nomenons. Spence developed a basic framework for signal-
ing environments using a labor market example [13]. This
framework was advanced by Bhattacharya in two ways: a
dissipative and a non-dissipative model [2][14]. The (for-
mer) dissipative model is most appropriate for our model
augmentation, as it deals with the questions of signaling
and optimal dividend policy in a setting quite similar to the
one we want to take as basis. He examines the case where
there is asymmetric information between current sharehold-
ers and potential future ones while including dividend tax-
ation. Thus he deals with dissipative signals and tries to
explain why even in this case paying dividends might be op-
timal. This is used as starting point for our analysis as we
gradually want to reveal the hidden information by adding
the parameter transparency. It is obvious that future cash
flows will not fully anticipated a priori even in the case of
full information, but there is no need to signal any earnings
expectations as the potential investor has the exact same
information and thus assesses the situation identically, re-
sulting in matching earning expectations. We will now give
a brief description of the model and the results in this frame-
work, before adding transparency as variable and deducing
results beyond the ones originating from the initial model.
Original Model
We follow the approach of Bhattacharya and present the
respective results in a nutshell. For the full details of these
calculations see [2]. He regards the incremental dividends D
paid as cause of an incremental liquidation value V (D) in
the future. Let X denote the future uncertain cash flow and
f(X) its density function. The dividend payments are taxed
at a personal income tax rate of (1− α) while capital gains
are not taxed at all. If the final cash flow exceeds the paid
dividend level, (X − D) is available for further financing,
otherwise (D − X) is additionally needed compared to the
situation (X = D). This additional capital is raised with
costs (think of risk premiums) which is reflected by (1 + β)
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To simplify the analysis of this general model he now as-
sumes the cash flows to be uniformly distributed over [0, t].














Using the first-order and consistency conditions for the equi-
librium dividend schedule D̃
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for D(t) usind the boundary condition D̃(0) = 0. This is
















The resulting equilibrium liquidation gain is
V (D) = ((1− α) + βA)D. (4)
Adding Transparency
We now want to introduce a new variable into this frame-
work: transparency γ. This variable has to be seen as a
transition parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] where γ = 0 yields the model
in the original form (asymmetric information) and γ = 1
represents the case of full information. Taking a detailed
look into the model dynamics as developed in the preced-
ing subsection, there is a natural first choice for including
transparency into the calculation: β. The cost of refinancing
actually is not zero due to a risk premium banks demand
for expanding credit lines or supplying additional capital.
Thus β(γ) should be a decreasing function in transparency.
We will not make any further assumptions concerning the
functional form of β as of now besides the two structural
boundary conditions: β(0) = β̂ and β(1) < β(0) = β̂. The
equilibrium dividend schedule and valuation gain function
have the form as above, just replacing β with β(γ). To
take a look at the change of the results subject to changes
in transparency we use an analytical approach. We replace
β(γ) with its Taylor series and discard the terms of order 2
and higher:










This is only true in its convergence radius R > 0, but a
similar representation can be found for the whole interval
γ ∈ [0, 1]. For simplicity we will use the centralized series
though.
Combining equation (3) and (4) and including γ yields the
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Note that γ only occurs in the square root. If we use the











being smaller or equal to the root prior to introducing γ be-
cause the derivative of β(γ) with respect to γ is ≤ 0. This
means ceteris paribus, V (γ) is a decreasing function in trans-
parency. This is the first result supporting the conjecture of
transparency influencing optimal dividend policy. Note that
this result again is quite intuitive, as with increasing trans-
parency the effect of signals will be diminished considerably.
One special case might be additionally noted: If β(1) = 0,
there is no refinancing cost in case of full information (which
does not mean, that every refinancing demand is met, but
rather, if it is met it bears no additional costs), simplifying
the objective function and yielding the special case of the
original model (see [2]).
In another step we modify the model even further by adding
incremental costs for increasing transparency C(γ) and thus
optionally reducing the need for costly signaling, meaning
a shareholder may choose between two alternatives for the
same gain of value. The effects of signals and measures of
increasing transparency may then be compared to find the
optimal levels of additional disclosure and payoff policy. The








































With the same ansatz as earlier there exist two solutions
for A: A = 0 and a way more complex form than before.
Thus we will only cover it structurally. The factor C(γ) only
occurs as product with β(γ), which is, as we found earlier,
a decreasing function in γ. The (not necessarily monetary)
incremental costs for transparency C(γ) are assumed to in-
crease with γ as creating the same additional gain in trans-
parency costs more effort if transparency is on a high level.
Thus the term β(γ)C(γ) is highly dependent on the func-
tional form of β(γ) and C(γ). But note that if one assumes
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polynomial functions one may compare different combina-
tions. Consider the functional forms:











• m > n The costs for increasing transparency grow
faster than the reduction due to cheaper financing.
• n > m The reduction in refinancing costs overcompen-
sates the additional cost of increasing transparency.
• m = n In this case, the product is highly depending on
the coefficients of the potencies of γ. In the case where
m = n = ∞ (using the full Taylor series) one may
use the Cauchy multiplication rule to derive further
results.
As we do not have any further information theoretically nor
empirically we will suggest this for future studies.
4. MEASURING TRANSPARENCY
The basic idea discussed in the preceding section is that
information asymmetries between managers (insiders) and
potential investors (outsiders) increase the financing costs
of firms. Dividend payments are just one possibility to re-
duce information asymmetries. An improved level of corpo-
rate transparency may help to decrease the cost of capital
as well, by giving relevant information to investors in a clear
and comprehensible way. Bushman, Piotroski and Smith for
example, have defined corporate transparency as the avail-
ability of firm-specific information to outsiders [15]. Given
that this paper also has an empirical focus, an important
and difficult question has to be answered at this point: How
to measure corporate transparency?
Recently, the R2 approach suggested by Roll ([16]) has be-
come a very popular measure of corporate transparency in fi-
nancial economics (e.g., [17][18]). In order to measure trans-
parency, Roll‘s approach examines the explanatory power
(which, of course, means the R2) of a regression using the
total returns of a broad stock market index and an appro-
priate industry portfolio as regressors explaining the total
return of an individual stock. The theoretical foundation of
this approach is the CAPM (respectively the APT).
This may be a problem when trying to use the methodology
to construct a measure of transparency that can be used in
an empirical analysis of dividend policy issues because the
CAPM requires a world characterized by perfect markets. In
fact, Miller and Modigliani have shown that in this perfect
information world without transaction costs dividends are of
no economic relevance [1]. Morck, Yeung and Yu, for exam-
ple, have shown that the R2 for those regressions tends to be
high in emerging markets where corporate transparency usu-
ally is seen to be low [19]. Moreover, Jin and Myers have ar-
gued that a lack of transparency increases the R2 by shifting
firm-specific risk to managers [17]. They and other studies
have offered an excellent explanation for this hypothesis as-
suming that poor protection of investors‘ property rights in
combination with a lack of transparency may allow insiders
to capture more of a firm‘s operating cash flows than they
would be able to extract when the property rights of out-
siders could be protected perfectly [18]. Given that outsiders
have some information about a firm‘s cash flows insiders can
skim more funds when cash flows are higher than expected
by outside investors. Consequently, insiders are forced to
extract less cash flow when there is bad news and cash flows
are lower than expected by outside investors. Investors, of
course, absorb all market risk because information about
macroeconomic phenomena should be common knowledge.
In other words, the management can capture more when the
hidden firm-specific information is positive and less when
it is negative. In order to possibly extract more funds in
good market environments, insiders have to absorb some
firm-specific variance. The firm-specific variance absorbed
by investors is correspondingly lower. Therefore, the ratio
of market to total risk ought to be increased in an envi-
ronment that is characterized by a lower level of corporate
transparency. This should lead to higher R2s. Moreover,
the willingness of insiders to absorb negative shocks to cash
flows most probably is limited. When there is too much bad
firm-specific news insiders leave the firm and all negative
information becomes available to outsiders at once. There-
fore, it is predicted that a lack of transparency leads to an
increase of the likelihood of crashes meaning large negative
market-adjusted returns on individual stocks [17].
They also focus on international empirical evidence analyz-
ing country averages using cross sectional regression tech-
niques. Given the question examined here we had to calcu-
late R2s for regional insurance sector indices using time se-
ries regression analysis examining data on individual stocks.
This is a problem. In fact, it was already noted that not us-
ing country averages creates a number of difficulties - mainly
because there may be country differences in R2s that could
be traced to reasons other than differences in opaqueness
[17]. These problems will now be discussed. In our view,
there is a major practical problem with the R2 approach
which applied econometricians examining transparency and
the dividend policy of the global insurance have to face. Usu-
ally, an econometrician trying to measure transparency with
the R2 of a time series regression analysis would explain the
total return holding the stock of on an individual insurance
company by the total returns of an adequate broad regional
stock market index and a regional sector index. A market
model regression equation of this type has been suggested
by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu [20]. The global in-
surance industry is characterized by a number of very large
companies. In Europe, for instance, there is a number of
insurers with an almost predominant role in specific coun-
tries (e.g, Allianz in Germany, Axa in France and Generali
in Italy).
These companies are large and - due to their market cap-
italization - have a high weight in both the broad stock
market index and the sector index. Allianz, for example,
has a weight of about 7,5% in the DAX and a weight of al-
most 64,0% in the German Prime Standard Insurance Index.
Moreover, these insurers are seen to have a signaling func-
tion for the equity market as a whole. Therefore, good or
bad news regarding these important insurers will also affect
stock prices of other companies - especially in the financial
sector. Consequently, a Roll approach regression will show
a relatively high R2 for these companies and all other in-
surers with a similar business model. In Germany a pure
small health insurer, on the other hand very likely had a
low R2 just because the business model of this firm is very
different from the business model of Allianz. This result
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would not justify any assertions considering transparency
but measures size (or the similarity to the large insurer).
There is a number of additional problems. First of all, the
estimated regression coefficients seem to be unstable over
time possibly resulting in difficulties with structural breaks
[20]. This would lead to low R2 examining the complete
data set while yielding higher R2s using sub-samples for the
estimation. Furthermore, Jin and Myers have noted that
opaqueness is only one possible explanation for the high R2
observed in emerging markets and have argued that this
finding could simply be a consequence of higher local mar-
ket volatility [17]. While they have argued that controlling
for the local market in the regression does not change the
role of their measures of transparency and other control vari-
ables there at least seem to be some effects as one coefficient
even changed its sign. This implies the lacking robustness
of this approach. Therefore, we have to be careful inter-
preting the results of this study. Additionally, they argued
that opaque stocks with high R2 are more likely to crash.
At this point there may be a problem with inverse causality.
In fact, high R2s simply might be a consequence of crashes
in the past. In sum, it seems to be necessary to search for
a more adequate measure of corporate transparency. Some
recently suggested measures of corporate transparency are
based on the extent to which companies avoid to report earn-
ings behind expectations or delay the recognition of losses
[21]. Other econometricians have examined the extent to
which financial statements reflect subsidiaries on a consoli-
dated basis or how many analyst cover a stock [18][22]. We
return to these ideas later on.
Transparency is also an important concept in the fields of
monetary and international economics. From the perspec-
tive of monetary economics a central bank may use trans-
parent communication strategies to anchor inflation expec-
tations of the public at the desired level [23]. In interna-
tional economics transparency is seen to help a country to
attract foreign capital [21]. Therefore, applied econometri-
cians working in the fields of monetary and international
economics also have a need for an adequate measure of trans-
parency. These research efforts may also be interesting for
financial economist searching for a gauge of corporate trans-
parency. Focussing on monetary economics Fry, Julius, Ma-
hadeva, Roger and Sterne have made suggestions for an in-
dex of central bank transparency based on the explanations
of policy decisions, the frequency and form of forecasts and
forecast errors as well as the frequency in which research pa-
pers are published and speeches are held [24]. Eijffinger and
Geraats have also calculated an index of transparency cover-
ing five important aspects of transparency (namely political,
economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency)
examining nine different central banks [25]. This index is
thought to reflect the public availability of information re-
garding the formal objectives, quantitative targets and in-
stitutional arrangements, of economic data, policy models,
and central bank forecasts and of minutes and voting records
as well as the promptness of announcements of interest rate
changes. In the field of international economics some mea-
sures of transparency focus on the frequency and timeliness
of the publication of key economic indicators while others
are based on the dispersion of macroeconomic forecasts by
different forecasters [21]. This approach is based on the as-
sumption that different economists produce more diverging
forecasts for countries that are less transparent about their
macroeconomic policy measures. We believe that this is an
interesting concept.
As already noted, the number of analysts actively covering
a firm is commonly seen as a measure of corporate trans-
parency. Jin and Myers, for example, have argued forcefully
that active coverage by financial analysts should make firms
more transparent [17]. Using this concept, we have tried to
measure the transparency of the insurance industries of the
U. S., Europe and Japan (see table 1)2. We have focused on
U.S. Europe Japan
High 19 50 16
Low 24 22 2
Mean 21,4 39,4 12
Table 1: Number of analysts covering a firm
the largest seven insurers of any country/region (by market
capitalization) because there only are seven big insurers in
Japan. The insurers are also required to be a member of
either the Dow Jones Sector Titans Insurance Index or the
leading regional insurance index. Quite clearly, the Euro-
pean insurance industry is covered by the highest number
of financial analysts. This, of course, is only one facet of
corporate transparency. Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker
have suggested examining the number of auditors [26]. We
think that it could also be informative to count the number
of rating agencies assigning credit ratings to the seven insur-
ers of the three countries or regions respectively3. Using this
criterion Japanese insurers would seem to be the most trans-
parent firms (see table 2). However, we have to be careful
U.S. Europe Japan
High 6 5 7
Low 4 3 5
Mean 4,4 4 6,3
Table 2: Number of rating agencies assigning credit
ratings
interpreting this result because it is mainly a consequence of
the existence of two rather important Japanese rating agen-
cies. This shows that national institutional arrangements do
matter when analysing corporate transparency issues.
Media coverage may also help to increase transparency [17].
We have tried to measure how often the insurers are named
in the international quality press4. Table 3 shows the to-
tal number and the number of appearances in headlines.
The results seem to indicate difficulties with this approach
as well. While the results from the international press sec-
tion of GENIOS do include almost all major U.S. and Asian
2We have used the Bloomberg ANR function to identify the
number of analysts actively covering a firm.
3In order to do so we have used the Bloomberg CRPR func-
tion. We have reported the number of rating agencies for
the respective holding company or of the subsidiary firm (in
the respective region) with most ratings by different rating
agencies.
4We have used the GENIOS tool to search for the 21 firms
in the international press. This excludes smaller European
newspapers (e.g., Aar-Bote or Main-Taunus-Kurier) from
the search. Our results are from one year (which means
we have started in May 2009).
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newspapers (e.g., Washington Post and Bangkok Post) GE-
NIOS may still have a stronger focus on Europe. This would
bias the results and could be one reason for the results re-
ported in table 3. On the other hand a number of insurers
U.S. Total Europe Total Japan Total
(Headlines) (Headlines) (Headlines)
High 1596 (183) 10987 (1039) 323 (67)
Low 43(0) 544 (33) 10 (0)
Mean 560,9 (61,8) 4213,7 (395,7) 129,1 (19,16)
Table 3: Media Coverage
play a special role in European stock markets and corre-
spondingly have high weights in the regional blue chip stock
market indices. As a consequence, it is quite common that
Allianz or Axa are mentioned in general stock market com-
mentaries. This is not the case with Aflac5. But does it
really increase corporate transparency when a press report
tells us that the DAX increased considerably and that Al-
lianz has contributed to this rise? Probably econometricians
planning to measure corporate transparency should focus on
headlines. There are also less practical problems. The Enron
scandal, for example, presumably has considerably increased
the presence of Enron in the media. But are press reports
about past scandals really a sign of more transparency? This
is also of importance in the insurance industry. In fact, the
presence of AIG in the quality press has largely decreased
after the crisis. Comparing the period May 2009 to May
2010 with May 2008 to May 2009 the number of press re-
leases dealing with AIG has almost halved. In fact, the high
media coverage of Prudential PLC (10987) has to be put in
this perspective because there have been many articles dis-
cussing the Asia deal with AIG.
The discussions above show that there are many different as-
pects of corporate transparency. Therefore, it may seem to
be a good idea to construct an index of transparency that
combines as much relevant information as possible. This
approach could also help to measure time-series variation of
corporate transparency. However, there are also some prob-
lems with this approach. Most importantly, it is not clear
how to set appropriate weights for the different components
of the transparency index. Phrased somewhat differently,
how many headlines make up one additional analyst cover-
ing a firm? One interesting solution is a measure suggested
by Jin and Myers: They argue that the diversity of ana-
lysts‘ earnings forecasts may be an appropriate measure of
transparency [17]. We believe that this is an excellent con-
cept that gives relevant information about corporate trans-
parency and also varies over time.
5AIG is the only U.S. insurer that had a media coverage
matching the large European insurers. However, AIG is not
one of our 7 U.S. insurers because it is neither a member of
the Dow Jones Sector Titans Insurance Index nor the U.S.
regional insurance index.
5. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The analysis of several different regions and their insurance
sectors suggest transparency to be a major factor when talk-
ing about dividend policy. This is intuitive, as a higher level
of transparency naturally results in less private information
which could be the cause for conducted signaling. If there is
no hidden and signaling-worthy information, dividend pay-
ments are of no use at all and even ream corporate earnings
because of taxes and the resulting dissipative nature. So the
sector-transparency should definately be included in the rea-
soning of managers concerning dividend policy. If neglect-
ing these findings it is well possible, that free cash flows are
partially consumed because of signaling costs. Thus espe-
cially in strongly regulated industries as the financial sector,
dividend payments might not be as important as currently
valued by a large proportion of investors. The negative im-
pact of cutting or even omitting dividends should therefore
be of minor influence during critical decisions for the future
of the company.
As already noted in section 3 there are several options for
future research. Following Bhattacharya, a combination of
his two models should be of interest ([2] and [14]). In that
case the dissipative nature of dividends and the possibility
of increasing disclosure are combined, targeting in the same
direction as this study does. But due to the structural dis-
parities this seems to be not as easy as it might appear on
first sight. Further investigating the model augmentation
proposed in this paper might therefore be a rewarding alter-
native. For example it might provide further insights when
analyzing different industries with regards to their trans-
parency and dividends paid, to make structural assertions
about the functional form of transparency costs and refi-
nancing costs with respect to γ.
Transparency and especially measuring transparency are hard
to handle due to the various facets of transparency as was
shown during the differing approaches in section 4. An ap-
propriate measure of transparency would be a major ad-
vancement for several sectors of economics. Further research
thus should investigate if for example the criteria described
above may be accumulated in a coherent index of trans-
parency. Also the dispersion arguments should provide in-
teresting insights into this complex matter. It might also
prove to be quite useful if heuristic to use the effectiveness
of signals (inferred from an analysis similar to the ones con-
ducted in section 2) as a proxy for a markets transparency.
The Geneva Association________________________Etudes et Dossiers no. 369
Document free to download                                        www.genevaassociation.org
6. REFERENCES
[1] Merton H. Miller and Franco Modigliani. Dividend
policy, growth, and the valuation of shares. The
Journal of Business, 34(4):411, 1961.
[2] Sudipto Bhattacharya. Imperfect information,
dividend policy, and ”the bird in the hand” fallacy.
The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1):259–270, 1979.
[3] Sebastian Reddemann, Tobias Basse, and
Johann-Matthias Graf von der Schulenburg. On the
impact of the financial crisis on the dividend policy of
the european insurance industry. The Geneva Papers,
35:53–62(10), January 2010.
[4] Tobias Basse, Sebastian Reddemann, Johannes-Jörg
Riegler, and Johann-Matthias Graf von der
Schulenburg. Dividend policy and the global financial
crisis: Empirical evidence from the italian insurance
industry. Zeitschrift für die gesamte
Versicherungswissenschaft, (forthcoming), 2010.
[5] Tobias Basse, Mario Gruppe, Sebastian Reddemann,
and Frank Schwope. Dividend policy issues in the
crisis: The example of the german automotive
industry. Working Paper, (forthcoming), 2010.
[6] Sebastian Reddemann, Tobias Basse, Johannes-Jörg
Riegler, and Johann-Matthias Graf von der
Schulenburg. Bank dividend policy and the global
financial crisis: Empirical evidence from europe.
Working Paper, (forthcoming), 2010.
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1 Introduction 
Trying to explain why firms pay dividends is an important problem faced by the modern 
theory of finance. In a seminal paper, Miller and Modigliani (1961) have argued that 
under certain assumptions the value of a firm is not affected by its dividend policy. 
According to their theory, dividend changes have no economic implications and therefore 
no optimal dividend policy appears to exist. This dividend irrelevancy hypothesis is based 
on the argument that dividends are paid from earnings and investors do not prefer 
dividend payments to capital gains or vice versa. Furthermore, there are obvious 
arguments against dividend payments as dividend income is subject to heavier taxation 
than capital gains in many countries. Thus, economic theory seems to have difficulties to 
explain why firms do pay dividends. 
The dividend signalling hypothesis is a very popular approach to justify dividend 
payments. This hypothesis is based on the idea that the management of a firm can use 
changes in the dividend level to overcome information asymmetries signalling revised 
earnings expectations to investors. Another important theory of dividend determination is 
based on the observation that companies seem to be reluctant to cut dividends and 
therefore try to alter the volume of dividend payments only gradually. In other words, this 
so-called dividend smoothing hypothesis predicts that firms plan to avoid sending out 
negative signals to their investors. According to this theory a strong link between 
dividend payments and corporate earnings still remains to exist. However, Goddard et al. 
(2006) have argued that the two hypotheses make opposing predictions about the 
temporal relationship and subsequently the Granger causality between dividend payments 
and corporate earnings. Whereas the smoothing hypothesis suggests that earnings lead 
dividends, the signalling hypothesis predicts that dividends lead earnings. 
Allen and Michaely (1995) have provided an excellent survey of the literature on 
empirical tests of theories of dividend determination. Therefore, this article does not 
attempt to extensively review the literature, but will only discuss two important but often 
neglected factors complicating tests of theories to explain the existence of dividend 
payments. Namely, clientele effects and inflation can create serious problems for 
econometricians as both factors may be of importance analysing dividend policy issues. 
Numerous firms seem to tailor their dividend payouts to suite particular groups of 
investors: In many countries, family-controlled firms may, for example, have a tax-based 
incentive to avoid dividend payments altogether (e.g., Gugler, 2003). Moreover, it has 
also been argued that inflation could distort the ability of firms to use dividend changes to 
signal revised earnings expectations to their investors (Basse, 2009). Therefore a 
tendency of firms to gradually increase dividend payouts due to inflation could falsely be 
interpreted as empirical evidence in favour of dividend smoothing. Tests of dividend 
policy theories should definitely control for these factors. Gugler (2003) recently has 
examined the existence of clientele effects in Austria and has argued that  
family-controlled enterprises have lower payout target ratios and are more likely to cut 
dividends while state-owned firms are most reluctant to do so. This empirical study 
should be complemented by studying the dividend policy of Austrian firms taking a more 
macroeconomic perspective examining the influence and possible effects of inflation. 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First of all empirical evidence of dividend payments 
in Austria is analysed taking a macroeconomic perspective considering inflation as 
additional variable. While dealing with those questions, the importance of appropriate 
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modelling and choice of methods is inestimable. Thus, this paper aims at the 
identification of adequate methods and the problems arising if chosen wrongly. In order 
to achieve this, an econometric approach is implemented dealing with the disclosed traps 
at the point of their appearance resp. relevance. So far the empirical evidence regarding 
the validity of the hypotheses have been more or less inconclusive. This could be due to 
overlooking model inherent or statistical problems. 
2 Inflation and the present value model 
To motivate the further empirical analysis the present value model with inflation is 
investigated from the viewpoint of economic theory. Following the reasoning of classical 














where ( )E   is the expectations operator, Dt the dividend process and Rt the risk adjusted 
required rate of return. Thus, the dividend discount model predicts that stock prices are 
fundamentally determined by the present value of expected future dividend payments. 
Expected dividends are discounted with 1 + Rt. At this point the dividend discount model 
requires that assumptions about future dividend payments and the required rate of return 
on equities are made. Different assumptions lead to a variety of more or less complex 
versions of this simple model. Gordon (1959), for example, suggested assuming 
dividends growing at a constant rate g. Corporate earnings are denoted by EA. Moreover, 
assuming that the required rate of return on equity is also constant and introducing b as 
ratio of reinvestment, leads to the equation (by using the limit for the geometrical series): 
(1 ) (1 )(1 )






D g EA b g
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R g R g
 
Gordon and Hochman (1978) made suggestions to improve this model by also examining 
the effects of inflation on stock prices under the assumption that the inflation rate per 
period S is constant over time. In this version of the dividend discount model, dividends 
are expected to grow at a constant real rate g. Therefore, the nominal rate of dividend 
growth is assumed to be (1 + g) (1 + S) – 1 and stock prices are given by: 
1(1 )(1 )t tSP SP g S    
These theoretical considerations are closely linked to the question whether stocks are a 
useful hedge against inflation. Gordon and Hochman (1979) have made some suggestions 
which conditions lead to positive correlations between equity returns and inflation and 
which lead to negative correlations. Following Campbell and Shiller (1988), Schotman 
and Schweitzer (2000) as well as Basse (2009) have shown that two countervailing trends 
are present. They have argued that there is a positive effect because inflation raises 
corporate earnings and thereby increases future expected dividends. However, there is 
also a second, negative effect of higher inflation rates because inflation increases the 
discount rate via the Fisher effect thus lowering stock prices. Fons and Osterberg (1986) 
have noted that firms typically are not able to match declines of profits with declines of 
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expenses in a deflationary of disinflationary environment. This seems to be especially 
true following periods of prolonged high inflation rates. More recently, Sharpe (2002) has 
argued that inflation is negative for stock prices because it lowers expected real earnings 
growth and increases the real required return. 
While there is no consensus on the effect of inflation on stock prices it seems to be 
generally accepted that increases to the price level do raise corporate earnings. Given that 
dividends are paid from earnings inflation quite clearly may be of relevance analysing 
dividend policy issues. Moreover, some empirical studies published more recently seem 
to indicate that stock prices and inflation are cointegrated (e.g., Kolari and Anari, 2001; 
Luintel and Paudyal, 2006). Therefore, dividend payments and the general price level 
could also follow common stochastic trends. The empirical evidence presented by Basse 
(2009) does indeed indicate that this is the case. 
3 Data and methodology 
As mentioned this paper employs a macroeconomic perspective analysing the 
relationship between dividends, earnings and inflation in Austria. Consequently, it does 
not focus on the dividend payments and earnings of individual firms but examines the 
aggregated variables of the ATX members using the dividend per index share and 
earnings per index share concepts. Therefore, there is no need to control for clientele 
effects. The ATX Index is a common measure for the performance of the Austrian stock 
market. It is a capitalisation-weighted index consisting of the most frequently traded 
stocks on the Vienna Stock Exchange. Bloomberg provides data on earnings and the 
volume of dividends paid by the ATX index constitutes. The measure of inflation used is 
the GDP price deflator which is a broad gauge for the development of the Austrian price 
level. Avoiding possible problems due to the introduction of the Euro in 1999 quarterly 
data from Q1 1999 to Q4 2008 is examined. 
To accurately model the interdependencies between the three variables assumed to be 
endogenous, the estimation of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model is inevitable. A VAR 
model is a system of equations that regresses the variables on themselves and the other 
included endogenous variables and thereby considers the interdependencies between all 
variables. It is of course still possible to include exogenous variables as regressors, but no 
new equation is connected with the addition of this variable. Variables contained in a 
VAR have to be stationary. Stationarity is tested using the ADF-tests reported in Table 1. 
The results of the test imply that all three variables are non-stationary and integrated of 
order 1. 
Assuming that a long run relationship of inflation and the two variables earnings and 
dividends exists, the Johansen (1991) cointegration test is performed. This test yields an 
interesting result. Inflation is a relevant factor in this model and may indeed partly be 
responsible for the inconclusive findings in the literature (next to the further discussed 
problems). According to the test results, two cointegration relationships seem to exist. 
Given the results reported in Table 2 a vector error correction model (VECM) shall be 
used which augments the standard VAR model in differences by an additional term: A 
linear combination between earnings and inflation respectively dividends and inflation. 
This is the so-called error correction term which has the effect that deviations from the 
joint equilibrium are cancelled out during the following periods and both processes 
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reverse to their long-term relationship. Thus, cointegration provides additional 
information to further improve the model. In order to avoid problems with structural 
breaks – which are known cause major problems with cointegration tests (e.g., Gregory 
and Hansen, 1996) – and to keep a parsimonious model we have shortened the time 
period analysed avoiding possible difficulties due to the introduction of the Euro. This 
does create a new problem. In fact, Monte Carlo experiments performed by Hargreaves 
(1994) do indicate some difficulties using the Johansen test with less than 100 data 
points. However, he has also argued that it is a common practice in applied 
econometricians to work with sample sizes of about 50 observations. 
Table 1 Testing for stationarity 
Null hypothesis: time series has a unit root 
Time series: ADF-test statistic 5% critical value 
GDP price deflator: 1.04 –2.86 
ǻ(GDP price deflator): –2.66 –2.86 
Dividends –1.90 –2.86 
ǻ(Dividends): –23.47 –2.86 
Earnings: –0.54 –2.86 
ǻ(Earnings): –3.21 –2.86 
Note: ADF ten max number of lags, seasonal dummies, no trend, critical values from 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). 
Table 2 Testing for cointegration 
r0 LR pval 90% 95% 99% 
0 62.76 0.0000 32.25 35.07 40.78 
1 23.95 0.0132 17.98 20.16 24.69 
2 4.93 0.3018 7.60 9.14 12.53 
Note: Critical values taken from Doornik (1998) 
To account for the strong seasonal pattern of the dividend time series seasonal dummies 
were included while estimating the model (two cointegration relations, four time lags). 
The choice of four lags is motivated by considerations of parsimony; relevant system 
dynamics are already covered by four lags as supported by the Portmanteau tests 
conducted (indicating randomness of the residuals with a p-value of 0.39). It may also be 
appropriate to work with seasonally adjusted data, but even after the standard adjustment 
process CENSUS X12 strong seasonal patterns are obvious in the resulting time series 
(and impulse-response graphs, whenever dividends are included). The following graph 
shows both the seasonally adjusted and the non-adjusted dividend time series. 
The adjustment procedure has severe problems with the massive increases once a 
year, when most companies payout the annual dividends. As already indicated the 
unadjusted data is used and adjusted in the process of model estimation by including 
dummy variables to soften the effect of the strong seasonal fluctuations. This process 
obviously is subject to the restrictions mentioned above, but seasonally unadjusted data is 
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used to not omit valuable information before the actual estimation begins, as even a 
preceding seasonal adjustment does not lead to time series without seasonal patterns. 
Figure 1 Seasonal adjustment 
 
Once the model is specified one can proceed to analyse the resulting estimation of the 
parameters. In this context impulse-response analysis is utilised to gain a deeper insight 
into the causal relations driving the model. Subsequently the standard method of 
orthogonalised impulses is briefly discussed following the ideas of Sims (1980) and 
Pesaran and Shin (1998). In a later section the notation of Pesaran and Shin is used again 
to discuss the concept of generalised impulses. 
Impulse-response analysis has developed to a very successful tool in the field of 
econometrics. It provides a variety of results, both graphically and formula-based and can 
be used to examine causal relations between endogenous variables in a VAR model. As 
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The Ai can be obtained via the recursive relation Ai = I1Ai – 1 + … + IpAi – pcA0 = Im and the 
Gi := Ai<. Now the following general impulse response function as introduced in Koop et 
al. (1996) is analysed: 
     1 1 1, , ,    :   :  :x t t n t t t n tGI n E x E xG H G  
where :t – 1 denotes the information available at time t – 1. It is clear that the resulting 
response function will greatly depend on the vector of shocks G. 
Since the correlation matrix 6 in most cases is not diagonal, there will be feedback 
mechanisms and intertemporal correlations providing a skewed impression of the actual 
interdependencies, leading to the problem of choosing an appropriate G. Thus 
econometricians thought about ways to circumvent these problems. Sims (1980) 
suggested orthogonalisation of the incoming shocks. Therefore a standard matrix 
decomposition technique is used, which is also often utilised in a numerical approach 
solving complex linear systems of equations, the Cholesky decomposition. With this 
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It is achieved that each variable only affects the succeeding variables by using this 
decomposition in the original moving average representation: 
    1
0 0 0 0
f f f f

   
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Here [t are orthogonal, i.e., the orthogonalised impulse response functions to a unit shock 
in variable j are given by: 
( ) , 0,1, 2,  !oj n jn A Pe nZ  
As the scale of variables differs in most cases, usually an innovation of one standard 
deviation is considered in the literature. 
Employing the Cholesky-decomposition to purge the unwanted interdependencies, a 
new problem occurs: the ordering. The econometrician has to decide a priori which 
variable affects which other variables. By imposing different orderings varying results 
may be obtained. In this study the relationship between dividends and corporate earnings 
with the inclusion of inflation as described in Section 2 is examined. Then the results of 
different orderings of the three variables are presented. 
Theory – and in particular the present value model – was developed throughout the 
past decades, resulting in theory-given possible orderings. There still is no unique order 
for the variables, as empirical studies do not verify a specific economic theory. This 
section does not try to validate or falsify one or another either, as the focus is laid upon 
problems arising from different orderings in the VAR/VECM. But nevertheless some 
theses can be found in the results section regarding the question of validity of the 
presented hypotheses (smoothing, signalling and irrelevance). More precisely, we use a 
variant of the approach suggested by Goddard et al. (2006) who have argued that 
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empirical evidence indicating that dividends lead corporate earnings would help to 
confirm the dividend signalling hypothesis while the finding that earnings lead dividends 
would give support to the dividend smoothing hypothesis. 
4 Results and interpretation 
As already noted, different orderings of the endogenous variables in a VAR/VECM may 
affect the results of the empirical investigations, especially when using the Cholesky 
decomposition during an orthogonal impulse analysis. Given these problems the ordering 
of the variables should be set according to economic theory. In fact, the general price 
level ought to be seen as the most exogenous variable affecting corporate earnings and 
thereby – because dividends are paid from earnings – the volume of dividend payments. 
Consequently, the appropriate ordering of the variables seems to be Austrian GDP price 
deflator (APDEF_ECO), ATX earnings per share (EAR_AUS), and ATX dividends per 
share (DIV_AUS). However, it may of course be possible to develop economic theories 
suggesting a different ordering of the three variables. Corporate earnings, for example, 
could be a major driver of inflation when firms are trying to increase profit margins. 
First of all the results using the ordering inflation, earnings and dividends (Figure 2) 
are analysed. At this point an important question emerges: How stable are these results to 
different orderings of the variables? This question is answered by examining the results 
of different orderings (see Figures 3–7). Note that no serial correlation is present in the 
estimated VECM residuals. As noted before the Portmanteau test including 16 lags 
cannot reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation with a p-value of 0.39. 
Figure 2 Ordering price deflator – earnings – dividends 
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Figure 3 Ordering price deflator – dividends – earnings 
 
Figure 4 Ordering dividends – price deflator – earnings 
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Figure 5 Ordering dividends – earnings – price deflator 
 
Figure 6 Ordering earnings – price deflator – dividends 
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Figure 7 Ordering earnings – dividends – price deflator 
 
Most importantly, there is no empirical evidence indicating that dividend signalling is of 
any relevance in Austria following the reasoning of Goddard et al. (2006) because 
dividends do not lead earnings. This finding is independent of the ordering of variables. 
Thus, given that it was controlled for inflation the Austrian data set does not indicate that 
inflation had significant negative effects on the ability of firms to use dividend changes to 
signal revised earnings expectations to their investors. This is probably no surprise at all 
because the period examined here was characterised by a relatively high degree of price 
level stability. The average annual inflation rate as measured by the GDP price deflator 
was just over 2%. Consequently, the informational costs of inflation should have been 
rather low in recent years. Moreover, the finding of inflation affecting corporate earnings 
is quite robust and in general does not rely on the specific ordering of the variables 
examined. Only one obvious exception exists: with the variable ordering earnings, GDP 
deflator and dividends there is no empirical evidence indicating that inflation does 
significantly affect corporate earnings. Additionally, using the ordering earnings, 
dividends, and GDP price deflator, the effect inflation has on corporate earnings is only 
marginally significant on the 95% level. These results are important examining the 
potential of stocks to hedge against inflation. Nominal earnings quite clearly seem to rise 
with inflation. However this positive reaction of corporate earnings to inflationary shocks 
is in general not very pronounced. Therefore, the results reported above seem to imply 
that inflation has a tendency to lower real earnings growth. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence also does show some signs of dividend 
smoothing with dividends in a number of cases reacting to shocks from corporate 
earnings. At this point a second VECM is estimated. This model includes only two 
variables: earnings and dividends. The results of the impulse response functions 
computed for this model are fairly stable to different orderings of the variables. For 
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further comprehension of the differences the two VECMs (one – just earnings and 
dividends; two – earnings, dividends and inflation) are compared directly (Figure 8). 
Obviously, using inflation as third endogenous variable in the estimation of the VECM 
does affect the results. The seemingly strong link between earnings and dividends  
(down-left graph in both 2 × 2 figures) nearly disappears as the confidence interval is just 
scraping zero. For reasons of comparability only the inflation variable was included 
leaving all other parameters unchanged (e.g., lag length, dummies) and using the ordering 
suggested by economic theory (inflation, earnings, dividends respectively earnings, 
dividends). The results presented in Figure 8 therefore rather clearly (and in most cases 
independently from the ordering of the variables) indicate that dividend smoothing is an 
economic phenomenon of less significance when inflation is also included in the VECM. 
Thus, the effects of inflation on dividend policy must be considered to avoid finding hints 
that are falsely interpreted as empirical evidence in favour of dividend smoothing. This 
may be due to inflation gradually increasing corporate earnings over time. 





   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   290 T. Basse and S. Reddemann    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
As shown, the ordering of variables is capable of drastically affecting the results of the 
impulse-response analysis. Next to examining all possible orderings to evaluate the 
stability of the results, this weakness of the orthogonalisation can also be surpassed by 
using generalised impulses. This means calculating the response functions in a variable 
ordering independent way thus leading to consistent results. The notation of Pesaran and 
Shin (1998) is followed returning to the level of the general impulse response function: 
     1 1 1, , ,    :   :  :x t t n t t t n tGI n E x E xG H G  
Now another approach would be not to decompose 6 for the choice of an appropriate G 
but shock one element of H directly and try to eliminate the influence on other variables: 
     1 1 1, , ,    :   :  :x j t t n jt j t t n tGI n E x E xG H G  
Figure 9 Comparison Hall/Efron bootstrapped CIs 
 
Under the assumption Ht follows a multivariate normal distribution it is seen that: 
    1 11 2, , ,     6! Tt jt j j j mj jj j j jj jE eH H G V V V V G V G  




 6  !gj jj n jA e nVZ  
These are invariant under variable reordering, as they directly account for the correlations 
included. The response function is furthermore ‘normalised’ by setting .j jjG V  
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While the impulse response analysis was undertaken, a second major problem 
emerged. The use of bootstrapped confidence intervals (as done in most recent papers) 
leads to enormous differences regarding the results. Here the methods of Efron and Hall 
were used and yielded the results presented in Figure 9. 
As it is clearly seen, all relations, without exception, are significant assuming 
confidence intervals computed by Hall’s (1992) method. In this paper bootstrapped 
confidence intervals as proposed by Efron and Tibshirani (1993) were computed as 
suggested for smaller samples by Scholz (1994). Given the results documented in Figure 
9 further research regarding appropriate techniques for bootstrapping confidence intervals 
would be of high value for applied econometricians. 
5 Conclusions 
Summarising and evaluating the results of this paper there are two different facets – one 
related to the theory of corporate finance and the other related to problems of applied 
econometric analysis – to be discussed. Firstly, the examined relationship between 
corporate earnings and dividends has to be reconsidered given the fact that inflation 
exerts a massive influence on the variables. This result is quite robust to different model 
specifications and empirical research strategies and therefore seems to be of special 
importance. Moreover, the empirical findings presented in the sections above do not 
support the dividend signalling hypothesis. However, the empirical evidence in general 
seems to be compatible with the more ‘intuitive’ dividend smoothing hypothesis, even 
though adding the variable inflation reduces the significance of the empirical evidence in 
favour of this hypothesis. Further research considering dividend policy of firms in 
inflationary environments should be carried out; especially studies focusing on countries 
with more volatile inflation rates could provide additional insight into relevant relations. 
Second, while performing the empirical analysis several statistical problems occurred. 
Namely problems with variable ordering, bootstrapped confidence intervals and seasonal 
adjustment procedures complicated the analysis. In the case studied here, a definite 
ordering was supplied by theory and its results were compared with other possible 
orderings. Significant differences were found thus making it indispensable to deal with 
the corresponding theory before actually estimating the first model or to use generalised 
impulses. Using different bootstrapping methods affected the results tremendously. 
Further research in this area is mandatory since most statistical/empirical papers use 
bootstrapping to indicate significance levels. As a matter of fact, the results reported in 
this paper appear to have an eminent importance for applied econometrics due to the fact 
that the widely used statistical packages either cannot compute impulse response standard 
errors for VECMs (EViews) or do not grant the possibility to employ generalised 
impulses (JMulTi, R or Gretl). 
This paper provides the fundamental message that it remains a fatal flaw of any 
economic model of dividend policy to not consider important variables. Examining the 
dividend policy of Austrian firms it was shown that neglecting inflation may greatly 
distort the empirical findings and therefore tempt the researcher to draw incorrect 
conclusions. Next to this finding, based on economic theory, it was also shown that it is 
of major importance to use appropriate econometric techniques fitting the particular 
question dealt with. 
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The discussion concerning long-term care insurance in Germany barely exceeds the
financial state of the social system. The view of the insured involved is largely ignored. This
paper analyses the effect of the introduction of compulsory long-term care insurance in
1995 in Germany on the perception of financial security when needing long-term care.
Using different regression techniques on a subset of the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP) data, we show that the introduction led to a general positive shift of the assessment.
Furthermore, experience with long-term care had no significant effect before the
introduction but a positive effect afterwards. Also, the perception of financial security is
found to be increasing with income at both times with similar magnitudes.
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Introduction
The potential need for long-term care is one of the greatest financial risks faced by
the elderly and their adult children. As traditional structures of the family evolve
towards one-generation households and female employment rates increase, family
members are increasingly unable to provide long-term care. As a result, institutional
care must be organised and paid for, or family members may have to interrupt their
employment. Both alternatives result in financial risks that emerge from long-term
care risk. In Germany, as well as in France and Austria, adult children are legally
obligated to support their parents if the parents have exhausted their financial
resources.
Following a large debate in Germany since the 1970s, compulsory long-term care
insurance was introduced in 1995 as the fifth pillar of social insurance and was
structured as a pay-as-you-go system. After several efforts to reform this system,
*We wish to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
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r 2010 The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics 1018-5895/10
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which suffered from severe financial problems, long-term care insurance reform in
Germany is currently widely discussed. Several measures were proposed by a number
of institutions, leaving the future of the programme in an uncertain state. Most
discussions have centred on the state of social funds while mostly neglecting the
mindset of the affected segment of the population. The recent debate on reforming
the social long-term care insurance scheme received renewed attention in September
2009 from the new German government, but several concrete steps still remain.
The development and implementation of social long-term care insurance in Germany
appears to be primarily dominated by fiscal, rather than socio-political arguments, as
the disburdening of the communities from long-term care insurance payments has
been one of the main arguments in the discussions.
Existant literature primarily focuses on analysing appropriate designs for a long-
term care system. These designs incorporate financial structures and apply theories of
demand.1 Kunreuther 2 states that high loss/low probability events that have not
occurred recently are likely to be ignored, which plays an important role in risk
assessment. Hershey et al.3 applied this theory to health insurance. Pauly4 suggests an
underestimation of needs by uninformed elderly individuals. Moreover, he finds non-
rational demand for long-term care insurance, which is motivated by second-stage
moral hazard behaviour between parents and children and by consumption reasons in
the case of death of a partner. Zweifel and Struewe5 built a two-generation model for
long-term care insurance based on this theory. Holtgrave and Weber6 state that most
of the risks considered by research on risk perception fall into the two categories:
health and financial risk. Moreover, most of the health risks include a financial com-
ponent. There are rarely studies that assess the financial aspects and also recommend
a new insurance scheme to implement.
In our paper, we focus on the perception of financial aspects concerning long-term
care risks. We aim to investigate whether the introduction of compulsory long-term
care insurance in Germany affects the individual assessment of the financial
implications of long-term care risks. This is performed by conducting regression
analysis on a fitting subsample of observations from the German socio-economic
panel before and after the introduction of long-term care insurance. Therefore, we
evaluate the perception of financial risk when needing long-term care, but we do not
estimate the individual probability of long-term care risk. Our three hypotheses are
embedded in the general question of the impact of social long-term care insurance in
a given setting.
1 German studies are found in Breyer (1991,1992), Buchholz and Wiegard (1992) and Eisen (1992);
international studies are found in Courbage and Roudaut (2008), Guillén and Pinquet (2008), Costa-
Font et al. (2008), Parker and Clarke (1997), Brown and Finkelstein (2007) and Doerpinghaus and
Gustavson (2002).
2 Kunreuther (1978).
3 Hershey et al. (1984).
4 Pauly (1990).
5 Zweifel and Struewe (1998).
6 Holtgrave and Weber (1993).
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As there are no empirical studies focussing on introductory effects of insurance
systems on individual perception, we are able to discover new insights as to how the
introduction itself, and other variables, influence the individual financial assessment
regarding facing personal high-probability risks. Our study helps to understand whether
the public adopts this new pillar of social security and whether the new financial burdens
that result from paying additional premiums are viewed as acceptable given the reduction
of other long-term financial risks. The answer to the question of acceptance provides
useful input for the discussion of changing the current system to a funded scheme.
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, an overview of German
long-term care insurance is given. In the next section, the methodology and data are
described, and the hypotheses are constructed. The regression results are presented in
the subsequent section and discussed against the background of the derived research
questions. The final section summarises the results, deduces possible implications and
hints towards further research questions.
Overview of German social long-term care insurance
Compulsory long-term care insurance in Germany was implemented in 1995 after
20 years of political discussion. The aim was to treat the risk of long-term care as an
existential risk (such as retirement, sickness, unemployment and disability) and roll
the programme into social security. Before the installation of social long-term care
insurance, whereas acute care was covered by health insurance, long-term care was
covered only for the needy through a community-based, means-tested programme.
This programme (Hilfe zur Pflege) only provides benefits if the recipient has exhausted
all private assets and income resources. Private care insurance has been available in
Germany since the mid-1980s but played a minor role in covering long-term care risk
due to low demand (only 250,000 private contracts were purchased).7
Prior to the introduction of social long-term care insurance, most of the chronically
ill or elderly individuals in need of long-term care were dependent on payments from
social assistance. Approximately 80 per cent of nursing home residents financed their
care by means-tested social assistance. In addition, the number of eligible persons
rose from 165,000 in 1963 to nearly 660,000 in 1993.8 Long-term care was a large and
growing financial burden for communities, and German Reunification exacerbated the
problems of financing long-term care. Figure 1 displays the increase in the number of
beneficiaries when long-term care social assistance was implemented. The introduction
of the social long-term care insurance programme in 1995 led to a downward shift in
the curve as a result of a massive shift from community-financed social assistance to
the new insurance scheme.
The mandatory social insurance programme for long-term care was established in
1995 as the fifth pillar of the social security scheme in Germany to protect the
population against the financial hardship associated with disability and chronic illness.
The government initially implemented social long-term care insurance to cover nursing
7 Goetting et al. (1994, p. 289) and Zweifel and Struewe (1998, p. 13ff.).
8 Statistisches Bundesamt (2009).
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care dependency, to disburden the local authorities from increasing payments to
provide social assistance and to enhance ambulatory care for long-term care patients.
These goals were mostly achieved.9
Social long-term care insurance was designed as a pay-as-you-go system and was
financed by income-related contributions, which are split equally between employees
and employers. The initial contribution rate in 1995 was 1 per cent. The new social
insurance programme provides home care and nursing home care for people with a
medically approved need without regard to age or financial status and without requiring
a means test. The benefits are fixed at a monthly maximum per eligible person and
are determined by illness/disability level and the setting.10 After the implementation
in January 1995, benefits for home care were paid in cash or in kind beginning in
July 1995, and benefits for nursing home care were added in July 1996.11 The
administration of social long-term care insurance was connected to the existing public
health insurance fund and covers the same people (approximately 90 per cent of the
population12 ). In 1996, the contribution rate was raised to 1.7 per cent due to the
















Figure 1. Recipients of social assistance for long-term care (Hilfe zur Pflege) 1963–2007 (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2009, Table D7).
9 BMGS (2003, p. 186) and Geraedts et al. (2000, p. 395).
10 BMG (2008a, pp. 11–12 and 23).
11 BMGS (2003, p. 185).
12 OECD (2008, p. 19). Individuals with high income and covered by private health insurance schemes were
obliged to purchase long-term care insurance at the same private insurance company with the same range
of coverage as the public scheme.
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in 1998. The benefit and contribution structure has been relatively stable since then,
excluding minor modifications.
Figure 1 illustrates that up to 400,000 individuals are dependent on both social
assistance and social long-term care insurance. This is based on the fact that social
long-term care insurance provides defined benefits (the limit of which depends on the
disability level)13 and form of care (home or institutional). Therefore, the provided
benefits or services often only cover part of an individual’s needs.14 If the personal
wealth of the aggrieved individuals or their potentially liable relatives cannot
completely cover the costs for needed care, they can also apply for social assistance.15
While the purpose of health insurance is to improve existing health conditions,
long-term care aims at making current conditions more bearable. As displayed in
Figure 2, more than two million people currently received monthly benefits from social
long-term care insurance. Most of these people receive ambulatory benefits (1.53 million).
Stationary care in nursing homes is used by 720,000 people. As the probability of
becoming dependent on long-term care after the age of 80 years is approximately
29 per cent, it is expected that in the year 2030, 3.09 million people will be in need of
long-term care.16
As the long-term care insurance programme began to run a deficit in 1999 and was
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Figure 2. Recipients of long-term care (1995 only recipient in total available) (BMG, 2008b).
13 The eligibility for benefits is distinguished by three levels of need and based on limitations for a minimum
of six months in activities of daily living (ADL) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADL).
14 BMGS (2003, pp. 185–186.)
15 BMG (2008a).
16 BMG (2009b, p. 15).
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initiated several small reforms.17 Connected with the newly elected government in
2009, the discussion about the financial deficit and the long-term care insurance
system resumed.
Data, methodology and hypotheses
The data used in this publication was made available by the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.
The German Socio-Economic Panel is a representative panel survey of households and
individuals. The first questioning was performed in 1984, covering approximately
6,000 households and 12,000 individual respondents. In 2008, the 26th questioning was
performed, which included nearly 11,000 households and 20,000 individuals. The
survey covers a wide range of diverse topics, such as income, employment status,
education and health situation.18
The aim of our paper is to analyse the individual assessment of financial risk
associated with long-term care dependency. The SOEP contains questions about
individual perceptions of the risks inherent to unemployment, old-age, long-term care,
etc. and information about income and other socioeconomic factors. We, therefore,
use the following question and the outcomes included in the SOEP survey as a proxy
for individual perception of the financial risks associated with long-term care:
The social security system in the FRG is split into several branches: health care,
unemployment insurance and pension insurance. The social security system and its
corresponding private businesses exist to provide assistance during emergencies
and old age. How financially secure are you in the following situations?
Only the answers concerning long-term care dependency are used in the regression
analysis as we aim to investigate the impact of the implementation of the social
long-term care insurance. Potential answers are divided into five categories, from
“very good” to “bad”, in addition to “don’t know/does not apply”. We transformed
the answers into a numerical scale from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to “bad” and 5
corresponds to “very good” (we dropped observations with the answer “don’t
know/does not apply” as they had no relevance). The SOEP includes this specific
question every five years, beginning in 1987. To analyse the effect of implementing
compulsory long-term care insurance, we use a balanced data set from 1992, 1997
and 2002. The answers from 2002 and 1997 were used to ensure not only the
detection of direct (short-term) effects (e.g., broad media coverage or introductory
problems) but also the long-term effects from the introduction. Our sample consists
of members of the German health insurance system, either compulsory or private.
All participants are aged 16 years or older. The final data set includes approximately
18,000 observations.
17 BMGS (2003) and BMG (2009a).
18 A detailed description of the SOEP can be found in Wagner et al. (2007).
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To examine our research questions, we estimate the following regression equation:
FSt
!! ¼ b! " Xt þ e!t ð1Þ
where FSt
!!
is the vector of individual perception of financial security with respect to
long-term care need at time t. The matrix Xt includes all variables inevitable to test
our hypotheses and a set of control variables. The vector et! represents the error
terms.
According to the ordinal scale of our dependent variable, we use an ordered probit
regression based on the latent variable approach19 to estimate Eq. (1). In our analysis,
we focus on relative comparisons and on coefficient signs rather than absolute values.
We also do not calculate marginal effects to interpret the results, as marginal effects
represent the probability that the individual i changes the former category of the
dependent variable, given a marginal change in an explanatory variable. Such infor-
mation does not deliver further information to analyse our hypotheses.
To analyse structural breaks of individual risk perception caused by the intro-
duction of compulsory long-term care insurance and the significance of these
influences, we ran separate regressions at all observed points in time. First, we look
at shifts in perception due to the introduction of compulsory long-term care insurance
by adding year dummy variables mt and their interaction terms with all other
explanatory variables (excluding control variables) to the variable-matrix Xt and
estimate Eq. (1) employing a pooled ordered probit regression. The year dummy
variables mt have a value of one at time t and zero otherwise. In the second step, we
estimate Eq. (1) separately for 1992, 1997 and 2002 to focus on the significance level of
the influences at each point in time.
Using our regressions, we will analyse the estimation results with regard to our
three hypotheses covering different aspects of the influence of introducing compulsory
long-term care insurance in Germany.
Motivation and formulation of hypotheses
As mentioned in the section ‘Overview of German social long-term care insurance’,
the implementation of long-term care insurance in 1995 exerted influence on the
financial situation of those in need of long-term care. The new system covers the
financial risk associated with becoming dependent on long-term care by offering
monetary assistance. Beforehand, people had to completely deplete their earnings to
finance their care needs and the majority of people obtaining care in institutions were
dependent on social assistance sooner or later. Owing to these financial aspects and
individual risk aversion, we expect the following results:
H1: The introduction of long-term care insurance in 1995 led to a general positive
shift in individuals’ assessment of their financial situation in the case of long-
term care need. In terms of our regression, the year dummy variables mt will be
positive and significantly different from zero.
19 For a detailed description of this approach, see Winkelmann and Boes (2006, ch. 6).
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H2: An individual’s assessment of their financial situation increases with income
both before and after introducing long-term care insurance. Therefore, all
income coefficients are positive and significantly different from zero. Further-
more, the financial support of compulsory long-term care insurance weakens the
influence of income, leading to significantly negative coefficients for the
respective interaction terms.
Hypothesis 3 (H3) arises from the insight that the perception of long-term care risk is
based on prospects that are influenced by a number of different factors. One important
factor is the level of information about financial consequences in the case of long-term
care need. The SOEP survey provides information on whether someone in the
respondent’s household needs care on a constant basis. This direct experience with the
psychological, physical and financial aspects of long-term care leads to a higher level
of information for the relevant respondent. Weinstein describes a bias in personal risk
perception, arguing that less informed individuals believe that they are less likely to
be affected by risks or situations than the average individual.20 This bias might partly
be reduced if the individual has experience with long-term care, resulting in a worse
perception in 1992 compared to individuals with no experience. In addition, McCall
et al.21 found the demand for long-term care insurance significantly increases with
long-term care experience. This additional demand may be covered by the newly
introduced insurance, leading to a better assessment in 1997 and 2002.
H3: Experience with long-term care in a respondent’s household has a negative
effect on the assessment of their financial situation. After the introduction of
compulsory long-term care insurance, this negative effect was diminished. In
our pooled regression, this would imply that the coefficient of experiencing
long-term care has a negative sign and is significantly different from zero.
Conversely, the respective interaction terms are positive and significantly
different from zero.
Variables
To analyse our hypotheses, we include the following variables:
“Income” is a natural variable for inclusion; we decided to use per capita household
income, which includes all income sources and accounts for both heterogeneous
income situations and the number of household members when comparing different
households. We did not use a continuous variable but rather clustered income into
ranges.
Another important variable is “experience with long-term care”, as experienced
interviewees have an informational advantage, and we base one of our hypotheses on
this fact. This variable is a dummy variable and equal to one if, in the household of
individual i, a need for long-term care exists. Two additional factors that yield an
informational advantage that we included are “political interest” and “general level of
20 Weinstein (1980, pp. 813, 818–819), Weinstein (1989, p. 1232).
21 McCall et al. (1998, p. 194).
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education” (low, middle or high). “Political interest” is coded as an ordinal variable
from one (none) to four (very strong).
We also include a set of conventional control variables in the regression, which may
be correlated with the dependent variable.
Results
We begin this section by evaluating the descriptive statistics of the data prior to going
deeper into detail and using more sophisticated analytics. Generally, we will focus on
and highlight the effects of the introduction of compulsory long-term care insurance
by looking at changes in the different clusters between 1992 and 2002. As we mentioned
in the third section, we will also refer to separate regressions if they provide additional
insights. We will try to verify or reject our hypotheses based on the results presented in
this section.
A first examination of the data is displayed in Figure 3, showing the relative
frequency of the different perception clusters in 1992, 1997 and 2002. The mass of the
distribution shifts from the lower values to higher values over time. This is an expected
result as long-term care insurance unburdens a large segment of the population. Only
the “very good” cluster exhibits decreasing numbers, but due to its small size, it does
not significantly influence the positive shift. To examine this apparent shift and the
influence of several other variables in more detail, we will focus on the regression
analysis presented in the section ‘Data, methodology and hypothesis’ after the initial
























Figure 3. Perception of financial security concerning long-term care (relative frequencies).
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positive trend in the perception of financial security, we compare the perception of
financial security in the case of long-term care needs with the perception of financial
security in the case of old age, sickness and unemployment, which are also covered by
the SOEP. Figure 4 displays the mean values of the perception of financial security in
1992, 1997 and 2002 for all four cases.22 The mean value in the case of long-term care
needs increases from 1992 to 1997, and the mean value decreases for all other cases.
Therefore, there appears to be a general negative shift in the assessment of financial
security; however, our results verify a positive impact on financial security in the case
of long-term care needs due to the introduction of compulsory long-term care
insurance. Comparing 1997 and 2002, the mean values represent a positive shift in the
assessment of financial security for all cases, which therefore support a general positive
trend from 1997 to 2002. Because the trend is positive for all cases, the positive shift in
the case of long-term care needs from 1992 to 1997 appears to be stable, at least in the
observed sample.
As noted in the section ‘Overview of German social long-term care insurance’,
compulsory long-term care insurance had a particularly positive effect on the mid-
income subgroup, which had to bear all the costs of long-term care prior to the
introduction of social long-term care insurance. Prior to 1995, financial support of
long-term care needs was only supplied by voluntary private insurance. Therefore,
we expect these clusters to have an increased level of perception relative to the
average. This expected effect must be further examined, so we split the population
into household-income per capita clusters and observed how their perception of
financial security changed over time for specific subgroups in the regression analysis.
The clustering split the sample into five groups: [0, 500), [500, 1,000), [1,000, 2,000),












Figure 4. Mean value of perception of financial security.
22 Although the mean value is not a probable measure for ordinal data, it is sufficient to identify a trend.
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Table 1 displays the perception change from 1992 to 2002 for the cluster that has less
than h500 of household income per capita. This is a special group with regard to the
changes that took place in 1995. As described in the section ‘Overview of German
social long-term care insurance’, it is more likely for this group to receive social
security benefits in the case of long-term care needs, relying on the aforementioned
“Hilfe zur Pflege”. This subgroup did not experience any major changes in coverage
with the introduction of the new insurance. Comparing the change in perception for
this subgroup with the change in perception for the overall sample, a similar trend can
be observed in the data, which leads to the assumption that the perception of financial
security is also positively affected by the introduction of social long-term care
insurance for this special subgroup.
Table 2 presents the regression results of the pooled ordered probit regression.
Introduction of compulsory long-term care insurance
The first result to note is that the coefficients for the year dummy variables for
1997 and 2002 are significant on the 1 per cent level and positive, suggesting that the
general view of financial risk associated with long-term care needs improved after
the introduction of compulsory long-term care insurance. This is also indicated in
Figures 3 and 4 where the shift of the distribution to a higher mean suggests the
same conclusion. As mentioned before, due to the general negative trend between 1992
and 1997 in the perception of financial security, the coefficients of the year dummy
variables are likely underestimated. These results verify our hypothesis that due to
individual risk aversion, long-term care insurance improves financial security.
Income
Now we explore the regression results with regards to our second hypothesis of income
positively influencing an individual’s assessment of financial security.
Note that the absolute values of the coefficient monotonously increase with the level
of household income per capita in 1992. The coefficient for the [500, 1,000) cluster is
insignificant, implying that it yields the same effect if household income per capita is
drawn from [0, 500) in 1992. The assessment of financial security increasing with
income is also observed in 2002. The interaction dummy variables for 1997 are all
insignificant, verifying the conjecture that income is now regarded as minor factor
when assessing financial security. Looking at the interaction dummy variables for 2002
Table 1 Relative frequency of perception for the (0, h500) cluster of household income per capita
Perception 1992 (in %) 1997 (in %) 2002 (in %)
Bad 51.89 30.19 26.60
Poor 25.00 35.85 31.58
Satisfactory 10.38 20.13 29.66
Good 11.32 13.21 11.68
Very good 1.42 0.63 0.48
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yields an interesting result. The coefficients rise to levels similar to before the
introduction of social long-term care insurance and are significant. The rationale for
this may be similar to the argument regarding the variable experience with long-term
care. While that group had an informational advantage by directly observing the
situation immediately after the introduction, inexperienced individuals appear to trust
the newly implemented governmental intervention and, as a result, rely less on their
Table 2 Regression results, confidence levels denoted by *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1% level
Variable Ordered probit
Coefficient Standard error
Year 1997 0.402*** 0.152
Year 2002 0.595*** 0.118
Experience with long-term care &0.049 0.087
Experience with long-term care* (Year1997) &0.048 0.113
Experience with long-term care* (Year2002) 0.207** 0.106
Having children under 16 0.254*** 0.039
Having children under 16* (Year1997) &0.209*** 0.050
Having children under 16* (Year2002) &0.224*** 0.048
Widowed (Reference category: married) &0.127 0.091
Widowed* (Year1997) 0.334*** 0.111
Widowed* (Year2002) 0.238** 0.105
Political interest &0.062*** 0.021
Political interest* (Year1997) 0.041 0.028
Political interest* (Year2002) 0.029 0.027
Household income per capita (Reference category: Incomeo500)
[500, 1,000) 0.079 0.092
[500, 1,000)* (Year1997) &0.043 0.136
[500, 1,000)* (Year2002) 0.021 0.098
[1,000, 2,000) 0.203** 0.092
[1,000, 2,000)* (Year1997) &0.044 0.136
[1,000, 2,000)* (Year2002) 0.049 0.101
[2,000, 3,000) 0.264*** 0.102
[2,000, 3,000)* (Year1997) &0.099 0.148
[2,000, 3,000)* (Year2002) 0.355** 0.145
X3,000 0.643*** 0.127
X3,000* (Year1997) &0.001 0.180
X3,000* (Year2002) &0.088 0.241
Education (Reference group: average education level)
Low education level 0.110*** 0.034
Low education level* (Year1997) 0.055 0.046
Low education level* (Year2002) &0.015 0.044
High education level &0.064 0.071
High education level* (Year1997) &0.070 0.092
High education level* (Year2002) 0.044 0.085
Log-Likelihood: &24,019.717 Pseudo-R2: 0.0368 Number of obs: 17,963
Additional control variables: age, sex, marital status, employment status, kind of health insurance,
perception of health status, financial assets, house owner.
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respective income, as we expected. In the following years, mass media headlines
suggested that insurance was experiencing financial difficulties, stoking fears of
insufficient funds and a return to the need for individual safety nets.
As the income cluster of [0, 500) cannot be directly observed because it is the
reference group for the regression, the regression is inconclusive when interpreting
the introduction effect for this income group. Therefore, only the descriptive analysis
in Table 1 may be used to derive any conclusion. As mentioned above, due to the
general trend, which is also present for the oh500 per capita income cluster, we may
deduce that even the lower income group assesses its financial security in the case of
long-term care needs significantly better than before the introduction and similar to all
other income groups. This is not intuitive as the coverage, or security, for a large part
of this group is not actually improving.
Experience with long-term care
According to our third hypothesis, our assumption can be upheld relatively but not
absolutely. Experience with long-term care was not a significant factor prior to the
introduction of social insurance. This implies that, contrarily to our first hypothesis,
experience had no negative impact on the assessment of financial security for the
aggrieved party.
Looking at the sign and coefficient of the change in influence of the experience with
long-term care variable, the influence did not change in 1997 but increased significantly in
2002. These effects yield the result stated earlier and in our hypothesis in relative form.
This fact may be interpreted as a hint towards the effectiveness of the introduction of
social long-term insurance. However, regarding the value and significance level of the
variable in 1997, one might suspect that the group of individuals experienced with long-
term care are affected by a slow and problematic start.23 In addition, they could directly
observe the effect of the introduction and therefore assess their own situation during the
implementation. The fact that the introduction was perceived positively over the long-
term is a result that was expected and confirmed by the data. The significant difference
does not directly imply that experience was a significant influence for long-term care
in 2002.
We also look at the experience coefficient in the separated 1997 and 2002
regression, the results of which are presented in Table 3. The influence is negative
and significant at the 10 per cent level in 1997 as well as significant and positive on
the 1 per cent level in 2002. This confirms the results of the pooled regression. We
also expect the assessment of financial risk prior to the introduction to be distorted
in this subgroup as the individual burden was expected to impair the perception
of financial risk. This is clearly not the case as the respective coefficient is insigni-
ficant. Thus, the experience with long-term care in individual households did not
have any influence in 1992.
23 Dietz (1992, p. 13).
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Children and widows
Although the following variables are not covered by the initially proposed hypotheses,
we want to highlight a set of control variables that yield interesting results. The first of
which is the influence of children. As mentioned in the introduction, families with
children should be less concerned about old age and nursing needs, as families were
traditionally responsible for this burden and generally bore the financial risk as
payback for the transfers they received while growing up. In 1992, the coefficient was
significant and positive, which is probably explained by the traditionalist view
discussed above. The assessment of their financial risk depended largely on whether
children existed in the respective household. This picture changes after the intro-
duction of social long-term care insurance. Both change coefficients are significant and
negative. Therefore, it appears that children did not matter in the assessment of
financial risk in the case of long-term care needs. The rationale for this finding is not
obvious. First, the introduction of long-term care insurance may be a major factor in
Table 3 Regression results, confidence levels denoted by *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1% level
Variable Ordered probit 1992 Ordered probit 1997 Ordered probit 2002
Coefficient (standard error)
Experience with long-term care &0.040 &0.122* 0.185***
(0.087) (0.073) (0.063)
Having children under 16 0.210*** 0.071* 0.015
(0.046) (0.040) 0.038
Widowed (Reference category: married) &0.115 0.210*** 0.137**
(0.098) (0.073) (0.062)
Political interest &0.043** &0.031 &0.036**
(0.0215) (0.019) (0.017)
Household income per capita (Reference category: Incomeo500)
[500, 1,000) 0.081 0.013 0.110***
(0.093) (0.101) (0.035)
[1,000, 2,000) 0.196** 0.138 0.269***
(0.094) (0.102) (0.045)
[2,000, 3,000) 0.241** 0.147 0.660***
(0.104) (0.109) (0.107)
X3,000 0.555*** 0.664*** 0.594***
(0.131) (0.132) (0.209)
Education (Reference group: average education level)
Low education level 0.110*** 0.154*** 0.010***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.030)
High education level &0.101 &0.110* &0.021
(0.073) (0.060) (0.049)
Log-Likelihood &6405.9055 &7976.8957 &9371.3532
Pseudo-R2 0.0177 0.0276 0.0314
Number of observations 4,971 6,017 6,975
Additional control variables: age, sex, marital status, employment status, kind of health insurance,
perception of health status, financial assets, house owner.
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this development. In fact, a large fraction of the financial obligations for long-term
care is borne by compulsory insurance after 1995. As a result, the need for financial
support from one’s children is of decreasing importance. There are other trends that
may be partially responsible for these observations. For example, the number of
children has significantly decreased, nullifying the effect of “several shoulders” bearing
the costs of long-term care. Keep in mind that our question only covers the financial
aspects of long-term care, not the fact that children provide important mental support
when individuals are in need. Therefore, this effect is not reflected in our results.
The next variable of interest is also not covered by our hypotheses, but we wanted to
present the results in this context. Being a widow significantly influences the individual
assessment of financial risk after the introduction of social long-term care insurance.
Compared to married individuals, the coefficient is insignificant in 1992; however,
the change in assessment for 1997 and 2002 is positive and highly significant. The
results suggest that before the introduction of long-term care insurance, there was no
significant difference in the assessment of financial risk between married or widowed
individuals. However, a widowed individual has a more optimistic view of their
financial security in the case of long-term care needs compared to a married individual.
This is an unexpected result in absolute terms. One explanation for this positive
change in the assessment of financial security may be a result of experience with
public benefits, such as widow pensions. This positive experience could have generally
strengthened the confidence in federal benefits, leading to an improving assessment of
financial security.
Education and political interest
Two other variables also produced interesting results: level of education and level
of political interest. It is interesting to note that with a higher level of education and
political interest, the assessment of financial security declines. This is most likely
because individuals with more education demand more information. Although this
is not surprising, the opposite argument could have also been made. As information
sources are limited in the lower educated social stratum, one could expect those
individuals to be more susceptible to manipulation by the media. However, this is not
verified in our data set. Similar to the case of widowed individuals, this result may be
due to greater exposure to social benefits and the positive assessment of those benefits.
Additional research in this direction could be enlightening.
Robustness of the results
To check our results for robustness, we performed the same regressions on subsamples
of the original sample. Thirty per cent of the observations were randomly dropped,
and the analysis was conducted several times. After 20 repetitions, the results were
compared. We could not identify any significantly different outcomes in any test
regressions. Only in the case where too many people of the small group of experienced
participants were dropped by the algorithm, the corresponding variable became
insignificant, but more importantly never changed signs. Furthermore, the separate
regressions reproduced the results of the pooled regression, where comparable.
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Conclusion
We gained meaningful insight into the validity of a large proportion of our
hypotheses. As expected, the feeling of financial security is an increasing function
in income. In addition, this effect was diminished with the introduction of long-
term care insurance in the short term, while returning to formerly high levels in
the long run. Experience with long-term care and an informational edge have a
positive influence on the perception of financial security with the introduction of
compulsory insurance; however, this occurs on a higher level in the long run than
we originally conjectured.
The results of our regression analysis illustrate that the perception of financial
security in the case of long-term care needs increased in all segments of the
population after introducing compulsory long-term care insurance. This is currently
not reflected in public discussions because it focuses on the shortcomings of
the current benefit schedule of this social insurance. As previously mentioned, the
discussion primarily focuses on directly measurable dimensions, narrowing the
argument to the state of insurance itself. Future reform should therefore be
accompanied by a more robust information policy. A specific subgroup in our
sample highlights the benefits of a better information policy. By directly observing
federal support and other benefits, they gain access to more information. As a
result, individuals who have experienced long-term care at home assess the situation
better. This information deficit can be closed by providing more transparency and
involving the insured, which will likely lead to no necessity of compulsory private
endorsements.
It is clear that the introduction of a new public benefit system appears to improve
an individual’s assessment of his or her financial security. This should be kept in
mind when thinking about merging health insurance and long-term care insurance,
as it has been recently proposed by several parties. Knowledge of the existence of a
support system appears to play a significant role in assessment, which can be seen
in the low-income cluster of our analysis. The primary change for a large segment
of the population is just a name change. This subjective reasoning may also be used
in another way: by building a joint institution, the demand for additional private
insurance could be artificially increased. Supplementing the current system with
private insurance contracts has often been publically discussed (e.g., in the Ruerup
commission).
Further research could perform a detailed analysis of how different factors influence
individual assessments of financial security. Especially regarding our result of
improving perception within the low-income group, further closer analysis is capable
of producing additional insights. Another study could analyse the influence of wealth
by using clusters of monetary commitments in different asset classes.
Lastly, we want to point out some limitations to our study. As it was not possible to
observe if individuals had private long-term care insurance prior to the introduction
of social long-term care insurance, we encountered an identification problem. This
could limit the validity of our results. However, as mentioned in the section ‘Overview
of German social long-term care insurance’, prior to the introduction, approximately
250,000 private contracts existed, making the effect negligible.
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The perception of financial risks - A panel data analysis on perceived 
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Even though there is a vast literature on risk perception,most studies focus on event
probabilitiesandlackadiscussionoflossseverity,whichisparamountforhighfinancialrisks
as longͲtermcareneed.Analyzing theperceptionof financialconsequencesandperceived
financialsecurity,conditionalonanadverseeventoccurring, isneededtofullyunderstand




the perception of effective financial security. The results indicate that political decision
















research group surrounding Paul Slovic coined the phrase “bounded rationality”, which
describesthebehaviorofindividualsfacingnaturalhazardssuchasdroughtsorearthquakes
or technological risks such as those of nuclear power, pesticides or smoking (Slovic,
Kunreuther andWhite 1974 and Fischhoff et al. 1978). Fueled by independent findings
showing that individuals tend to have large biases in their risk perceptions and selfͲ
assessments(e.g.,thesoͲcalledoverconfidencebias:Weinstein1989orKrugerandDunning
1999), subsequentempirical studiesattempted to isolate the causeof thesephenomena.
Slovicetal.(1980)suggestedearlythatan individual’sperceptionofaspecificrisk ishighly
dependent on experiences of the individual (i.e., familiarity), the “quality” of the risk
(i.e., dread) and the subjective relevance of the risk (i.e., exposure). These resultswere
obtained by conducting a factor analysis on data generated by extensive questionnaires






general context, other authors went further to differentiate between the behaviors of








isexpected loss rather thanan isolatedconsiderationofeventprobabilities.Theexpected
loss is theproductof theprobabilityof an adverseevent and the severityof thatevent,
conditionalon theeventoccurring.This implies that theassessmentof the severityofan
adverse event, conditional on the event of needing longͲterm care (LTC), has a positive
3

relationship with the demand for LTC insurance. In fact, studies support this argument
(Sjöberg1998,1999).Sjöbergevenconcludes,“thatdemandforriskreduction isdrivenby
the severity of consequences, not probability of risk” (Sjöberg 1999, p. 129). This
consideration isespeciallyrelevantforhighfinancialriskssuchastheriskofneeding longͲ
termcare(seeNorton2000andZhouͲRichteretal.2010).
Despite the fact thatLTC isconsideredasahigh financial risk, it is surprising that (toour
knowledge) no empirical study exists investigating the individual perception of financial
consequences.1Analyzing the individual factors that influence the perception of financial
consequencesisthereforeofmajorinterest.
Theaimofthisstudyistofocusonthelatterpart,theseverityofaneventconditionalonits
occurrence. More specifically, we wish to analyze the assessment of financial security
conditionalonbeinginneedofLTCforGermany.TheargumentofLTCbeingahighfinancial
risk also applies for Germany as the currentGerman statutory LTC system –whichwas
introducedin1995Ͳonlyprovidespartialcoverage(seenextsectionfordetails).
Analyzing perceived financial security conditional on being in need of LTC provides an
important contribution to the prior literature as it complements studies on probability
estimations with the perception of the second factor of expected loss. Because of the
positive relationshipbetweenperceived financial securityand LTC insurancedemand, the
assessment of financial security unites several interesting features of the demand for
(supplementary) LTC insurance. The connection of our results to possible factors that
influenceLTCinsurancedemandshedssomefurtherlightonthisissue.
Theresultsprovidemeaningfulimplicationsforpolicymakersandtheinsuranceindustryand
canhelp to furtherunderstanddecisions concerning (LTC) insurancedemand inconsistent
with canonical insurance economics. More precisely, studies exploring the potential
misperceptionof financialconsequences (i.e.expected loss incaseofneedingLTC)or the
relationship between the available information and the perception of financial
consequences could help to dampen negative effects with regard to the perception of
financial consequencesand LTC insurancedemand respectively. Furthermore, information
onpotentialsubstitutesforLTCinsurancedemand(e.g.havingchildrenorrealestate)could





children has a negative impact on LTC insurance demand, policymakers could consider
reform options that counteract such relationships. Here, information regarding the
relationship between such variables and the perception of financial consequences yields
important insights,assuming thealreadystatedpositiverelationshipofperceived financial
consequencesandLTCinsurancedemandviaexpectedcosts.
Inparticular,toanalyzetheperceptionoffinancialsecurityconditionalonbeing inneedof
LTC,weuse the followingquestion: “Howdo individualsperceive financial security in the
eventoflongͲtermcareneed?”.2ThisquestionwastakenfromtheGermanSocioͲEconomic
Panel (SOEP), a broad panel dataset. This question implies the conditionality structure
describedaboveandalsoprovidesabroaderscope forresearch,asthequestiondoesnot




to provide amore complete view of potential factors that influence the perception and
insurancecoveragedecisions.Thus, theSOEPquestion isavalidproxy for the individual’s
expectationofthesecondfactor,asitimplicitlyincludesalltheseinfluences.
Theremainderofthisarticleisstructuredasfollows.Inthenextsectionweprovideareview
ofthe literatureontheassessmentof(LTC)riskandpotentialcausesof lowLTC insurance
demand.Thatsectionalsoprovidesamoreprecisemotivationforourresearchquestionand
considered hypotheses. These hypotheses are presented in section three. Section four

















Eligibility for LTC benefits from statutory LTC insurance is determined by a medical
examinationandassessmentofdailylivingcapabilities.Itisdifferentiatedintothreelevelsof
severity(seeRothgang2010).Furthermore,theamountofbenefitsisalsodependentonthe
kindofcare, i.e.homecareornursinghomecare. In2012, thebenefits ranged from235
(700)Eurosforhomecare level1(level3)upto1,023(1,550)Eurosfornursinghomecare
level1(level3).AmoredetailedtabulationofthebenefitsispresentedinZuchandkeetal.
(2012).When theown financial resources areexhausteddue tooutͲofpocketpayments,
adult childrenare legallyobliged to support theirparents' costsof care.Asa lastoption,
means tested social assistance exists in Germany to ensure a minimum income level.




coveredby the statutoryLTC insuranceowncomplementary insuranceproducts (seeGDV
2011andFederalMinistryofHealth2011).ThissoͲcalledLTCinsurancepuzzleexistsinmany
developedcountries (seePestieauandPontière2012). In theattempt to solve thispuzzle
moreandmorestudiesemphasizethat individualperceptionsandassessmentsofLTCrisk
driveactual LTC insurancedemand (seee.g.CourbageandRoudaut2008,Finkelsteinand
McGarry2006andAHIP2012).3
Based on a broad literature review, Brown and Finkelstein (2009) clustered different












The first class of arguments contends that individuals manifest a low level of financial
literacyandareunableto fullyunderstand the financialconsequences incaseofrequiring
LTC.Additionally,individualstendtomisperceivetheriskofLTC.Thisrationaleisconsistent
with findings of Kunreuther et al. (1978), who argues that people have difficulties
understandinglowͲprobabilityandhighͲseverityrisks.Onarelatednote,Pauly(1990)argues
thatmany individuals have little knowledge about LTC programs. Thismight result in a
misperception that, for example Medicare or statutory LTC insurance fully covers LTC
expenditures (in theU.S. orGermany respectively). Potentialmisperceptions of LTC risks
havebeenobservedbyanotherstudy (seeAARP2006).TheAARP (2006)determined that
more than half of all respondents to a survey believe thatMedicare covers the costs of
nursinghomecare.Furthermore, theirquestionnaire revealed thatapproximately60%of
respondentsunderestimated themonthly costsof LTCbymore than20% relative to the
averagecostlevel.
These findingssuggest that informationaboutandexperienceswithLTC risk influences its
perceptionand thereforeprobablyalso insurancedemand.This reasoning issupportedby
several independent studies. ZhouͲRichter et al. (2010) asked respondents about their
insurancedemandbeforeandafterproviding informationon financialconsequences (e.g.,
monthly costs and benefits from statutory LTC insurance) of LTC need. They observed a
significantchangeinthewillingnessofrespondentstobuyLTCinsuranceaftertheyreceived
relevantinformation.McCalletal.(1998)foundevidencethatindividualswithcareͲneeding
family members are more aware of the risk. Demand for LTC insurance among these
individuals ishigher.Similar to these findings,Zuchandkeetal. (2010)have shown thata
careͲneeding familymember influencestheperceptionof financialsecurity intheeventof
LTCneed.Onamoregenerallevel,Viscusi(1990)statesthatnewinformationalsoinfluence
theassessmentofrisk.Inanotherstudy,HakesandViscusi(2004)haveshownthat“better








reveal a strong link between risk communication and risk perception. Bomlitz and Brezis
(2008)findasignificantmisrepresentationofhealthrisksbymassmediatotheextentthat
therearecasesofan inverserelationbetweentheprobabilityofariskand itscoverageby
themedia.4 Ackerson and Viswanath (2010) verified thesemedia attention effects for a
differentsetofrisks.Additionally,differentstudiesstatethatrisksreceivingmediaattention
aremore likely tobeoverestimatedby individuals (e.g., Fischhoffet al.1981 andViscusi
1990).
Withregardtothethirdclassofarguments,BrownandFinkelstein(2009)discusspotential
substitutes forLTC insurancecoverage,namely family, illiquidhousing (or realestate)and
public LTC insurance schemes.Theyargue, forexample, that childrenareconsideredasa
possible substitute for formal LTC and therefore for LTC insurance coverage. Zweifel and





Realestate is consideredasanadditional financial resource (seeFinkelsteinandMcGarry
2006). Besides nonͲliquid assets like real estate, itmight be reasonable to also include
financialassetsaspossiblesubstitutesforLTCinsurance.Forexample,Bernet(2009)argues
that the attractiveness to selfͲinsure increaseswith networth. In this case,when taking
assets intoaccount, it isplausibleto includetheirnetvalue intheanalysis(i.e.,grossvalue












onthe individualperceptionof financialsecurity intheeventofLTCneed.Theycompared





compared to all other cases. However, although they had panel data available for their
analysistheauthorsrestrictedthemselvestocrossͲsectiontechniques.
Allof the findingsaboveare strong indicators thatperceptionof LTC risks ingeneraland
perception of its financial consequences in particular areof importance to LTC insurance
demand. Even the aspects of the third class of arguments (i.e., potential substitutes) are




As stated earlier, we analyze individual factors that are influencing the perception of
financialconsequencesintheeventofneedingLTC.Whereastheanalysesofseveralfactors
mightbeofinterest,wetesthypothesesthatarerelatedtothestatedclasses(1)and(3)by
BrownandFinkelstein (2009) (seeprior section).Moreprecisely, the first twohypotheses
are related toknowledgeand levelofknowledge regarding the financial consequencesof
needingLTC.Here,wetakeexperience intoaccountasan immediatesourceofknowledge,
aswellaslevelofeducationandpoliticalinteresttoproxyforlevelofknowledgeregarding
LTC risk. For the latter two factors,we argue that educationwill impact risk assessment
abilitiesandthatpolitical interestwill impactdemandfor information.Hypotheses3and4




of“better”or“worse” in thecontextofperceptionaswellas“negative”or“positive” for
impact on the perception of financial security respectively. Throughout this article, we
consider if an individual actually subjectively feels better orworse in terms of financial
9
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security. The influence of certain variables on the individual ability to objectively assess
financial security is explicitly not a part of our research question. Additionally, when







As mentioned above, different studies (e.g., Pauly 1990, AARP 2006) have shown that
individualswith a low level of knowledge aremore likely to underestimate the financial
consequences of needing LTC. These effects are also likely to be observed in Germany.
Partial coverage in combination with different benefit levels might be a source of
misperception.Many individualsmay not be fully aware of the amount of coverage to
expect. Furthermore, the existing meansͲtested social assistance to ensure a minimum
income level inGermany could be another source of the false impression that they are
covered sufficiently. Experience with the current system is providing direct information,
increasing the individual’s level of knowledge. As a consequence, individuals with this
informationcanbetterassesstheactualfinancialsituationthatariseswhenLTC isneeded.
Thus,weexpect thatexperiencewith theLTCsystemnegativelyaffects theassessmentof
financialsecuritywhenLTCisneeded.

Hypothesis 2: The level of education is negatively related to the assessment of financial
securityintheeventofneedingLTC.Furthermore,themagnitudeofthiseffectisdecreasing
overtime.
Basedonthesameargumentpresented forhypothesis1 (i.e.,underestimationdueto low
levelofknowledge)andconsistent findings inthe literature (esp.HakesandViscusi2004),
weargue thatmoreeducated individuals canmorepreciselyperceive the riskandbetter
understand how to gather crucial information. Furthermore, we expect the same
relationshipforperceptionoffinancialsecuritywhenneedingLTC.Consequently,weassume
anegativerelationshipbetweeneducationandtheassessmentoffinancialsecurity.Onthe
other side, less educated individuals are probably more influenced by (negative)
10
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misrepresentations (e.g.,Bomlitz andBrezis 2008)providedbymassmedia,whichwould
leadtoacountervailingeffect.Althoughweassumethatthis lattereffect isdominatedby




Hypothesis 3: The extent of political interest is negatively related to the assessment of
financialsecurityintheeventofneedingLTC.
Asstatedabove,weusepolitical interestasaproxy forknowledgeabout theLTCsystem.
Furthermore,weassume that individualswhoaremore interested inpolitical issuesmake
better use of publicly available information about the LTC system. This is similar to
hypothesis2whereeducationwasusedasan indicatorof informationdemand.Therefore,
theseindividualsareabletoestimatethefinancialsituationthatariseswhenLTCisneeded
moreaccurately.Combinedwith the fact that less informed individualsaremore likely to
underestimate the financial consequencesofneeding LTC (AARP2006,ZhouͲRichteretal.
2010),we assume anegative relationshipbetween thisproxy andperceptionof financial









indicate that (ceteris paribus) children are a potential source of parents feeling better
secured (i.e. in our context, to perceive financial securitymore optimistically) and, as a






Hypothesis5:Assets (debt)arepositively (negatively) related to theperceptionof financial
security in theeventofneedingLTC.Furthermore, theexpected (permanent) incomehasa
positiveinfluenceontheassessmentoffinancialsecurityintheeventofneedingLTC.
ConnectedtothereasoningofBrownandFinkelstein(2009),assetsmaybeliquidatedinthe
eventofLTCneed.Therefore, individualswithassetsare financiallymore flexiblecovering









To empirically testourhypotheses,weusedata from the SOEPprovidedby theGerman
Institute for Economic Research, Berlin (DIW Berlin). The SOEP is a representative panel
surveyofhouseholdsand individuals(HaiskenͲDeNewandFrick2005)andcontainsawide
rangeofquestionsontopicssuchasincome,employment,educationandhealthstatus.The
first surveywas conducted in 1984with participation of approximately 6,000 households
and12,000individualsresponding.In2010,the27thwavewascompleted,includingroughly
11,000householdsand20,000 individuals.All initiallyselectedsamplesofSOEParemultiͲ
stage random samples. In each selected household,memberswho are 17 and older are






TheSOEP is frequentlyused for scientific studies.Currently,more than7,000publications
related to theSOEPare listed in the literaturedatabaseSOEPlit.5Amongothers,Wagner,









Aswe cannot observe perception of severity directly,we use information on perceived
financialsecurityintheeventofLTCneedasaproxy(seeIntroduction).Morespecifically,we








With regard toour fivehypotheses,weconsider the following independentvariables:For
experiencewith LTC,we use two different questions. Individuals are asked if there is a
householdmemberinneedofLTC.Startingin2002,participantsareadditionallyaskedifthe
familymember inneedof care receivesbenefits from statutory LTC insurance.Using this
information,wearenotonlyabletodifferentiatebetweenlevelsofexperience(yes/no)but
alsowhethertheneedingindividualreceivesbenefitsfromstatutoryLTCinsuranceornot.
The SOEP provides the variable schoolyears, which we use as a cardinal measure for
education toaddressour secondhypothesis.To representpolitical interest,weutilize the
followingquestion:"How interestedareyou inpolitics?".Thepossibleanswersaredivided
into fourcategories, from"1=notatall" to"4=verymuch".As thisvariablehasanordinal
structure, itcouldbeappropriate tocreatedummyvariables for theparticularcategories.
However,astheresultsarequitesimilarundereitherspecification,wedecidedtousethe
originalordinalvariable.








nominal valuesof assets anddebt isonly available for thewaves conducted in2002 and
2007. Up to 1997,we can only use binary information of having/not having real estate
and/or financialassets.Therefore,we take thebinaryvariables realestateandassets into
accountwhenever considering all fourwaves.As this dummy structure does not provide
preciseestimates,wealsoconfirmtheresultswithasubanalysisusingthewaves2002and










theaveragehousehold incomeoverallyears the individual is in the survey (see,e.g.,van
Praagetal.2003).However,asweusea fixedeffectsapproach (seesectionMethod), the
permanent incomeasatimeͲinvariantvariable isalreadycoveredbythe individualͲspecific
interactionterm(seeKazarosian1997).Therefore,wemakeuseoftheproxyvariableecon.
situation, which codifies the intensity of anxiety of one’s individual future economic
situation. We utilize the question: "Are you concerned about your future economic
situation?".Thepossibleanswersaredivided intothreecategories,from"1=notconcerned
at all" to "3=very concerned". As in the case of political interest, the results of dummy






















































age,age2 continuousvariable age(rangesfrom17 to92)andthesquaredvalueofage

Method
Tomake use of the panel structure,we employ panelͲestimation techniques to test our
hypotheses. Panel data allows us to control for possible unobserved individual
heterogeneity,whichislikelybecauseofthesubjectivecharacterofourdependentvariable.
Amongothers,one issueofsubjectivity isan individual interpretationof theordinalscale.
15

Moreprecisely, it ispossiblethattwo individualswiththesameperceptionmarkdifferent
categories (e.g.,3 and4),whichwould lead tobiasedestimates. There are two common
ways to control for unobserved heterogeneity: the fixed effectsmodel and the random
effectsmodel (seeBaltagi 2008). To testwhether randomor fixedeffects estimators are
appropriate,weconductedaHausmanspecificationtest.Theresultsindicatethatthefixed
effectsmodelisappropriateinourcase8–adetaileddescriptionofthistestcanbefoundin
Baltagi (2008).Using fixedeffects, theproblemof individual interpretationof theordinal
scaleiseliminatedifthiseffectcanbeassumedtobetimeinvariant.Adetaileddescription
ofthefixedeffectsapproachcanbefoundinAllison(2009).
Besides considering endogeneity caused by unobserved individual heterogeneity,we also
tested for possible endogeneitywith respect to the idiosyncratic error term. To exclude
possible sources of endogeneity we instrumented the variables for income, economic
situationaswellas forwealthanddebt.9To test fora systematicdifferencebetween the
ordinary fixed effects approach and the nonͲefficient instrumental variable fixed effects
approach we conducted a Hausman specification test. The test cannot reject the null




Another econometric issue could rise throughmulticollinearity. To check if this poses a
problem in our specific dataset,we calculated the variance inflation factors (VIF) for all
considered variables.With regard toour analyzed variables, children reached thehighest
valueof2.68.Usingtheacceptedpracticeofacriticalvalueoffive(seeMenard1995),the









10Thevalueoftheteststatisticis߯ଶሺʹ͵ሻ ൌ ͹Ǥͷሺ݌ ൌ ͲǤͻͻͻሻincaseallfourwaves(withoutinteractionterms)
and߯ଶሺʹʹሻ ൌ ͳ͹Ǥ͸Ͷሺ݌ ൌ ͲǤ͹ʹ͹Ͳሻincaseofwaves2002and2007only.
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The fixed effects approach uses withinͲindividual variation only, which implies lower
precisionofestimates (seeAllison2009)andcan lead todifficultieswhen interpreting the
results,especiallyifthewithinͲindividualvariationisverysmallasinthecaseofeducation.11
Whereas individualshavedifferentoptionsconcerningeducation(evenextraoccupational)
the withinͲindividual variation should normally be very small over time. As we use this





or ordered logit regression. A description of bothmethods can be found inWooldridge
(2002). Using an ordered responsewith panel estimation techniques, however, leads to
technicalandconceptualproblems(seeClarketal.2009andAllison2009).Inourcase,the
most important restriction is thenonͲavailabilityof random and fixedeffectswhenusing
orderedresponsemodels.Tomanagetheseproblems,weusetheprobitͲadaptedordinary
leastsquares (POLS)approachbyvanPraagandFerrerͲiͲCarbonell (2008).Thecoreofthis
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sample distribution of the observed ordinal variable. According to a given sample
distributionሺሻ,wecanwrite

  ሺ¿୩ሻ ൌ 	ሺሻ,        (2)

where	ሺሻ ൌ σ ሺሻ୩୨ୀଵ  represents the cumulatedprobabilityof response category.We
cancalculatethecutͲoffpointsbyrewritingequation(2)as

  ¿୧ ൌ ିଵሾ	ሺሻሿ.        (3)

Using the calculated cutͲoff points ¿୩ in equation (1), the transformation leads to the
cardinalized variable ୩େ for ൌ ሼͳǡͷሽ. This variable is used as dependent variable in our
regressions.VanPraagandFerrerͲiͲCarbonell (2008)haveshown thatestimatedeffectsof
an orderedprobit and POLS are almost identical up to amultiplicative factor. To further
emphasizetheappropriatenessofthisapproach,wealsocomparedtheestimationresultsof







perform regressions including thewavesof2002and2007only.Furthermore,becauseof
possiblechangesoftheimpactonperceptionoffinancialsecurityduetotheintroductionof
the statutory LTC insurance,we also consider interactioneffectsbetweenour considered
variablesandthewavedummies.Themeasureddifference inthe impactovertime isalso
known asdifferenceͲinͲdifferenceestimation.Anoverview about this issue isprovided in
Bertrandetal.(2004)andLechner(2011).Doingthis,weareabletoobservechangesinthe
relationship between independent and dependent variables. This is especially relevant as
the introductionof statutory LTC insurancemay change the impactof a variable (as also




notprovidethesignificance levelsoftheoveralleffects (i.e.the impactofan independent
variablefortherespectiveyear).Hence,wewouldnotacquireinformationontheabsolute
significanceof theanalyzedvariables,asasignificantchangedoesnotnecessarilyhave to




Before looking at the results regarding the endogenous variable, table 2 and 3 present
summarystatisticsofallconsidered(dependentandindependent)variables.Table2displays
meanvalues(andfractionsincaseofdummyvariablesrespectively)andtheoverallaswell










overall within  overall within
dependentvariable 0.0017 0.9346 0.5060 econ.development 2.2281 0.6196 0.3493
experience† 0.0439 0.2049 0.1018 single† 0.1126 0.3161 0.1258
nobenefits† 0.0150 0.1217 0.0538 married†‡ 0.6623 0.4751 0.1701
benefits† 0.0275 0.1635 0.0598 widowed† 0.0476 0.2129 0.0797
schoolyears 11.9089 2.6524 0.5070 partner† 0.1614 0.3679 0.1874
politicalinterest 2.3051 0.8088 0.3258 divorced† 0.0161 0.1260 0.0676
econ.situation 1.9311 0.6923 0.3376 employed†‡ 0.5473 0.4978 0.2235
children 0.8982 1.1208 0.4953 selfͲemployed† 0.0614 0.2401 0.1002
assets† 0.8965 0.3047 0.1582 unemployed† 0.0606 0.2385 0.1411
assets(value) 19,322.54 102,930.00 46,667.93 outoflabourforce† 0.3308 0.4705 0.2027
debt(value) 3,013.58 35,904.17 22,548.11 health 3.3801 0.9442 0.4354
mortgage(value) 19,844.39 53,763.06 19,866.49 persons 2.8101 1.2831 0.4940
realestate† 0.5072 0.5000 0.1792 sex† 0.4841 0.4998 0
realestate(value) 96,150.25 161,535.30 49,086.49 age 47.8427 16.3664 3.5067
income 2,744.84 1,883.94 905.62 priv.LTCinsurance† 0.1133 0.3170 0.1010
†binaryvariable:meanvalueequalsthefractionofindividualswiththerespectivecharacteristic
‡basecategoryinregressionanalysis     

Table2shows that theaverageageofoursample isnearly48anddividedalmostequally






from statutory LTC insurance. As stated in the subsectionMethod, thewithinͲindividual
variation is generally smaller than the overall variation. Most importantly, the overall
variationof schoolyears ismore than five timeshigher compared to thewithinͲindividual











overall 1992 1997 2002 2007
1 0.28 0.46 0.26 0.19 0.31 0.14 0.28 0.10 0.04
2 0.29 0.23 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.13
3 0.28 0.17 0.30 0.32 0.26 0.29 0.21 0.33 0.34
4 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.08 Ͳ Ͳ 0.41
5 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 Ͳ Ͳ Ͳ 0.09

Withregardtoourdependentvariable,table3showsageneralpositivetrendinperception
of financialsecuritybetween1992and2002andadecline (comparedwith2002) in2007.
Furthermore, it can be seen that almost half of all respondents classify their perceived





group variables experiencewith LTC, having children, political interest, having assets and
econ.situation.Suchachangecanalsobeobservedforeducationin2002.Thedifferencefor



















and random effects estimations in case of considering all waves. Columns (1) and (3)





respective interaction effect. For example, the overall effect of experience in 1997 equals the sum of Ͳ












































































Variables  Coefficients Overalleffects Coefficients Overalleffects
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
         
experience  Ͳ0.160** (0.069) Ͳ0.160** (0.069) Ͳ0.130*** (0.046) Ͳ0.130*** (0.046)
×1997  0.091 (0.079) Ͳ0.069 (0.058) 0.088 (0.062) Ͳ0.041 (0.044)
×2002  0.224*** (0.079) 0.063 (0.047) 0.158*** (0.055) 0.029 (0.032)
×2007  0.272*** (0.079) 0.112** (0.044) 0.199*** (0.055) 0.069** (0.032)
         
politicalinterest 0.006 (0.017) 0.006 (0.017) Ͳ0.001 (0.013) Ͳ0.001 (0.013)
×1997  0.015 (0.020) 0.021 (0.016) 0.005 (0.017) 0.004 (0.012)
×2002  0.025 (0.019) 0.031** (0.013) 0.011 (0.015) 0.010 (0.008)
×2007  0.017 (0.020) 0.024* (0.014) Ͳ0.005 (0.015) Ͳ0.006 (0.009)
         
schoolyears  Ͳ0.008 (0.008) Ͳ0.008 (0.008) Ͳ0.029*** (0.004) Ͳ0.029*** (0.004)
×1997  Ͳ0.004 (0.006) Ͳ0.011 (0.008) Ͳ0.002 (0.005) Ͳ0.031*** (0.004)
×2002  0.002 (0.006) Ͳ0.006 (0.007) 0.011** (0.005) Ͳ0.018*** (0.002)
×2007  0.017*** (0.006) 0.009 (0.007) 0.023*** (0.005) Ͳ0.005* (0.002)
         
econ.situation  Ͳ0.043** (0.019) Ͳ0.043** (0.019) Ͳ0.132*** (0.014) Ͳ0.132*** (0.014)
×1997  Ͳ0.139*** (0.023) Ͳ0.182*** (0.018) Ͳ0.135*** (0.019) Ͳ0.267*** (0.014)
×2002  Ͳ0.107*** (0.022) Ͳ0.150*** (0.014) Ͳ0.112*** (0.016) Ͳ0.244*** (0.010)
×2007  Ͳ0.098*** (0.022) Ͳ0.141*** (0.015) Ͳ0.095*** (0.017) Ͳ0.227*** (0.010)
         
assets Ͳ0.073 (0.054) Ͳ0.073 (0.054) 0.046 (0.038) 0.046 (0.038)
×1997  0.148** (0.063) 0.075* (0.040) Ͳ0.010 (0.048) 0.036 (0.030)
×2002  0.125** (0.061) 0.052 (0.032) 0.006 (0.043) 0.052** (0.022)
×2007  0.098 (0.060) 0.025 (0.029) 0.001 (0.043) 0.047** (0.020)
         
realestate  Ͳ0.044 (0.029) Ͳ0.044 (0.029) 0.053*** (0.020) 0.053*** (0.020)
×1997  0.023 (0.030) Ͳ0.021 (0.027) Ͳ0.011 (0.025) 0.042** (0.019)
×2002  0.035 (0.029) Ͳ0.009 (0.023) Ͳ0.005 (0.023) 0.047*** (0.013)
×2007  0.011 (0.031) Ͳ0.033 (0.024) Ͳ0.020 (0.024) 0.033** (0.014)
         
children  0.059*** (0.014) 0.059*** (0.014) 0.052*** (0.011) 0.052*** (0.011)
×1997  Ͳ0.072*** (0.015) Ͳ0.013 (0.014) Ͳ0.055*** (0.013) Ͳ0.003 (0.011)
×2002  Ͳ0.091*** (0.016) Ͳ0.032** (0.013) Ͳ0.075*** (0.012) Ͳ0.023*** (0.009)
×2007  Ͳ0.079*** (0.018) Ͳ0.020 (0.015) Ͳ0.057*** (0.013) Ͳ0.005 (0.010)
         
Observations  36,201 49,397
Noofindividuals: 14,467 27,663
RͲsquared:  0.081 0.148
IndividualFE:  Yes No
YearFE  Yes Yes
Controls:income,employmentstatus,familystatus,perceptionofhealthstatus,priv.LTCinsurance,numberof
personsinhousehold,worriedabouteconomicdevelopment,sexandage(onlyincaseofrandomeffectsestimation)
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1;standarderrorsinparenthesis    

Table5providesasubͲanalysisofthefixedandrandomeffectsapproaches(waves2002and








Table5:Resultsof fixed (column5,6 and7) and random effects (column 8,9 and10) approach
(2002–2007)
  Coefficients Coefficients
variables  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
experience 0.104* Ͳ Ͳ 0.062** Ͳ Ͳ
 (0.054) (0.025) 
nobenefits Ͳ Ͳ0.040 Ͳ0.041 Ͳ Ͳ0.143*** Ͳ0.135***
  (0.076) (0.076) (0.040) (0.040)
benefits Ͳ 0.209*** 0.209*** Ͳ 0.178*** 0.185***
  (0.068) (0.068) (0.031) (0.031)
politicalinterest 0.024 0.025 0.024 Ͳ0.006 Ͳ0.006 Ͳ0.008
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
schoolyears 0.036** 0.037** 0.037** Ͳ0.013*** Ͳ0.013*** Ͳ0.014***
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
econ.situation Ͳ0.140*** Ͳ0.140*** Ͳ0.139*** Ͳ0.249*** Ͳ0.249*** Ͳ0.240***
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
assets 0.019 0.024 Ͳ 0.047*** 0.048*** Ͳ
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.016) (0.016) 
ln(assets) Ͳ Ͳ 0.0005* Ͳ Ͳ 0.0009***
  (0.0003) (0.00015)
ln(debt) Ͳ Ͳ Ͳ0.00002 Ͳ Ͳ Ͳ0.0004**
  (0.0003) (0.0002)
realestate Ͳ0.031 Ͳ0.030 Ͳ 0.044*** 0.043*** Ͳ
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.012) (0.011) 
ln(realestate) Ͳ Ͳ 0.00002 Ͳ Ͳ 0.0014***
  (0.0005) (0.0002)
ln(mortgage) Ͳ Ͳ Ͳ0.0004 Ͳ Ͳ Ͳ0.0014***
  (0.0005) (0.0002)
children Ͳ0.001 Ͳ0.001 0.0002 Ͳ0.00004 Ͳ0.0002 Ͳ0.0006
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations  17,328 17,328 17,328 29,814 29,810 29,810
Noofindividuals: 8,664 8,664 8,664 21,150 21,150 21,150
RͲsquared: 0.093 0.094 0.094 0.161 0.162 0.164
IndividualFE: Yes Yes Yes No No No






















These findings support the hypothesis of a possible underestimation of the financial
consequences by uninformed individuals in the absence of statutory LTC insurance. Both
effects (fixed and random effects) are similarwith respect tomagnitude and significance
level,whichadditionallysupportsthisreasoning.Thepicturesignificantlychangeswiththe
introductionofstatutoryLTCinsurance.Thestatisticallysignificantchangesinperceptionsin
2002 and 2007 provide some indication that perceptions are differentwhen a statutory
insuranceschemeexists(seealsoLangeetal.2012).Furthermore,thestatisticallysignificant
and positive overall effects in 2007 (see table 4, column 2 and 4) are remarkable. One
explanation for these effects could be the alreadymentionedmedia effect (Bomlitz and
Brezis 2008, Fischhoff et al. 1981 and Viscusi 1990), combinedwithmedia attention for
statutoryLTCinsuranceasmentionedabove.Individualswithalowlevelofinformationare
probablymore affected bymassmedia. This resultwould also be in linewith observed
increasing positive interaction effects caused by increasingly negative news about the
prospectivefinancialproblemsoftheLTCinsurancescheme.However,aswearenotableto
estimateadirecteffectofmassmedia,our resultsand the interpretation cannotprovide
sufficientevidence forestablishing a relationshipbetweenmassmedia andperceptionof
financialsecurityincaseofneedingLTC.
Amore detailed analysis is provided in columns (6), (7), (9) and (10) of table 5,where
experienceisreplacedbythevariablesbenefitsandnobenefits.Whilehavingexperiencebut
not receiving benefits from statutory LTC insurance results in a negative effect (which is





on perception of financial security (and not just the fact that a familymember in the
household is dependent). This result further supports our assumption that direct
information regarding financial consequences in the event of needing LTC has a strong
impactonperceivedfinancialsecurity.Ourresultsconcerningexperienceareconsistentwith
resultsofLangeetal.(2012),whofoundapositiveeffectofexperience(intermsofdoctor
visitsandhospitalstay)ontheassessmentof financialsecurity intheeventof illness.This




Analyzing the effect of schoolyears, the coefficients are negative in 1992 under both
approaches (table 4) and furthermore statistically significant in the random effects
estimation (column 3). While interaction effects are slightly negative and statistically
insignificant in1997,theyarepositiveandmostlystatisticallysignificant in2002and2007.
Only the interaction coefficient of thewithinͲindividual estimation in 2007 is statistically
significant(p<0.01).
Analyzing the overall effects, all coefficients are negative except for thewithinͲindividual
estimationeffectin2007.Asexpected,alloveralleffectsofwithinͲindividualestimationsare
statistically insignificant, probably due to the already mentioned low withinͲindividual
standarddeviation(seetable2).Thepictureisdifferentundertherandomeffectsapproach.
Thecoefficientsarenegativeandstatisticallysignificantinallyears,althoughthemagnitude
reducesover time,probablydue toageneral increase in the levelof informationpublicly
available.Thesefindingsaretosomeextentsupportedbytheresultsintable5.Whereasthe
coefficients are positive and statistically significant (p<0.05) under the fixed effects























The impactofpolitical interestonperceived financial security is somewhatdifferent than
that of education. In the fixed effects approach, all overall and interaction effects are
positive(seetable4).Furthermore,theoveralleffectin2002(2007)isstatisticallysignificant
atthe5%level(10%level).Column(3)showsanegativeoveralleffectin1992andpositive
(negative) interactioneffectsandoveralleffects in1997and2002 (2007) for the random
effectsestimation.However,andmoreimportantly,alloveralleffectsoftherandomeffects
approach are statistically insignificant. The results of political interest do not support
hypothesis3.









security in 1992 for both the fixed and random effects approach (table 4). This finding
supports our hypothesis. Furthermore, all interaction terms are negative and statistically




coefficients in 2002 are negative and statistically significant (p<0.05 for fixed effects
approachandp<0.01 for randomeffectsapproach).Additionally,all coefficientsare small
andstatisticallyinsignificantinthesubanalysis(seetable5).
This result supports our hypothesis that individuals who have children assess financial
security in case of need for LTC more positive. Furthermore, the positive impact on
perception of financial security also indicates that children are substitutes for
(supplementary) LTC insurance demand if no statutory LTC insurance exists. After the
introduction of statutory LTC insurance, the positive impact of children on perception of
financial security cancelsout.One reason couldbe that childrenno longerhave a strong
effectonfinancialsecurityas individualsarefinanciallysecuredbystatutoryLTC insurance.
In the context of insurance demand, Courbage and Roudaut (2008) found evidence that
havingchildrenpositivelyinfluencesthelikelihoodofhavingprivateLTCinsurance.Theyalso
argue that altruistic behavior or bequest motives could be a reason for observing
comparably higher insurance demand.However, there need not exist a conflict between
both results,asaltruismmaynothavean impacton the individualperceptionof financial
security in the event of LTC insurance.More precisely, the results indicate that having
childrenleadstoamorepositiveperceptionoffinancialsecurityandthereforetoanegative
impacton LTC insurancedemand.Evenunder thisassumption, thealtruisticeffectwould

















andpositivebutstatistically insignificanteffects in2002and2007 (column2).Considering
the random effects approach, the interaction coefficients are negative (positive) in 1997







the1% level incolumn10).Comparedwiththestatisticallysignificanteffect inthewithinͲ
individual estimation, the dummy variable assets leads to a positive but statistically
insignificanteffect(seecolumns5and6). Insummary,hypothesis5canbeconfirmedonly
indicativelywhen analyzing theeffectof financial assets, as the coefficientof thewithinͲ
individualestimatorisonlysignificantatthe10%level.
Anothersourceofassetsisrepresentedbythevariablerealestate.Lookingattheresultsin
table4, thecoefficient for1992 isnegativeandstatistically insignificant incolumn (1)and
positiveand statistically significant (p<0.01) incolumn (3).The interactioneffectsarealso
quitedifferent.Whiletheinteractioneffectsinthefixedeffectsestimationarepositiveand
statistically insignificant, they are slightly positive and also statistically insignificant in the
randomeffectsestimation.Asaresult, theoveralleffects from1997 to2007arenegative
andstatisticallyinsignificantincolumn(2)andpositiveandstatisticallysignificantincolumn
(4). These results are consistent with the coefficients in table 5, being negative and
statistically insignificant in columns (5) and (6) and positive and statistically significant
(p<0.01)incolumns(8)and(9).
Weobserve similar results for the variable ln(real estate) (see table5); a relatively small
positiveandstatisticallyinsignificantcoefficientincaseofthewithinͲindividualestimationas
well as a positive and statistically significant coefficient (p<0.01) in case of the random
effects estimation. Focusing on the withinͲindividual estimation, we do not find strong





the low liquidityof realestate.Whilesome financialassetsalsocanhavea longmaturity,
they are (on average)more liquid. This consideration further emphasizes the impact of
financialassetsontheindividualperceptionoffinancialsecurity.
The variable ln(mortgage) in table 5 leads to the following results: The variable has the
expected negative sign in both approaches. Nevertheless, the effect is statistically
insignificantincaseofthewithinͲindividualestimationandstatisticallysignificant(p<0.01)in
caseoftherandomeffectsestimation.Focusingonthesignsoftheeffects,hypothesis5can




similar to the coefficients of ln(mortgage). However, the impact on the perception of




and not significant in the withinͲindividual estimation we could not observe a strong
confirmationofhypothesis5withregardtoln(debt).
The relatively smallandnonͲsignificantcoefficients (in thewithinͲindividualestimation)of
ln(mortgage) and ln(debt)mightbe causedby the attitude that (with respect to financial
security)itdoesnotmatteriftheindividualis indebtedorjustdoesnotaccumulatecapital
because of other reasons.However, comparing the coefficients,mortgages have a three
timesstrongereffectrelativetoplaindebt.Thiscouldbeanindicationthatindebtednessis
morelikelytoplayaroleontheperceivedfinancialsecurityfordebtwithlongmaturity(like
mortgages). Ifso,oneargument for thenegative relationshipcouldconcern the increased
financialburdenofpayinginterestondebtandbeingLTCdependent.
Tosumup the results regardinghypothesis5, financialaspectsonlypartlymatterwhen it
comes to theperceptionof financial security in theeventof LTCneed. Furthermore, the
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positiveandsignificantrandomeffectsregression indicates,thatthere isastronger impact
betweenindividualscomparedtotheimpactwithinindividuals.15
WithrespecttopossibleeffectsonLTC insurancedemandtheseresultsmightentailthata
better financial security only due to higher assets could reduce the demand for LTC
insurance (e.g. incaseof financialassets).However, therealsoexistsadirect relationship
between assets and LTC insurance demand.More precise, the value of assets could also
haveapositiveeffectonLTC insurancedemandbecause insurancecoveragecanprovidea
protectionfortheindividual´swealth(seeBrownandFinkelstein2009).Takingbotheffects
intoaccount,the influenceonLTC insurancedemand isambiguous(boththedirectionand
thelinearity)asitdependsontwocountervailingeffects.Thiscouldbeanexplanationfora
bellshapedrelationshipbetweenassetsandLTCinsurancedemand(seeBernet2004)which







Concerning the independent variables,wewant to highlight that the value of assets and
debtarenotavailableforthewholedataset.Inaddition,datawithrespecttobenefitsfrom
statutory LTC insurance arenot availablebefore2002.Thus,we areonly able touse the
wholerangeofinformationforasubanalysisoftheyears2002and2007.
As alreadymentioned,wewerenot able to estimate adirect relationshipbetweenmass
media and perception of financial security in the event of needing LTC. Therefore the
interpretationofour results regarding schoolyearsandpolitical interest shouldbe treated
with caution.Knowledgeabout the relationshipbetweenmassmediaand riskperception
mightrevealapossiblesourceofaninformationbias.Therefore,furtherresearchintothese
matterscouldshedsomemorelightonthisissue.






financialsecurity.Nevertheless,as the fractionof individualsholdingasupplementaryLTC
insurance isverysmall–only2.15%ofall insuredpersons in thestatutoryLTC insurance
(seeGDV2011andtheFederalMinistryofHealth2011)–theresultingbiasshouldbevery
small.
Concerningourdependent variable,wewish to stress its subjective character,which can
lead to a heterogeneous interpretation between individuals. The use of the fixed effects
approach, however, reduces this problem with heterogeneity. In contrast, the taken
approach increases the standard errors (see Allison 2009) because it only takes withinͲ
individual variation into account. Especially in case of education, the precision of the
estimates is very low due to a lowwithinͲindividual variation. Some of the inconclusive





significance. Itmighteven result in the situation thatonlyeffects close to the considered
wavesaremeasuredappropriately.Moreprecisely,shocks(e.g.,unemploymentordivorce)




used an unbalanced panel for our analysis. In addition, attrition can lead to a serious
problem inpaneldata.However, in thecaseof the fixedeffects regressions, this isonlya
problemwhenselectionislinkedtoidiosyncraticerrors(seeWooldridge2002).Tocheckfor
apossibleattritionprobleminourdataset,weconductedasimpletestsuggestedbyNijman
andVerbeek (1992)andWooldridge (2002).Theresultingselection indicator isstatistically
insignificant(pͲvalueof0.110),demonstratingthatthere isnostrongevidenceforattrition
inouranalysis (seeWooldridge2002).The selection indicator further reduces (pͲvalueof
0.553) when only considering the years 2002 to 2007 for the conducted subͲanalysis.
Furthermore,similarresultsfordifferentestimations(table4and5)supporttherobustness









conditional on the risk occurring. In the literature, this factormaking up expected costs
seems to be insufficiently researched or even ignored. We start closing this gap by
investigatingabroad spectrumofhypotheses.Mostof thehypothesesdeduced fromour
initial research question found some support in the dataset analyzed. Experience with
financial consequences for affected people, in particular, shows a strong impact on
perception of financial security. This findingmight be due to individualswith experience
havingintimateknowledgeaboutfinancialconsequencesofsuchanevent.Thisconjectureis
also supported by other findings in our analysis. Education has a negative impact on
perceptionoffinancialsecuritybutthatseemstodecreasewithtime.




beneeded tobolster social safetynets.This implication isespecially interesting forpolicy
makers, who may adapt information and communication strategies to affect adverse
insurancedemandbehavior.Resultingnegativeeffectscould leadtosocietal inefficiencies.





In total, some experience and a solid economic situation, paired with more general
informationonthetopicdueto increasedpresence inthemedia,werefoundtoresult ina
more positive perception of the financial consequences of needing LTC. This finding is
consistentwith findingsby Sjöberg (2003).Pure supplyof information isnot sufficient to




one hand, it can be observed that additional objective information can lead to amore
accurate perception of risk. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the presentation of
information is important. If the presentation of information is performed poorly or in a
biased fashion – e.g., presentingworstͲcase scenarios during an election campaign – the
opposite effect could prevail, on average resulting in even less accurate perceptions.
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